“投资”的定义：一条可能产生未知后果的附带意见（瑞士案例）

更新时间：2017-11-08 13:27:39   张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1335次

几个月前，Naomi Briercliffe和Stephanie Grace Hawes发表了一篇非常有趣且发人深思的文章，其中就国内法院对管辖权异议的审理提出了他们认为最合适的审查标准。

在那篇文章中，关于撤销投资条约裁决（有关管辖权的裁决）的申请，Naomi和Stephanie考虑了新加坡上诉法院和瑞士最高法院分别作出的两份判决。

在介绍了这些法院所采用的审查标准后（即新加坡上诉法院采用“重新审查（denovoreview）”标准，该标准需要对所有的事实和法律问题进行重新审查；瑞士最高法院则采用“充分审查权（full power of review）”标准，审查范围仅限于与仲裁庭管辖权有关的法律论据），两位作者认为，与新加坡法院相比，瑞士最高法院的审查方法更值得青睐。

虽然我赞同两位作者的观点，即认为“重新审查(de novo review)”的标准可能有些离经叛道且可能导致潜在的程序滥用，但我认为还有一个要点Naomi 和Stephanie的文章中几乎没有提及，可在我看来确实会引起某些挑战和合理关注。

这些关注源于瑞士最高法院的一个附带意见，其影响和现实意义尚不明朗。为便于讨论，我先对瑞士最高法院的裁定进行概括。

“Recofiv the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”案

2013年，Recofi（一家法国公司）对越南提起仲裁，并要求越南政府支付一系列未清偿的合同价款，这些合同由Recofi和一些私营或国营的越南公司分别签订，涉及食品与其他基本商品的供应。Recofi认为《法越双边投资协议（BIT）》明确承认，“对金钱或对经济活动的主张”都可以视为“投资”，另外，许多裁决都确证对“投资”采用广泛解释。

仲裁庭拒绝行使管辖权，原因是根据适用的双边投资协议（BIT），本案缺少“投资”。仲裁庭认为，金钱主张被列为受保护投资（根据《法越双边投资协议》第1（1）条的非详尽列举）的这一事实，是证明合格投资存在的必要非充分条件。在考虑了双边投资协议的对象和目的之后，仲裁庭认为，为了从双边投资协议的保护中受益，协议范围里的资产必须投资在东道国境内并符合所适用的国家法律法规的规定。按照这些原则，仲裁庭查明Recofi未曾参与越南境内的任何食品项目，也未能证明这样的项目曾经存在。

Recofi向瑞士最高法院请求撤销上诉裁决。瑞士最高法院驳回了该请求并维持原裁决。

根据《维也纳公约》第31条，最高法院对《法越双边投资协议》第1（1）条（关于“投资”的定义）进行分析并认为申请人的活动在适用的双边投资协议中不构成一项投资。

对于Recofi提出的国际公认的“投资”定义（涉及金钱主张的投资），瑞士最高法院在其论证理由中驳回了Recofi的论点并澄清道，在缺乏国际公认的“投资”定义时，《双边投资协议》的条款应在涉及的单个BIT的基础上进行解释，而不是通过参考其他（没有约束力的）判定。

出人意料的是，瑞士最高法院在确认会全面审查仲裁庭的管辖权问题之后，又在其裁定中添加如下附带意见：

“……因《双边投资协议》第1（1）条所指“投资”一词由三位仲裁员定义，他们在该领域的经验和国际声望都由双方当事人认可，所以瑞士最高法院在无正当理由的情况下，不会背离该领域权威专家对该术语的一致解释。”

这个（有趣的）附带意见体现了法庭对仲裁庭调查结果的（异常）尊重程度，但该意见至今未在瑞士仲裁界得到广泛关注。然而，在请求瑞士最高法院撤销有关管辖权问题的投资条约裁决时，这个意见可能会对瑞士判例法的演变产生深远影响。

讨论

在对撤销仲裁裁决的申请进行审查时，一般来说瑞士最高法院会受到仲裁裁决中事实认定的约束。因此，瑞士最高法院（与其他州法院不同）不会审查仲裁庭对事实的认定。瑞士最高法院一再重申，其任务不是重审此案，而只是对撤销裁决的法定理由存在与否进行考虑。然而，一般规则中还有一个例外：如果存在《瑞士国际私法法》第190（2）条规定的撤销裁决的情形，最高法院可以对事实认定进行审查。例如，申请人可以设法证明仲裁庭作出的事实认定建立在损害申请人审理权或违反公共程序性政策的基础之上。

在对撤销仲裁裁决（关于管辖权的裁定）的申请进行审查时，若该裁决涉及对管辖权的裁定（如Recofi案的情况），瑞士最高法院仍然有权对涉及仲裁庭管辖权的法律论据进行充分审查，而不会受到仲裁庭作出的事实认定的限制。换言之，瑞士最高法院的审查不会受到任何方式（例如，仲裁庭的裁决结果或者理由）的限制或阻碍。瑞士最高法院在先前的判决中一再重申这一原则。

在Recofi案的附带意见中，瑞士最高法院似乎打开了背离这个原则可能性的大门。换言之，按照瑞士最高法院的说法，尽管其对于仲裁庭管辖权的判定拥有无限的自由裁量权，但若无正当理由，最高法院不会对权威专家仲裁员一致作出的司法裁决进行干涉，特别是在法律观念尚未确定的投资领域。

这份声明不仅违背了瑞士最高法院的原则（即最高法院对于仲裁庭作出的管辖权裁定享有充分的审查权），还引起了其他疑问：最高法院在未来判决中将如何定义“权威专家”仲裁员？如果作出的裁决不一致会导致何种后果？最后，如果其中一位仲裁员提出不同意见，最高法院是否会采取不同做法？

这个问题在未来的案件中难免会再次出现，至于最高法院是否会确认、澄清或者干脆废除这一声明（以明确或默示的方式）还不得而知。在我看来，第三个选项（即废除这个附带意见）具有明显优势，因为这种做法符合撤销程序（基于管辖权问题）适用的法律原则，也可以避免法院对涉及管辖权问题的条约和商业裁决采取不同做法。至少，对该声明的澄清将受到欢迎。

【英文版】

Definition of “investment”: an intriguing obiter dictum of the Swiss Supreme Court with unknown consequences

A few months ago, Naomi Briercliffe (a talented former colleague of mine) and Stephanie Grace Hawes posted on this blog a very interesting and thought-provoking analysis of what they consider to be the most appropriate standard of review when jurisdictional challenges to investment treaty awards are filed before national courts.

In their post, Naomi and Stephanie considered two decisions, rendered by the Court of Appeal of Singapore and the Swiss Supreme Court respectively, in the context of setting aside applications filed against treaty awards on jurisdiction.

After presenting the standard of review applied by these courts (that is, de novoreview,entailing a fresh examination of all of the factual and legal issues (Court of Appeal of Singapore), and full power of review, but limited to the legal arguments relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Swiss Supreme Court)),the two authors argued that the approach of the Swiss Supreme Court was to be preferred to that of the Singaporean courts.

While I share the authors’ view that a de novo review probably goes too far and is likely to expose the challenge process to potential abuse, there is one important element that remains almost unaccounted for in Naomi and Stephanie’s post, and which does, in my opinion, raise certain challenges and legitimate concerns.

At the root of these concerns is an obiter dictum of the Swiss Supreme Court, the impact and practical significance of which remains unclear. For the purpose of this discussion, I begin by summarising the context in which the decision of the Swiss Supreme Court was made.

Recofi v the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

In 2013, Recofi (a French corporation), initiated arbitration proceedings against Vietnam. It was claiming outstanding contractual payments, following the conclusion of a series of contracts relating to the supply of food products and other basic commodities, with both private and state-controlled Vietnamese companies. Recofi alleged that the France-Vietnam bilateral investment treaty (BIT) explicitly recognised “claims to money or to any other performance of an economic value” as “investments”, and that numerous awards confirmed a broad interpretation of the term investment.

The arbitral tribunal declined to exercise jurisdiction for lack of an “investment” under the applicable BIT. The tribunal held that the mere fact that monetary claims are included in the non-exhaustive list of protected investments under Article 1(1) of the France-Vietnam BIT is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for establishing the existence of a qualifying investment. After considering the object and purpose of the BIT, the arbitral tribunal held that, in order to benefit from the protection of the BIT, the assets falling within the scope of the BIT had to be invested in the territory of the host state, and in accordance with applicable national laws and regulation. In light of those principles, the arbitral tribunal found that Recofi had not participated in any food program in Vietnam and that it had failed to prove that any such program ever existed.

Recofi filed an application before the Swiss Supreme Court to have the award set aside. The Swiss Supreme Court rejected the application and upheld the award.

With reference to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention,the Supreme Court embarked on an analysis of Article 1(1) of the France-Vietnam BIT (defining investment) and concluded that the claimant’s activities did not constitute an investment in the sense of the applicable BIT.

In its reasoning, the Swiss Supreme Court rejected Recofi’s argument of an internationally accepted(broad) definition of investment covering monetary claims. The Supreme Court made clear that, in the absence of an internationally accepted definition of investment, BIT provisions should be interpreted on the basis of the individual BIT in question, and not by reference to other (non-binding) decisions.

Surprisingly, the Swiss Supreme Court added the following obiter commentin its decision, just after confirming that it would examine the issue of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction with full power of review:

 “… as the term investment set out in Art. 1(1)of the BIT was defined by three arbitrators, the experience in the field and the international reputation of whom both Parties recognise, the Swiss Supreme Court will not depart from the unanimous interpretation of the term given by leading experts in the field without reasonable cause”.

This (intriguing) obiter dictum, which shows an (unusual) degree of deference and regard to an arbitral tribunal’s findings, has received very little attention in the (Swiss) arbitration community so far. However, it might have a far-reaching impact on the evolution of Swiss case law when challenges to investment treaty awards on jurisdiction are brought before the Swiss Supreme Court, as explained below.

Discussion

As a general rule, in the context of setting aside proceedings of arbitral awards, the Swiss Supreme Court is bound by the factual findings of the arbitral award under review. As aresult, the Swiss Supreme Court (unlike other state courts) does not review the arbitral tribunal’s findings of fact. The Swiss Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that its mission is not to re-try the case, but only to consider whether any of the statutory grounds for setting aside the award exists. There is, however, one exception to that general rule: the Supreme Court can review the findings of fact when those findings are tainted by a ground for setting aside within the meaning of Article 190(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act. For instance, the petitioner can seek to show that the findings of fact have been established by the arbitral tribunal in violation of the petitioner’s right to be heard or in violation of public procedural policy.

In the context of setting aside proceedings brought against an arbitral award on jurisdiction (as that was the case inthe Recofi matter), the Swiss Supreme Court has nevertheless full power to review the legal arguments relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, but faces the same limitations as those described above with respect to the findings of fact by the arbitral tribunal. Put differently, the review of the Swiss Supreme Court is not limited or precluded in any way by, for instance, the findings (or reasoning) of the arbitral tribunal. This principle was consistently reaffirmed by the Swiss Supreme Court in prior decisions.

In the obiter dictum in Recofi,the Swiss Supreme Court appears to have opened the door to the possibility of departing from that principle. In other words, according to the Swiss Supreme Court, despite its unlimited discretion to assess the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, it would not, without reasonable cause, interfere with the jurisdictional decisions of leading expert arbitrators who rendered a unanimous decision, in particular with regard to the undetermined legal notion of investment.

Not only does this statement seem to go against the principle that the Swiss Supreme Court should have complete and full power to review the arbitral tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction, it raises other queries: how would the Supreme Court define “leading expert” arbitrators in future decisions? What if the decision is not made unanimously? Mirroring that last observation, would the Supreme Court adopt a different approach if a dissenting opinion is filed by one of the arbitrators?

This issue will inevitably crop up again in future cases, and there is considerable uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court will confirm, clarify or simply rescind (expressly or implicitly) that statement. In my opinion, the third option (rescission of that obiter observation would have the (clear) advantage of being in line with the legal principles that apply in the context of setting aside proceedings on jurisdiction.It would also avoid creating a difference of approach in respect of treaty and commercial awards on jurisdiction. A clarification of that statementat least would be welcomed.