英国法院拒绝执行已由俄罗斯法院撤销的仲裁裁决（英国案例）

更新时间：2017-11-09 12:00:08  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：2994次

英国法院最近作出的一项判决再次表明，申请人必须满足非常高的要求才能让英国法院执行已由管辖地法院撤销的仲裁裁决。在Maximov v OJSC Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat案中，英国法院拒绝执行由俄罗斯联邦工业商会的国际商事仲裁庭作出的仲裁裁决。

莫斯科商业法院已裁定撤销了这个仲裁裁决，该裁定随后得到了莫斯科区联邦商业法院和俄罗斯联邦最高商业法院的支持。

尽管俄罗斯法院的判决理由遭到了一些尖锐的批判，英国法院认为撤销仲裁裁决的决议并不是特别“极端和反常”以至于只能认定为存在实际偏见。

一、案情介绍

这个上诉申请源于一桩仲裁案件，申请人为一名俄罗斯商人，被申请人公司主要由另一名俄罗斯商人拥有并控制。争议焦点在于股权转让协议中购买价格的计算，被申请人同意收购申请人持有的OJSC Maxi-Group（一家俄罗斯冶金企业）50%加一股的股权。俄罗斯联邦工业仲裁会（ICAC）的仲裁员作出了对申请人有利的仲裁裁决，涉案金额89亿卢布。

被申请人请求莫斯科商业法院撤销仲裁裁决并得到了该法院的支持。随后，申请人向俄罗斯上级法院的上诉全部以失败告终。因此，申请人试图在包括在法国、荷兰和英国在内的多个欧盟国家请求执行仲裁裁决。

在英国法院，Burton J 认为本案适用的检验标准是俄罗斯法院的决议是否过于极端和错误以至于只能认为该法院没有秉公办事。Burton J 认为表面上的偏见还不够充分，必须证明实际偏见的存在，即使缺乏偏见或腐败存在的直接证据，实际偏见也可以通过周围环境推断出来。因此，法官的判决理由集中于俄罗斯法院撤销仲裁裁决的理由分析。

莫斯科商业法院撤销仲裁裁决基于以下三个理由：

两位仲裁员未能披露其和专家证人之间的关系（不披露理由）；仲裁裁决和俄罗斯公共政策相悖（公共政策理由）；这是一起企业纠纷，因此不具有可仲裁性（不可仲裁性理由）。

Burton J严厉批判了这三个撤销裁决的理由并认为基于“不披露理由”的裁定是一个“无法忍受的结论”；基于“公共政策理由”的裁定“无可救药”；而基于“不可仲裁性”的裁定是“冒险的”且“具有争议”。此外，法官还对公共政策和不可仲裁性的理由表示担忧，认为这两个理由在俄罗斯法院初审时并未提及或讨论，而只在俄罗斯法官随后的书面理由中提及。

Burton J 似乎认同申请人的观点，但最终却表示更倾向于接受被申请人律师的主张，即认为俄罗斯法院的判决理由可以由其他理论解释而非仅能解释为法院对申请人的偏见。Burton J总结到，判决理由没有“过于极端和反常以至于只能归咎于对申请人的偏见。”

法官认为很重要的一点是，俄罗斯的一审判决是公开的，且并未被认为存在异常，因许多后来的案件都引用了这个判决结果。Burton J 认为俄罗斯法院对于仲裁员的批判似乎源于俄国法院一贯对待仲裁的消极态度，不能有力地证明偏见的存在。法官还指出，莫斯科商业法院拒绝基于欺诈指控而撤销裁决，该法院本可接受该指控理由，若其决心作出对申请人不利的认定。

二、英国法院的裁定

英国高等法院在Maximov案中遵循了英国法的做法，即在考虑撤销仲裁裁决时要参考英国法承认外国判决的一般原则（参见：Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry ofReligious Affairs of Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, 798）。因此，当事人通常能够依靠撤销仲裁裁决的外国判决，除非该判决违反了诚信、自然正义的基本原则和国内的公共政策观念。

Burton J还强调，若至少存在一个可争辩的论点表明裁决的撤销违反了自然正义，英国法院不应简单地接受外国法院已经撤销裁决的事实。

这点重申了Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company案中的判决理由。在该案件中，对于已经由莫斯科商业法院撤销的仲裁裁决（且撤销裁定得到上诉法院的支持），英国高等法院就仲裁裁决在原则上是否能够执行进行了考虑。该案中被申请人以“无中不能生有（ex nihilo nil fit）”原则进行抗辩，该法律理论认为如果仲裁裁决在仲裁地被撤销，则该裁决在法律上已经不复存在。高等法院认为“无中不能生有”原则不能适用于英国法律，因此并不能阻止已被仲裁地撤销的仲裁裁决的执行。相反，法院必须考虑是否可以承认裁决的效力，尽管该裁决已经被撤销。法院无须认可一个与诚信、自然公正和公共政策相悖的判决。

Maximov案的被申请人律师在其抗辩理由中也援引了“无中不能生有”原则。Burton J 认为不必对这个“有趣的观点”作出裁定，而是在附带评论中提到了Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company案。因此这个原则有待上级法院进行考虑。

三、结论

Maximov案的判决表明，申请人必须达到很高的门槛才能执行一个已由仲裁地法院撤销的仲裁裁决。若没有强有力的证据显示撤销裁决的判决违反了诚信的基本原则和国内的公共政策，仲裁裁决在英国法院的执行可能注定会失败。

当事人应当认识到英国法院不太愿意执行这些案件的仲裁裁决。在起草仲裁协议时，缔约双方应仔细考虑未来仲裁裁决的执行是否涉及在英国的资产，若涉及，则应考虑将英国作为仲裁地。当裁决已被仲裁地法院撤销之后，申请人须考虑是否存在有利证据能够证明撤销裁决的行为违反了基本的司法公正原则。若没有强有力的证据，申请人不妨放弃在英国执行裁决的意图。

【英文版】

English Court Denies Application to Enforce Russian Arbitral Award Set Asideby Russian Courts

By Jonathan Kelly, Adam Grant, Marina Zarubin

A recent decision by the English Court shows once again the very high bar that a claimant must reach to enforce an award that had been set aside by the court at the seat of jurisdiction. The judgment handed down in Maximov v OJSC Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat [2017] EWHC 1911(Comm) on 27 July 2017 denied an application to enforce an award issued by the International Commercial Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industryof the Russian Federation (“ICAC”).

The arbitration award had been set aside by a decision of the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, which was then upheld by the Federal Arbitrazh Court of Moscow District and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation.

Despite some trenchant criticism of the Russiancourts’ reasoning, the judge found that the set aside decision was not so “extreme and perverse” that it could only have been reached as a result of actual bias.

The Maximov Case

The application arose from an arbitration between claimant Nikolay Maximov, a Russian businessman, and the defendant company, majority owned and controlled by Russian businessman Vladimir Lisin. The dispute centered around the calculation of the purchase price under a sharepurchase agreement by which the defendant agreed to acquire the claimant’s 50% plus one share stake in OJSC Maxi-Group, a Russian metallurgical business. The ICAC arbitrators rendered an award of 8.9 billion rubles in favour of the claimant.

The defendant successfully applied to the Moscow Arbitrazh Court to have the award set aside. Following the set aside decision by the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, the claimant failed to overturn the decision on appeal to the higher Russian courts. The claimant then sought to enforce the arbitral award in multiple other jurisdictions in Europe, including France, the Netherlands, and England.

In the English court, Burton J held that the applicable test was whether the Russian courts’ decisions were so extreme and incorrect that the Russian courts could not have been acting in good faith. Burton J determined that apparent bias would not be sufficient and actual bias must be shown, although if direct evidence of bias or corruption were lacking, actual bias could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The judge’s reasoning therefore centered around an analysis of the Russian court decisions setting aside the arbitral award.

The Moscow Arbitrazh Court based its set aside decision on three grounds:

that two arbitrators failed to disclose their links to expert witnesses put forward by the claimant in the arbitration (the“Non-Disclosure Ground”);

that the award was in conflict with Russian public policy (the “Public Policy Ground”); and

that the dispute was a corporate dispute and was therefore not arbitrable (the “Non-Arbitrability Ground”).

Burton J severely criticised all three grounds for the set aside decision, referring to the decision on the Non-Disclosure Ground as an “unsupportable conclusion”, the decision on the Public Policy Ground as “hopeless” and the decision on the Non-Arbitrability Ground as “adventurous ”but “arguable”. The judge also expressed concern that the Public Policy Ground and the Non-Arbitrability Ground were “unfairly” not raised or argued before the first instance Russian court and were only referenced in the Russian judge’s subsequent written reasons.

Burton J appeared to agree with the claimant’s case, but ultimately said that he was more persuaded by counsel for the defendant who argued that the Russian Court’s reasoning can be explained other than by bias against the claimant. In a finding that appeared to be at odds with his assessment of the defendant’s case, Burton J concluded that the decisions were not “so extreme and perverse that they [could] only be ascribed to bias against the claimant”.

The judge found it significant that the Russian first instance judgment was public, and was not regarded as an outlier, since it was regularly followed by later judges. Burton J held that the Russian courts’ criticism of the arbitrators appeared to be rooted in the general negative treatment of arbitration by Russian courts in general and did not constitute cogent evidence of bias. The judge also noted that the Moscow Arbitrazh Court rejected allegations of fraud as a basis for setting aside the award, which it might have accepted if the court was determined to find against the claimant.

English Court Treatment of Arbitral Awards Set Aside at the Seat

The English High Court’s decision in Maximov followed the English law approach that decisions setting aside arbitral awards should be treated according to the ordinary principles for recognition of foreign judgments (see, e.g., Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, 798). A party will, therefore, generally be able to rely on a foreign decision setting aside an award unless that decision is found to be contrary to basic principles of honesty, natural justice and domestic concepts of public policy.

Burton J also stressed that the English court should not simply accept that a foreign court had set aside an arbitral award where there was at least an arguable case that the award had set aside in breach of natural justice.

This echoed the court’s reasoning in Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm). In that case, the English High Court considered whether an arbitral award could in principle been forced despite the set aside decision of the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, which was upheld on appeal. The defendant in that case pleaded the principle of exnihilo nil fit (or ‘nothing comes of nothing’), the legal theory that if an arbitral award is set aside in the seat of the arbitration, it ceases to existin a legal sense. The High Court held that there is no principle of ex nihilonil fit in English law precluding the enforcement of arbitral awards set aside at the seat. Instead, the court must consider whether an award can be given effect notwithstanding a set aside decision, and that it is not bound to recognise a decision contrary to the principles of honesty, natural justice,and public policy.

Сounsel for the defendant in Maximov also pleaded the principle of ex nihilo nil fit. Burton J said he did not have to decide “this interesting point” but made obiter remarks echoing Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company. The ex nihilo nil fit principle has yet to be considered on appeal by higher courts.

Conclusion

The Maximov judgment shows that a claimant must surmount a very high bar to enforce an arbitral award that has been set asideby a court at the seat of the arbitration. Absent cogent evidence that the set aside decision offends basic principles of honesty and domestic public policy, the arbitral award may be doomed at the enforcement stage before English courts.

Parties should be aware of the English courts’ reluctance to enforce arbitral awards in these cases. When drafting arbitration agreements, parties should think carefully whether or not the enforcement of any future award will be required against assets in England and, if so,consider choosing this jurisdiction as a seat. After an award has already been set aside by a court at the seat, a claimant should carefully consider what evidence is available to him to claim that the decision to set aside the award is contrary to basic principles of justice. If cogent evidence is not available,a claimant may wish to abandon attempts to enforce it in England.