a）在Rakna Arakshaka一案中，原告以三个理由申请撤销最终裁决：

（i）最终裁决涉及的是一项不属于仲裁请求的纠纷，因为一项谅解备忘录（“MOU”）终止了将案件提交仲裁条款，并导致仲裁庭缺少管辖权（“管辖权问题”Jurisdiction Issue）。

（ii） 原告没有收到仲裁程序的合理通知，或由于部分信件和文件没有抄送给原告，原告无法对其案件进行陈述，导致其权利被侵害，违背了仲裁裁决作出过程中的自然裁断原则（“自然正义问题”Natural Justice Issue）；以及

（iii） 由于仲裁程序中的主合同是通过贿赂取得的，因此裁决是在受到欺骗或舞弊（fraud or corruption）的情况下、或受上述影响下作出（“公共政策问题”Public Policy Issue）。

b） 管辖权问题

新加坡高等法院认定，根据新加坡国际仲裁法（“IAA”）第10（3）条与国际商事仲裁示范法（“示范法”）第16（3）条，原告需要在收到仲裁庭对管辖权的裁定通知后30天内，将管辖权异议作为一个初步问题请求新加坡高等法院作出决定。否则，将导致原告无权提交撤销仲裁裁决的管辖权异议。事实上，新加坡高等法院进一步指出，当事人本可以在示范法第16（3）条规定的30天期限内，也就是在仲裁程序环节，提出管辖权异议，但是直到对方当事人走完整个仲裁程序并获得最终仲裁裁决，异议方毫不费力由于管辖权问题而提出撤销申请，此时，允许一方当事人提出管辖权异议，这将会是一种滥用程序的行为。

在任何情况下，新加坡高等法院都认为，该谅解备忘录实际上并没有终止仲裁庭的权限。

c） 自然正义问题

原告声称，由于没有收到实质性开庭证据的副本，因违背自然正义原则，影响了原告方的权利。“原告几乎全部脱离了仲裁程序”这一点是背离事实的（This is despite the fact of the plaintiff’s “near-totaldisengagement from the arbitral proceedings“）。因此新加坡高等法院认为，根据本案的事实，是原告选择不参与仲裁程序，不能因此认定原告无法对其案件进行陈述，也不能认定存在违背自然正义原则的情况。

d） 公共政策问题

新加坡高等法院同样拒绝了原告提出的这项理由。

第一，原告声称主合同是通过在斯里兰卡进行的贿赂和舞弊取得的 ，因此执行该合同条款的仲裁裁决将违背新加坡公共秩序，其应根据示范法第34(2)(b)(ii)条以及新加坡国际仲裁法第24条予以撤销。新加坡高等法院特别指出新加坡国际仲裁法第 24（a）条规范的是裁决本身，而不是当事人之间的合同受到欺骗或舞弊的情况（is tainted or induced by fraud or corruption）。但是，新加坡高等法院也认为，如果当事人的主要负责人受到的舞弊指控最终成立，原告有权引用第31(4)(b)条规定的公共政策作为撤销仲裁裁决的理由。

新加坡国际仲裁法第24（a）条与第31(4)(b)条分别针对不同的情况——第24（a）条规定了若裁决是在受到欺骗或舞弊的情况下，或受上述影响而作出的，新加坡高等法院可撤销该裁决；第31(4)(b)条则规定了若执行该裁决与新加坡的公共政策相抵触，新加坡高等法院有权拒绝执行该裁决。

第二，原告声称主合同要求履行行为的规定违反履行地法律（例如，斯里兰卡），因此，执行该合同内容的仲裁裁决将与新加坡公共政策相抵触，且应当根据示范法第34(2)(b)(ii)条以及新加坡国际仲裁法第24条被撤销。新加坡高等法院认为该问题应当由仲裁庭认定，若仲裁庭认为对双方具有约束力的事实没有违法性，则该问题不应再由上级法院重新审理。

启示

a)     新加坡高等法院关于自然正义问题和公共政策问题的裁决是基于新加坡法院权力的既有界限。由于最低法庭干预的司法政策（judicial policy of minimal curial intervention），新加坡法院不会轻易地撤销某裁决。正如上诉法院在Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd 诉Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R)86 一案中指出，“根据原则和政策，法庭将力求支持而不是阻挠或推翻仲裁进程...没有影响当事人一方权利的枯燥、空洞、技术上或程序上的异议不应被采纳。只有对自然正义原则的违反超越了合理期待与适当的界限，并最终对当事人一方产生了实际不利影响，才可以或应当提供救

b)     值得注意的进展是新加坡高等法院针对管辖权问题作出的决定。

虽然示范法第16（3）条中用宽松的语言规定“仲裁庭作为一个初步问题裁定其拥有管辖权的，任何一方当事人可在收到裁定通知后三十天内请求法院对此事项作出决定”，新加坡高等法院的裁定还是要求仲裁当事人确保他们遵守示范法第16（3）条规定的30天期限。事实上，新加坡高等法院认为，允许一方当事人提出管辖权异议，却选择不参与仲裁程序环节，而等待通过提出撤销裁决申请对仲裁庭的管辖权提出异议，是一种滥用程序的行为，这是对示范法第16（3）条的公然漠视。

The Singapore High Court decides that there is no choice of active remedies for a party challenging a tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction

1. KeyPoints

(a) In Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd v Avant Garde Maritime Services (Private) Limited [2018]SGHC 78 (“Rakna Arakshaka”), the Singapore High Court held that where a tribunal had ruled on its own jurisdiction as a preliminary question,the party wishing to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction had to bring that issue to the supervisory court within 30 days of receipt of notice of the tribunal’s ruling, pursuant to Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (“ModelLaw“), read with section 10(3) of the International Arbitration Act (“IAA“).The failure to do so would preclude such party from raising the same jurisdictional objection in setting aside proceedings pursuant to Article34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.

(b)However, such a party is not precluded from raising the same jurisdictional challenge when it exercises its passive remedy of resisting enforcement of the award. In other words, under Singapore law, while a party that wishes to challenge the tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction has a choice of electing between the active remedy under Art 16(3) of the Model Law and the passive remedy of resisting enforcement, such a party does not have a choice of electing between the active remedy under Art 16(3) of the Model Law and the active remedy of setting aside the award under Art 34(2)(iii) of the Model Law.

(c) This is the first time that the Singapore High Court had the opportunity to decide on this significant issue – it is significant because a party may unwittingly lose its right to challenge jurisdiction given the permissive language in Article 16(3) of the Model Law. While the decision is being appealed to the Singapore Court of Appeal, it nevertheless presents an interesting development in Singapore’s arbitration jurisprudence and serves to caution parties in arbitration to adhere to the 30-day period in Article 16(3) of the Model Law if applicable. This issue has previously been considered and discussed by the co-author in a separate publication titled “Choice of Active Remedies Under the UNCITRAL Model Law – When “May” Means May“, (2017) 28(1) The American Review of International Arbitration 159.

2. Decision

(a) In Rakna Arakshaka, the plaintiff applied to set aside a final award on three grounds:

(i) the final award deals with a dispute not falling within the terms of submissions to arbitration as a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU“) had terminated the reference to arbitration, resulting in lack of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal (the “Jurisdiction Issue“);

(ii) the plaintiff was not given proper notice of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present its case because certain pieces of correspondence and documents were not copied to it, giving rise to a breach of natural justice in the making of the award by which its rights had been prejudiced (the “NaturalJustice Issue“); and

(iii) the making of the final award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption as the underlying contract in the arbitral proceedings was procured by bribes (the “PublicPolicy Issue“).

b)    Jurisdiction Issue

The Singapore High Court held that section 10(3) of the IAA and Article 16(3) ofthe Model Law required the plaintiff to raise its jurisdictional objection to the Singapore High Court within 30 days of having received notice of the Tribunal’s ruling on its own jurisdiction as a preliminary question. The failure to do so precluded the plaintiff from raising its jurisdictional objection in setting aside proceedings. In fact, the Singapore High Court went further to state that it would be an abuse of process to allow a party who had raised a jurisdictional challenge but chose not to participate in most part of the arbitration, to wait till the opposing party goes through the entire arbitral process, obtains an award, only to be met by a setting aside application at the seat when it could have done so within the 30-day periodunder Article 16(3) of the Model Law.

Further and in any event, the Singapore High Court held that the MOU did not in fact terminate the Tribunal’s mandate.

c)    Natural Justice Issue

The plaintiff claimed that it had suffered prejudice as a result of a breach of natural justice because it was not given a copy of the notes of evidence of the substantive hearing. This is despite the fact of the plaintiff’s “near-total disengagement from the arbitral proceedings“. The Singapore High Court therefore held that on the facts of the case, having chosen to absent itself from the arbitral proceedings, the plaintiff could not say that it was unable to present its case or that there was a breach of natural justice.

d)  Public Policy Issue

The Singapore High Court also rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on this ground.First, the plaintiff claimed that the underlying contract was procured by and was a means of furthering bribery and corruption in Sri Lanka, and an arbitral award enforcing the terms of such a contract would be in conflict with the public policy of Singapore and should be set aside under Art 34(2)(b)(ii) ofthe Model Law read with section 24 of the IAA. The Singapore High Court highlighted that section 24(a) of the IAA contemplates a situation where the award itself, rather than the contract between the parties, is tainted or induced by fraud or corruption. However, it also opined that if the convictions of the chairpersons of the parties on charges of corruption are eventually secured, the plaintiff may be able to invoke public policy under section31(4)(b) as a ground to resist the enforcement of the award. Sections 24(a) and31(4)(b) of the IAA deal with different situations – section 24(a) provides that the Singapore High Court may set aside an award if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, while section 31(4)(b) provides that the Singapore High Court may refuse to enforce a foreign award if such enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore.

Second,the plaintiff claimed that the underlying contract requires the performance of an act which is illegal by the law of the place of performance (i.e. Sri Lanka) and therefore an arbitral award enforcing the terms of such a contract would bein conflict with the public policy of Singapore and should be set aside under Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law read with section 24 of the IAA. The Singapore High Court held that as this issue was considered by the Tribunal,the Tribunal’s finding of fact that there was no illegality was binding on theparties and could not be reopened by a supervisory court.

3. What This Means For You

a)   The Singapore High Court’s decision on the Natural Justice Issue and the Public Policy Issue is based on the established line of authorities of the Singapore Courts. The Singapore Courts would not easily set aside an award given its judicial policy of minimal curial intervention. As the Court of Appeal in SohBeng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007]3 SLR(R) 86 cautioned at [98], “[a]s a matter of both principle and policy,the courts will seek to support rather than frustrate or subvert thearbitration process…Arid, hollow, technical or procedural objections that donot prejudice any party should never be countenanced. It is only where the alleged breach of natural justice has surpassed the boundaries of legitimate expectation and propriety, culminating in actual prejudice to a party, that a remedy can or should be made available.”

b)   The interesting development to note is the Singapore High Court’s decision onthe Jurisdiction Issue. Notwithstanding the permissive language of Article16(3) of the Model Law, which states that “[i]f the tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request,within thirty days … the court … to decide the matter” [emphasis added], in light of the Singapore High Court’s decision, parties in arbitration would need to ensure that they adhere to the 30-day period in Article 16(3) of the Model Law if applicable. In fact, the Singapore High Court opined that it would be an abuse of process to allow a party such as the plaintiff, who raised a jurisdictional challenge but chose not to participate in most part of the arbitration, to wait to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction in a setting aside application, in blatant disregard of Art 16(3) of the Model Law.

BY Baker McKenzie Wong& Leow.