美国地方法院中止诉讼程序并强制香港HKIAC仲裁

更新时间：2017-12-01 15:24:27  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1604次

被告Hybrid Kinetic Group Limited ("Hybrid Kinetic")及BillionEnergy Holdings Limited ("Billion") (合称"HKG")是注册在香港生产电动汽车的实体企业。原告是Townsend Ventures LLC ("Townsend")、其子公司 XALTEnergy, LLC以及XALT Energy MI, LLC (与 Townsend合称为 "XALT")，主要从事锂电池仓储、设计、制造。XALT对HKG提起诉讼后，HKG向法庭提出了中止诉讼程序并强制仲裁的动议。

本案涉及上述当事人三份协议。首先，XALT和HKG就开发电池技术和HKG利用XALT所有锂电池产能签订了建立战略伙伴关系的谅解备忘录。该谅解备忘录没有仲裁条款。

其次，HKG与XALT签订了独家供货协议。不同于谅解备忘录，该协议有仲裁条款，并且规定了任何与供货协议相关的纠纷、争议或索赔均应提交香港国际仲裁中心("HKIAC")进行仲裁。

最后，双方订立了框架协议，规定HKG购买XALT的一家子公司。框架协议并不包含仲裁条款。

2015年5月，XALT与HKG之间就合作事宜产生纠纷。HKG告知XALT将延迟支付供货协议中规定的资金，XALT通知HKG迟延付款将会导致其代表HKG停止一切经营活动。因此，XALT在马里兰州的联邦地区法院对HKG提起了诉讼，声称HKG欺诈并违约，而HKG提起中止诉讼程序并强制仲裁的动议。

法院阐明裁定强制仲裁动议时通常需要分两步进行调查：（1）法院必须确定争议是否具有可仲裁性：仲裁庭还是法院有管辖权?；以及（2）如果法院认定对可仲裁性具有管辖权，法院应该对争议是否事实上具有可仲裁性作出裁定。

法院进一步阐明尽管存在有利仲裁的普遍性政策导向及联邦推定，但是该推定不能用于解决可仲裁性争议本身的可仲裁性。除非当事人“明确无误地另行规定”，法院将对可仲裁性作出裁定。再者，不能仅仅因为某协议包含了将所有可解释为“与本协议有关的”或“因本协议产生的”争议提交仲裁的广义性仲裁条款，即认为存在明确无误的证据。

然而，法院查明本案符合“明确无误的”标准，因为争议中的仲裁条款不仅范围宽泛，还并入了授予仲裁庭决定可仲裁性的仲裁规则。具体而言，当事人已并入了香港国际仲裁中心的仲裁规则，该规则规定了“仲裁庭可根据本规则对其自身的管辖权作出裁定，包括任何对仲裁协议的存在、有效性或范围的异议。”

由于Hybrid Kinetic和Billion均是外国实体，法院也因此根据《承认和执行外国仲裁裁决公约》（“纽约公约”）审查是否可以强制仲裁。法院查明其可以这样做，原因是（1）供货协议是书面的协议，当事人均同意仲裁；（2）仲裁机构是HKIAC，而中国是纽约公约的签署国；（3）供货协议具有商业性质；并且（4）供货协议的签订者Billion是外国实体。另外，XALT并未主张供货协议无效、失效或者不具可执行性。

因此，法院中止了诉讼程序，并强制当事人将争议提交给HKIAC仲裁。

【英文原文】

District court stays proceedings and compels arbitration in HongKong, as the parties clearly and unmistakeably committed the determination ofarbitrability to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre

Townsend Ventures , LLC v. HybridKinetic Grp. Ltd., Civil Action No. GLR-17-130(D. Md. Aug. 30, 2017)

Defendants, Hybrid Kinetic Group Limited ("Hybrid Kinetic") and Billion Energy Holdings Limited ("Billion") (collectively with Hybrid Kinetic, "HKG") are HongKong-based entities that manufacture a wide range of electric vehicles.Plaintiffs, Townsend Ventures LLC ("Townsend"), and its subsidiaries XALT Energy, LLC and XALT Energy MI, LLC (collectively with Townsend,"XALT" ) are engaged in advanced lithium-based energy storage, and design, manufacture and service lithium energy storage products. After XALT brought suit against HKG, HKG filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration.

There were three agreements between the parties. First, XALT and HKG had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a strategic partnership where the parties would collaborate on the development of battery technology and HKG would utilize "all" XALT's lithium battery capacity. The MOU did not contain an arbitration clause.

Second, HKG and XALT entered into a supply agreement where HKG would provide capital funding to XALT and XALT would manufacture and supply batteries to HKG. The arrangement was to be exclusive,such that XALT would provide batteries only to HKG, and HKG would purchase all batteries manufactured by XALT. This agreement, unlike to the MOU, did containan arbitration provision, which provided that any dispute, controversy or claim relating to the supply agreement would be heard before the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (the "HKIAC").

Finally, the parties entered into a framework agreement that provided for HKG to purchase a subsidiary of XALT. The framework agreement did not include an arbitration clause.

In May 2015, the arrangements between XALT and HKG "began to unravel." HKG notified XALT that capital contributions provided for in the supply agreement would be late and XALT informed HKG that late payment would cause XALT "to cease all activitieson behalf of" HKG. XALT thereafter filed suit in federal court in Maryland against HKG, alleging fraud and breach of contract, and HKG responded by movingto stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.

The court explained that resolving a motion to compel arbitration typically involves a two-step inquiry: (1) the court must determine who decides whether a particular dispute is arbitrable: the arbitrator or the court; and (2) if the court concludes that it is the proper forum in which to adjudicate arbitrability, the court then decides whether the dispute is, in fact, arbitrable.

The court further explained that, while there is a general policy-based, federal presumption in favor of arbitration,that presumption is not applied to resolve questions of the arbitrability of arbitrability issues themselves. Unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise," the court determines arbitrability.Moreover, clear and unmistakable evidence will not be found simply because an agreement contains a broad arbitration clause committing all interpretive disputes "relating to" or "arising out of" the agreement.

Here, however, the court found the "clear and unmistakable" standard was met, as the arbitration clause at issue was not only expansive, but incorporated a specific set of rules that authorized the arbitrators to determine arbitrability. Specifically, the parties had incorporated the HKIAC Rules, which provide that "[t]he arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction under these Rules, including any objections with respect to the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement[s]."

Because Hybrid Kinetic and Billion were foreign entities, the court also considered whether it could compel arbitration under the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention").The court found that it could do so because (1) the supply agreement was a written agreement under which the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the arbitration would occur at the HKIAC and the People's Republic of China was a signatory to the Convention; (3) the supply agreement was commercial in nature;and (4) Billion, which signed the supply agreement, was a foreign entity.Further, XALT did not argue that the supply agreement was null and void,inoperative or incapable of being performed.

The court therefore stayed the proceedings and compelled the parties to arbitrate the matter before the HKIAC.