仲裁庭有义务说明裁决理由（新西兰案例）

更新时间：2017-11-16 14:39:20  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1517次

在NgātiHurungaterangi & Ors v Ngāti Wahiao[2016] NZHC1486案的裁定中，新西兰高等法院驳回了原告的请求（即认为仲裁裁决理由不充分并要求撤销）。高等法院虽然将仲裁庭的裁决理由形容为“不可否认的稀少”，但同时也认为该裁决几乎满足（只有细微差别）自然公正的要求。高等法院的上述裁定现已被新西兰上诉法院推翻。上诉法院有力地确认了对裁决理由的要求并痛斥了仲裁庭未能履行其义务。

本案争议源于一份土地归还协议（英国归还由其统治了115年的毛利人祖传土地）。两个毛利部落对土地的专属实际所有权的主张发生冲突。英国法律承认这份协议（与英国政府的协议）的效力，该协议规定部落之间的争议应通过仲裁解决。仲裁庭对此案进行了13天的庭审并听取了大量历史证据。随后，该仲裁庭作出了相对简洁的裁决，认为该土地应该平均分配。原告获得了向高等法院和随后的上诉法院上诉的特别许可。

上诉法院注意到《新西兰仲裁法》（吸收了《UNCITRAL示范法》的规定）对裁决理由的立法要求并解释了该要求的目的和性质。该法院援引了英国上诉法院在Flannery vHalifax Estate Agencies Ltd案中的裁定。该裁定涉及在司法背景下对裁决理由的要求，认为裁决理由是正当程序的一种功能因此是正义的。新西兰法院评论道，这个根本目的是仲裁程序和司法程序所共有的。

在对立法要求（关于裁决理由的要求）的目的进行详述时，法院强调，裁决理由能使决策过程具有纪律性和稳健性。要求在裁决书中说明理由能够“集中精神”并将当事人置于“专家审判员严谨的思维模式”之中。

这种义务的性质和范围因案件背景而异。其中最基本的要求是，裁决理由“必须连贯一致，并符合内容充分的基本逻辑使当事人能够理解仲裁庭作出此种裁决的方法和原因。裁决理由必须充分结合当事人的竞争性观点和证据以得出公正的结果。”除此之外，裁决理由的范围将取决于案件背景并且“必须反映仲裁参考文献和仲裁庭结论的重要性”。

就最后一点而言，上诉法院注意到这种详尽的仲裁对于当事人的重要性并指出仲裁是这个漫长而复杂过程的顶点。法院援引了常设仲裁法院对Abyei边界委员会上诉案件的裁定。在该案中，常设仲裁法院注意到这一关键问题的重要性并认为推理的程度应当与结论的重要性相称。裁决理由能够“消除任何关于专断的暗示并确保公平。”新西兰法院采纳了常设仲裁法院的上述观点并认为这种观点同样适用于本案。

在设定“严谨的思维模式”和“基本的逻辑水平”的要求之后，法院开始分析仲裁庭的五段裁决理由，并认为这些非常基本的要求未被满足。

首先，该裁决未能列明争议焦点为推理过程提供“有组织的框架”，而是对“三个没有很大争议的形式问题”进行认定。就这一点而言，法院认为复述当事人陈述不能取代焦点问题的认定。

其次，仲裁庭未能解决证据中非常重要的部分。仲裁庭是“分析事实的老手”，对证据的自由裁量权“并不能免除仲裁庭的说明义务（说明其优先采纳某些证据的原因）。

最后，仲裁庭所谓的对重要事项的认定是“无根据的推断，而非基于严谨的推理”。法院认为推断行为“确实存在（inescapable）”，表现为：仲裁庭“只是简单地采用了方便的折中方案（这种妥协没有经过任何的推理或逻辑论证）就得出了争议事项困难且复杂的结论。”法院引用了Lord Bingham的话，将该裁决形容为一个不能以任何理由维持的“荒谬的折中方案”。

如前所述，法院判决最终最重要的意义不在于对裁决理由的要求进行重申，而在于对裁决的客观分析。在裁决书中仅重述当事人的论点并作出推断性认定是不够的。当事人有权查看经过严谨思考（辛勤工作）的证据，这应成为任何疑难裁定的基础。故意避开这一点并采取简单捷径的仲裁员将面临裁决被撤销的风险。

【英文版】

The Duty to Give Reasons – A Robust Affirmation

Last year I posted on the New Zealand High Court’s decision in Ngāti Hurungaterangi & Ors vNgāti Wahiao [2016] NZHC1486. The High Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that an arbitral award was inadequately reasoned and should be set aside. The Court described the panel’s reasoning as “undeniably sparse” but held by a “fine margin” that the requirements of natural justice had been met. That decision has now been reversed by the Court of Appeal. The Court has delivered a robust affirmation of the requirement for reasons and a stinging critique of the panel’s failure to discharge this obligation.

As I explained in my earlier post, the case arose from an agreement to return specified ancestral lands to Māori after 115 years in Crown ownership. Two Māori groups (hapū) had competing claims to exclusive beneficial ownership. The legislation giving effect to the agreement with the Crown provided for the dispute between hapū to be resolved by arbitration. The arbitral panel sat over 13 days and heard very extensive historical evidence.The panel delivered a relatively brief award determining that the land should be apportioned equally. The plaintiffs were given special leave to appeal to the High Court and subsequently to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal noted the legislative requirement for reasons in New Zealand’s Arbitration Act (reflecting theUNCITRAL Model Law) and explained the purpose and nature of that requirement.In doing so, the Court drew on the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377 (CA).That decision related to the requirement for reasons in the judicial context,holding that reasons are a function of due process and therefore of justice.The New Zealand Court commented that this underlying purpose is common to both arbitral and judicial processes.

Expanding on the purpose of the requirement, the Court emphasised that reasons bring discipline and robustness to the decision-making process. A requirement to give reasons “concentrates the mind”and exposes the parties “to the disciplined thought pattern of the specialist adjudicator”.

The nature and extent of the duty varies with context. The most basic requirement is that reasons “must be coherent and comply with an elementary level of logic of adequate substance to enable the parties to understand how and why [the panel reached its decision]”. The reasons “must engage with the parties’ competing cases and the evidence sufficiently to justify the result.” Beyond this, the extent of the reasons required will be dictated by context and “must reflect the importance of the arbitral reference and the panel’s conclusion”.

In respect of this last point, the Court noted the significance of this particular arbitration to the parties and the fact that the arbitration was the culmination of a long and complex process. The Court drew on the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on appeal from the Abyei Borders Commission. In that case, the Permanent Court had noted the significance of the issues at stake and that the degree of reasoning should be commensurate with the importance of the conclusions. Reasons “dispel any hint of arbitrariness and ensure the presence of fairness”. The New Zealand Court adopted the Permanent Court’s statements and held that they applied equally tothe case at hand.

Having set out the requirements for a “disciplined thought pattern” and “an elementary level of logic”, the Court turned to the panel’s five paragraphs of reasons. The Court makes clear that these very basic requirements had not been met.

First, the award failed to set out a list of issues which would have provided an “organised framework” for the reasoning process. Instead the panel had identified “three largely uncontentious and formalistic issues”.In this regard, the Court commented that recitation of the parties’ cases is no substitute for identifying the true issues.

Second, the panel had failed to address very significant parts of the evidence. Whilst an arbitral panel is “master of the facts”, this evidentiary discretion “does not absolve the panel from stating why it preferred certain evidence”.

Third, the purported findings on significant issues were “conclusory, not reasoned”. The Court held that the “inescapable” inference was that the panel “having concluded the issue was difficult and complex, simply elected to adopt a convenient compromise, one that was not the result of any reasoned or logical process.” The Court quoted Lord Bingham in describing the award as “an irrational splitting of the difference” that could not be sustained on any grounds.

What is ultimately most significant about the Court’s judgment is not its recitation of the requirement for reasons. That hasall been said before. Rather, it is the Court’s clinical analysis of the award.Mere words on the page, consisting of repetition of the parties’ arguments and conclusory findings, are not enough. The parties are entitled to see evidence of the disciplined thinking – the hard work – that should form the basis for any difficult decision. Arbitrators who avoid this and take easy shortcuts risk having their awards set aside.