英国高等法院拒绝撤销未经等待相关国内法院诉讼结果作出的仲裁裁决

更新时间：2018-05-28 15:51:57  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1259次

2018年5月3日，英国高等法院（“该院”）在其SCM Financial Overseas Ltd v Raga Establishment Ltd [2018] EWHC 1008 (Comm)一案判决中，拒绝基于严重不当行为事由撤销裁决，在该案中仲裁地位于伦敦，仲裁庭（“仲裁庭”）直接适用LCIA规则作出了裁决，而未等待对仲裁庭所处理的争议可能具有重要影响的国内法院诉讼程序的结果。

该院的判决是有重要影响的，因为其强调了仲裁庭被赋予的按其认为适当的方式处理仲裁程序的过宽的自由裁量权，并表明了根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条成功提起挑战具有很高的门槛。该判决还提供了关于仲裁与国内法院诉讼之间关系的有趣言论，以及如一方当事人选择仲裁将面临裁判不一致的固有风险。

背景

根据购销协议（“SPA”），Raga Establishment Ltd（“Raga”）同意向SCM Financial Overseas Ltd (“SCM”)出售其在UA Telecominvest Limited (“UAT 股份“)的股份，UAT持有ESU 100%的股份。ESU转而持有乌克兰最大固定电话运营商之一－Ukrtelecom约93%的股份。ESU获得的Ukrtelecom股份是根据私有化协议从State Property Fund of Ukraine (“SPFU“)处购得的，该协议要求ESU有义务向Ukrtelecom的业务进行投资，并向乌克兰国家运输受保护的电信网络（“投资和网络义务“）。

UAT股份的收购价为8亿6000万美元，应由SCM分三期支付。UAT股份的主要价值体现在间接持有的Ukrtelecom股份。SPA中规定了ESU对Ukrtelecom的股份享有有效所有权的这样的条款以及Raga将确保ESU遵守其在私有化协议下的义务。

在出售股份后（但在所有分期付款被支付前），SPFU发布了一份报告，声称ESU违反了投资和网络义务，并建议将Ukrtelecom的股份返还给国家。

仲裁程序

Raga根据LCIA规则在伦敦启动了向SCM提起的仲裁程序，请求其支付SPA项下到期的未付分期款项。SCM主张，ESU已违反了投资和网络义务，这些违约行为导致了Ukrtelecom的股份被没收的风险。SCM声称，Raga对ESU遵守其义务作出了错误陈述，这使得SCM有权解除SPA，并且由于没收其完全没有得到合同履行的对价。

在仲裁庭审开始前不久，SPFU向乌克兰法院对ESU提起诉讼，声称ESU违反了投资和网络义务，并请求退回Ukrtelecom股份。在仲裁庭开庭审理的最后陈述中，SCM敦促仲裁庭延期作出裁决，理由是乌克兰法院的判决将与本仲裁中的争议问题具有高度相关性。Raga主张裁决不应被延期，而且SPFU在乌克兰的诉讼与本案无关。

裁决与乌克兰判决的不一致

仲裁庭拒绝等待乌克兰法院的判决，并作出了部分最终裁决（“裁决”），该裁决驳回了SCM的案件，并作出有利于Raga的裁决。仲裁庭继续进行裁决的理由是，尽管乌克兰法院的判决是有关联的，但仲裁庭仍应根据其获得的证据作出裁决。等待乌克兰的判决可能会导致长期的不确定性，这可能对各方不利。

因此，根据乌克兰法律方面的专家证据，仲裁庭认为Raga并未违反SCM声称的投资和网络义务。在作出该结论时，仲裁庭认为乌克兰法院并未作出任何对这一争议问题有重大影响的决定。

该裁决作出后的三个月时间内，乌克兰法院做出了一项判决，判决Raga违反了投资和网络义务，并下令没收Ukrtelecom的股份。

基于严重不当行为申请撤销裁决

SCM根据仲裁法第68条下严重不当行为的规定向法院申请撤销裁决。SCM案件中，在不予同意延期裁决方面，仲裁庭违反了该法第33条的一般义务。

关于因仲裁庭未能遵守一般职责而申请撤销裁决的观点

仲裁庭被指违反仲裁法第33条下的一般职责而对该裁决提起异议的问题，法院作出了八点意见：

1. 在确定仲裁庭是否违反一般职责时，必须评估仲裁庭在作出该裁决时所作的行为。裁决作出后最终发生什么与不当行为的问题无关（尽管其可能与实质性的不公正问题有关）。

2. 对裁决异议的当事人必须证明仲裁庭的不公正性，而不仅仅是当事人或其律师犯下的错误。

3. 仲裁庭的一般职责是为双方当事人提供一个合理的机会来陈述案情，并采取能够提供解决争议的公正方法的程序。这些标准并不是过分苛刻的标准。即使是不完美的程序也可能是“公平的”。

4. 仲裁庭必须避免不必要的延期（根据仲裁法的制订目的），即使该不必要的延期不会造成损害（prejudice）。

5.在程序性裁决的公正性受到质疑的情况下，法院可以审查仲裁庭的决定理由，但最终的问题还是取决于该裁决是否客观公正。

6.与是否存在不当行为的问题相反，实质性的不公正可能是现发生的或是将来发生的。

7.没有必要证明如若不是由于不当行为，结果会有所不同。如果可能存在不一样的结果，则将存在实质性的不公正。

8. 选择仲裁的当事人可能面临仲裁庭与法院或不同仲裁庭之间裁判不一致的固有风险。风险产生的这一事实本身并不等同于实质性的不公正。

拒绝延期裁决并不等同于仲裁庭对一般职责的违反

该院认为，乌克兰的判决虽然对仲裁庭没有约束力，但其可能成为仲裁中极为重要的证据。该院还认为，仲裁庭作出不予延期裁决直至获得进一步证据的决定构成对一般责任的违反。不延期的决定是否构成违反职责将取决于案件的所有情况（在裁决时进行评估），包括证据的性质和重要性、证据的可得性、可能导致的延期时长以及对反对延期的当事人造成的延期损害。

法院认为，本案中，仲裁庭在未经等待乌克兰判决而继续作出裁决方面没有违反其一般职责。虽然存在支持延期裁决的因素，包括乌克兰判决的证据价值，但也存在一些因素是反对延期的：特别是，Raga将因潜在的长时间延期而遭受的损害。重要的是，在裁决作出时，仲裁庭并未被提供有关乌克兰法院诉讼可能持续时间的信息。

尽管仲裁庭本有权决定暂时延期裁决，以便进一步了解乌克兰诉讼的期间长度，但仲裁庭也有权进行裁决，而不这样做。因此，仲裁庭继续裁决的决定并非不公平的，以致于构成对一般职责的违反。

评论

法院驳回SCM申请的决定因如下几个原因而值得关注

其确认了关于延期裁决的程序性裁决是否能够构成对一般职责的违反，并使该裁决可根据仲裁法第68条提起异议。

法院认为，仲裁庭与法院或两个仲裁庭之间裁判不一致的风险——是仲裁固有的风险。因此，仲裁庭的程序性裁决的公平性或不公平性将根据该固有的风险进行评估。

法院赋予了仲裁庭决定是否延期裁决的过宽自由裁量权，尽管如果仲裁庭决定延期裁决，乌克兰的判决将具有重大意义，并至少在短期内，仲裁庭也不可能受到批判。

因此，法院的判决表明了根据仲裁法第68条提起的异议获得支持的门槛很高。统计资料证实了这一情况：自2015以来，根据第68条向法院提交的超过100个的申请中，只有三个申请获得了支持。

【英文原文】

English High Court refuses to set aside award made without awaitingoutcome of relevant domestic court proceedings

In its recent decision in SCM Financial Overseas Ltd v Raga Establishment Ltd [2018]EWHC 1008 (Comm) (available here), the English High Court (“Court“) refused to set aside an award on the ground of serious irregularity in circumstances where the London-seated tribunal applying the LCIA rules (“Tribunal“) proceeded to issue an award rather than await the outcome of domestic court proceedings which could have had a significant impact on the issues before the Tribunal.

The Court’s decision is significant because it highlights the wide discretion afforded to tribunals to manage the proceedings as they see fit, and demonstrates that there is an high bar to a successful challenge under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“Act“). The decision also provides interesting observations on the relationship between arbitral and domestic court proceedings, and the inherent risk of inconsistent decisions should a party choose to arbitrate.

Background

Pursuant to asale and purchase agreement (“SPA“), Raga Establishment Ltd (“Raga“) agreed to sell to SCM Financial Overseas Ltd (“SCM”) shares in UA Telecom invest Limited (“UAT Shares“), which owned 100% of the shares in ESU. ESU, inturn, owned approximately 93% of the shares in Ukrtelecom (“UkrtelecomShares“), one of the largest fixed line telephone operators in the Ukraine.The Uk rtelecom Shares had been acquired by ESU from the State Property Fund of Ukraine (“SPFU“) pursuant to a privatisation agreement which obliged ESU to make investments to Ukrtelecom’s business and to transfer to the Ukrainian state a protected telecommunications network (“Investment and Network Obligations“).

The purchase price of US$860 million for the UAT Shares was payable by SCM in three instalments. The principal value of the UAT Shares was the indirect shareholding in the Ukrtelecom Shares. There were terms in the SPA to the effect that ESU had good title to the Ukrtelecom Shares and that Raga would procure ESU’s compliance with its obligations in respect of the privatisation agreement.

After the sale(but before all the instalments were paid), the SPFU issued a report claiming that ESU had breached the Investment and Network Obligations and proposed that the Ukrtelecom Shares be returned to the State.

Proceedings before the Tribunal

Raga commenced arbitral proceedings under the LCIA rules in London against SCM seeking the unpaid instalments due under the SPA. SCM argued that ESU had breached the Investment and Network Obligations, and that these breaches gave rise to a risk of the Ukrtelecom Shares being confiscated. SCM alleged that Raga had made misrepresentations as to ESU’s compliance with its obligations which entitled SCM to rescind the SPA, and that there was a total failure of consideration by reason of the prospect of confiscation.

Shortly before the arbitral hearing commenced, SPFU filed proceedings against ESU in the Ukrainian court alleging breaches of the Investment and Network Obligations and seeking the return of the Ukrtelecom Shares. In oral closings at the arbitral hearing, SCM urged the Tribunal to defer its award on the basis that the findings of the Ukrainian court would be highly relevant to the issues in the arbitration. Raga argued that the award should not be deferred and that theSPFU’s action in the Ukraine was irrelevant.

Inconsistent Award and Ukrainian judgment

The Tribunal declined to await the Ukrainian court’s decision and issued a partial final award (“Award“) which rejected SCM’s case and found in favour of Raga.The Tribunal’s reason for proceeding with the Award was that while the findings of the Ukrainian court would be relevant, the Tribunal should nevertheless makeits decision on the basis of the evidence before it. Waiting for the Ukrainian judgment could result in uncertainty over a lengthy period which could be prejudicial to the parties.

Accordingly, and based on the expert evidence on Ukrainian law before it, the Tribunal found that there was no breach of the Investment and Network Obligations as alleged by SCM. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal considered the absence of any Ukrainian court decision on the issue to have been significant.

Less than three months after the Award was rendered, the Ukrainian court issued a judgment which found that there had been breaches of the Investment and Network Obligations and ordered that the Ukrtelecom Shares be confiscated.

Application to set aside Award for serious irregularity

SCM brought an application before the Court to set aside the Award on the basis of serious irregularity under section 68 of the Act. SCM’s case was that in refusing to defer the Award, the Tribunal had breached its general duty under section 33 of the Act.

Observations on application to set aside due to failure to comply with tribunal’s general duty

The Court made eight observations in respect of challenges to awards based on an alleged breach of a tribunal’s general duty under section 33 of the Act:

• In determining whether there has been a breach of the general duty, the tribunal’s conduct must be assessed as at the time of the award. What ultimately transpired after the award is not relevant to the question of irregularity (although it may be relevant to the question of substantial injustice).

• The party challenging the award must show unfairness by the tribunal, and not merely a mistake by the party or its lawyers.

• The tribunal’s general duty is to give each party a reasonable opportunity to present its case and adopt procedures which provide a fair means of resolving the dispute. These are not unduly demanding standards.A procedure may be “fair” without being “perfect”.

• The tribunal must avoid unnecessary delay (in accordancewith the objectives of the Act), even if an unnecessary delay would not cause prejudice.

• Where the fairness of a procedural decision i schallenged, the court may examine the tribunal’s reasons for the decision but ultimately the question turns on whether the decision was objectively fair or not.

• In contrast to the question of whether there was irregularity, substantial injustice may be either present or future.

• It is not necessary to show that but for the irregularity the result would have been different. There will be substantial injustice ifthe result might have been different.

• A party choosing to arbitrate faces the inherent risk of inconsistent decisions as between the arbitral tribunal and a court or different arbitral tribunals. The fact that the risk materialises cannot by itself amount to substantial injustice.

Refusal to defer Award did not amount to breach of Tribunal’s general duty

The Court considered that the Ukrainian judgment, although not binding on the Tribunal,had the potential to be extremely important evidence in the arbitration. The Court also considered that a decision not to defer an award until further evidence is available is capable of amounting to a breach of the general duty.Whether a decision not to defer would amount to a breach would depend on all ofthe circumstances of the case (assessed at the time of the award), including the nature and significance of the evidence, the likelihood of it becoming available, the length of the delay which would result, and the prejudice of the delay on the party resisting deferral.

The Court concluded that in the present case the Tribunal had not breached its general duty in proceeding to issue the Award without waiting for the Ukrainian judgment.  While there were factors in favour of deferring the Award,including the evidential value of the Ukrainian judgment, there were factors weighing against deferral: in particular, the prejudice that Raga would sufferby reason of a potentially lengthy delay. It was significant that, at the time of the Award, the Tribunal had not been provided with information about thelikely duration of the Ukrainian court proceedings.

While it would have been open to the Tribunal to delay the Award for a short while in order tofind out more about the timescale of the Ukrainian proceedings, it was also open to the Tribunal to proceed without doing so. The Tribunal’s decision to proceed was therefore not unfair so as to constitute a breach of its general duty.

Comment

The Court’s decision to dismiss SCM’s application is noteworthy for several reasons:

• It confirms that a procedural decision about whether todefer an award is capable of amounting to a breach of the general duty, and may  render the award amenable to challenge under section 68 of the Act,

• The Court observed that the risk of inconsistentdecisions – between an arbitral tribunal and a court or two arbitral tribunals– is an inherent risk of arbitration. The fairness or unfairness of atribunal’s procedural decisions will thus be assessed in the light of that inherent risk.

• The Court afforded the Tribunal a wide discretion indeciding whether or not to defer the Award, notwithstanding that the Ukrainian judgment would have been potentially significant and the Tribunal “could nothave been criticised” had it decided to defer the Award, at least for a short while.

The Court’s decision thus demonstrates that there is a high threshold to succeed in achallenge under section 68 of the Act. This is borne out by the statistics:since 2015, only three of the more than 100 section 68 applications brought before the Court have succeeded (see furtherhere).

By Craig Tevendale