新西兰最近与全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（CPTPP）的五名成员国:文莱达鲁萨兰、马来西亚、秘鲁、越南和澳大利亚—签署了“附加协议”(“side letters”)，以排除强制性的投资者与东道国争端解决机制（“ISDS”）。这展现了ISDS在亚太地区的演进路径，尤其在全球对ISDS的将来热议的背景下，鉴于CPPTPP成员在全球经济中的重要性。

投资者国家争端解决：全球和地区趋势

世界各地的国家和地区组织均已提出并开始调整以改变ISDS形势。在全球层面上，这包括联合国贸易法委员会第三工作组为促进ISDS体系更加coherent and consistent而讨论ISDS可能性改革建议。另一个值得注意和期待的进展是ICSID即将出版的关于ICSID仲裁规则修正案文件，该修正案是“基于以往案例经验实现现代化”。

欧盟正在寻求建立一个多边投资法庭来取代临时仲裁制度。同时，在对外商直接投资政策审查后，南非、印度、印度尼西亚、委内瑞拉、玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔等国已决定终止、重新谈判或不再续签双边投资条约（“BITs”）。在美国，关于ISDS的热议和NAFTA的重新谈判也仍在进行中。

关于CPTPP的附加协议

美国退出跨太平洋伙伴关系（TPP）后，11个国家已决定签署TPP 的改版协定－CPTPP协定。值得注意的是，CPTPP已经缩小了投资者提起ISDS索赔的范围——例如，CPTPP限制了私有公司与政府签订投资合同中使用ISDS争端解决。

2018年3月8日，在签署CPTPP本身的同时，新西兰与五个CPTPP缔约国—文莱达鲁萨兰、马来西亚、秘鲁、越南和澳大利亚还签署了排除适用强制性ISDS的附加协议。鉴于2017年10月新西兰新任政府宣布其不会同意ISDS，以及新西兰外交部和贸易部此前观点，尤其是新西兰将继续“寻求与哪些对ISDS有共同担忧的国家达成共识”的态度，早就预料可能有这样的结果。

新西兰已经采取了两种不同的方式达成附加协议，这些协议构成了相关国家之间的双边协议，并将与CPTPP同一日期生效。

第一种方式：完全排除ISDS

第一种方式是完全排除投资者寻求ISDS解决争端的权利。这种方式鉴于秘鲁和澳大利亚的附加协议。CPTPP国家在新西兰投资中80%来自澳大利亚，这一做法与这两个国家此前排除ISDS的条款做法一致（例如，关于东盟-澳大利亚-新西兰自由贸易协定（“AANZFTA”））。至于秘鲁的附加协议，新西兰此前并未与秘鲁签订投资条约，因此从实际的角度来看，其并未改变这两个国家在ISDS方面的立场。

ISDS：阶段性方式 （escalation approach）

其余的三个附加协议采取的第二种方式更为复杂，并提供阶段性的争议解决。在发生争议时，投资者应提出书面的磋商和谈判请求，并简要说明有关争论中的措施事实。东道国和投资者将在六个月内通过利用无约束力的第三方程序（包括斡旋、调解和调停）来友好解决争端，如未能解决，争议将根据CPTPP第9章提交仲裁，但是需要国家同意（并且，在越南的附加协议中用的是“特别同意”）该仲裁申请。

这种方式改变了传统的机制，即东道国通过条约提供一个固有的仲裁提议以及同意书，投资者通过启动仲裁达成仲裁协议。从附加协议的措辞来看，东道国只有在无法友好解决争端之后才能自行决定提供同意书，而一个国家拒绝同意或“特别同意”仲裁，则可能会限制投资者的仲裁选择。

文莱达鲁萨兰的附加协议附加规定了，当东道国不同意ISDS时，投资者母国可根据新西兰－文莱达鲁萨兰关于双边磋商的协定请求与东道国协商。因此，理论上，根据该协定启动争端解决机制的投资者可能会得到一个额外的保护层，尽管这将取决于母国的自由裁量权并且这毫无疑问将进行政治方面的考量。

来自文莱达鲁萨兰、马来西亚和越南的投资者以及在这些国家投资的新西兰投资者，仍然可以依据其他规定了ISDS争议解决的并且上述国家为缔约国的协定，例如AANZFTA。因此，根据CPTPP协定的第1.2条（与其他协定的关系），成员国承认在所有或至少两个CPTPP成员国为缔约方的现有国际协定下各成员国的权利和义务。此外，越南的附件协议中明确规定，其任何条款“均不应减损减损当事人在任何现有的国际协定中的权利和义务”。

关于ISDS的联合声明

除了签署附加协议外，新西兰还与智利和加拿大签署了关于ISDS的联合声明。在重申各国“在其领土内为达到合法的政策目标进行管控”的权利时，该声明承认了“对CPTPP强有力的程序性和实质性保障”，并有意“考虑不断变化的国际实践和以及ISDS的演进，包括通过多边国际论坛开展的工作。”尽管智利和加拿大似乎不愿意限制ISDS整体的可用性，但这一声明的实际作用仍有待观察。这种“不断发展的国际实践”，至少在加拿大，可能会成为欧盟和加拿大正在讨论的全面经济贸易协定中关于使用投资法庭替代仲裁的谈判的一种参考。

评论

在CPTPP中对ISDS采取的方式表明了一种可根据范围更广的国际协议实现的灵活性。与其允许ISDS问题阻碍该协定，各方取而代之的是达成了双边协定和谅解备忘录（范围缩小的）。

在实践中意味着，除非有关ISDS的附加协议是在CPTPP生效之前签署的，否则CPTPP第28章中所包含的一般ISDS条款将适用于新西兰和其余五个CPTTP缔约国之间。迄今为止，日本、墨西哥和新加坡决定不对ISDS发表任何具体意见，而智利和加拿大的联合声明意味着他们在目前仍有意在当前系统内保留地位。值得注意的是，这些附加协议仅仅是双边性的，它们只适用于那些投资新西兰的文莱达鲁萨兰、马来西亚、秘鲁、越南和澳大利亚的投资者，反之亦然。

在包括ISDS条款的附加协议范围内的投资者可能会受益于其他国际规定中的ISDS保护。然而，附加协议签署国所采取的方式表明他们有意限制或排除ISDS，并且仍有待观察的是，是否AANZFTA的修正案也将如此。

【英文原文】

New Zealand signs side letters with five CPTPP members to exclude compulsory investor state dispute settlement

By BrendaHorrigan

New Zealand has recently signed “side letters” to exclude compulsory Investor State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS“) with five members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP“) – Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Peru, Viet Nam and Australia. This demonstrates the evolving approach to ISDS in the Asia Pacific region and is of particular interest both in the context of the worldwide debate about the future of ISDS, and also due to the importance of CPTPP members within the global economy.

ISDS: global and regional trends

Countries and regional organisations worldwide have proposed and have started implementing various changes that will alter the ISDS landscape. At a global level, this includes the work of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III in considering recommendations on the possible reform of ISDS to make the ISDS system more coherent and consistent. Another notable and awaited development is the upcoming publication by ICSID of background papers on proposed amendments to ICSID Arbitration Rules, so as to “modernize [them] based on case experience”.

Regionally, the EU is seeking to establish a Multilateral Investment Court to replace the system of ad hoc arbitration. Meanwhile, following policy reviews on foreign direct investment, countries like South Africa, India, Indonesia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador[1] have decided to terminate, re-negotiate or not renew their Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs“). In the US, the debate about ISDS and the renegotiation of NAFTA is still on-going.

Side letters to the CPTPP

Following the withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP“), 11 countries have decided to sign the CPTPP, a revived version of the TPP. Notably, the CPTPP has narrowed the scope for investors to make ISDS claims – eg the CPTPP restricts the ability of private companies who enter into an investment contract with the government to use ISDS.

On 8 March 2018, alongside signing the CPTPP itself, New Zealand also signed side letters to exclude compulsory ISDS with five signatories to the CPTPP – Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Peru, Viet Nam and Australia. This move was anticipated given  announcements by New Zealand’s newly elected government in October 2017 that it would not agree to ISDS, as well as prior observations by the New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in particular that New Zealand would continue “to seek similar agreements with the other countries that share [their] wider concerns about ISDS.”

New Zealand has taken two different approaches to the side letters, which constitute bilateral agreements between the relevant states that will enter into force on the same date as the CPTPP itself.

First approach: full exclusion of ISDS

The first approach is to fully exclude an investor’s right to ISDS. This can be seen in the Peru and Australia side letters. Australia is the source of 80% of New Zealand’s overseas investment from CPTPP countries and this approach is consistent with the previous practice of these two countries to exclude ISDS clauses (eg in relation to the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (“AANZFTA“)). As for the Peru side letter, New Zealand did not previously have an investment treaty with Peru, therefore from a practical perspective it has not changed the stance of the two states in relation to ISDS.

ISDS: escalation approach

The second approach, taken in the remaining three side letters, is more complex and provides for dispute resolution on a staged basis. In case of a dispute, an investor should make a written request for consultations and negotiations, briefly describing the facts regarding the measure(s) at issue. The state and the investor will then try to resolve the dispute amicably within six months by using non-binding third party procedures, including good offices, conciliation and mediation, failing which the dispute may be submitted to arbitration in accordance with Chapter 9 of the CPTPP, provided, however, that the state consents (and, in case of the Viet Nam side letter, “specifically consents”) to its application.

This approach changes the traditional mechanism where a state party provides a standing offer and consent to arbitration via the treaty and the arbitration agreement is perfected through of the commencement of an arbitration by an investor. It follows from the wording of the side letters that a state may provide consent upon its own discretion only after an unsuccessful attempt to resolve a dispute amicably, and a refusal by a state to consent or “specifically consent” to arbitration may then limit the option of arbitration for that investor.

The Brunei Darussalam side letter additionally provides that when the host state does not provide consent to ISDS, the investor home state may request consultations with the host state under a New Zealand-Brunei Darussalam agreement on bilateral consultation. In theory, therefore, investors initiating a dispute settlement mechanism under this instrument may have an additional layer of protection, albeit this will depend on the home state’s discretion and will, no doubt, be exercised with political considerations in mind.

Investors from Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Viet Nam and investors from New Zealand investing in these countries may still be able to rely on other instruments providing for ISDS to which the above states are party, as for example, AANZFTA. Thus, under article 1.2 (Relation to Other Agreements) of the CPTPP member states acknowledge existing rights and obligations of each member state under existing international agreements to which all or at least two CPTPP member states are parties. Moreover, the Viet Nam side letter expressly provides that nothing in it “shall derogate from the rights and obligations of the Parties under any existing international agreements”.

Joint declaration on ISDS

In addition to signing the side letters, New Zealand, together with Chile and Canada, also made a joint declaration on ISDS. While reaffirming the right of each state to “regulate within its territory to achieve legitimate policy objectives”, this declaration recognises “the strong procedural and substantive safeguards” of the CPTPP and intends “to consider evolving international practice and the evolution of ISDS including through the work carried out by multilateral international fora”. It remains to be seen what the practical consequences of this declaration are, although it seems that Chile and Canada are unwilling to restrict the availability of ISDS in its entirety. Such “evolving international practice” may, on Canada’s part at least, be a reference to the ongoing negotiations between the EU and Canada in the CETA regarding the use of an investment court, rather than arbitration.

Comment

The approach taken to ISDS within the CPTPP demonstrates the flexibility that can be achieved under the broader church of such a wide ranging international agreement. Rather than allowing the issue of ISDS to stymie the agreement, parties have instead reached bilateral agreements and understandings which derogate from the wider agreement.

In terms of what this means in practice, unless additional side letters in relation to ISDS are signed before the CPTPP enters into force, the general ISDS provisions contained in Chapter 28 of the CPTPP will apply between New Zealand and the remaining five CPTTP signatories. Japan, Mexico and Singapore have, to date, decided not to express any specific views on ISDS, whereas the joint declaration of Chile and Canada signify their intention to remain within the current system at this time. It is worth remembering that these side letters are solely bilateral and that they only apply for investors of Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Peru, Viet Nam and Australia into New Zealand and vice versa.

Investors covered by the side letters which include escalation ISDS provisions may be able to benefit from ISDS protection in other international instruments. However, the approach taken by the side letters’ signatories shows their intention to limit or exclude ISDS and it remains to be seen if amendments to AANZFTA could follow.

For more information, please contact Brenda Horrigan, Partner, Vanessa Naish, Professional Support Consultant, or your usual Herbert Smith Freehills contact.