在过去几年里，对投资者-东道国争端解决机制（ISDS）的不满情绪在世界不同地区不断升温，但在欧盟内部尤其如此。（ISDS是投资者-东道国争端的临时仲裁的公认简称。）欧洲委员会对ISDS的重视程度如此之高，以至于许多人都认为影响深远的改革是不可避免的。委员会的提议是，发展一个多边投资法院体制（MIC）。该建议雄心勃勃，但可能不切实际或者无法实现。去年，贸易法委员会第三工作组(WGIII)将ISDS的争论纳入其讨论事项。第三十三届会议的报告确认了这一点[1]这“是在这一领域进行有意义的改革的一个特别机会”。

当然，来自世界各地的高级政府代表的参与以及第三工作组进程的透明性表明，这个论坛为体制改革提供了条件。然而，第三工作组程序的特点使贸易法委员会的计划在其发展的较早阶段，即在贸易法委员会设法为主要变革争取到大量支持之前，就受到全球监督。欧盟代表团中的一个代表团以观察员身份在第三十四届会议上指出[2]欧盟“相信贸易法委员会是一个可以找到解决办法的论坛”，即使代表们从不同的立场出发。问题是，商议（deliberations）的结束所委员会所愿。

欧盟的“定位”

在过去几年中，欧盟各机构投入了相当大力量进行ISDS的改革。在欧洲议会（EP）就ISDS进行了讨论，并就该主题提出了许多问题。在2015年7月的决议中，EP“强调有必要……以新的制度取代ISDS制度，以解决投资者与遵守民主原则和监督的东道国之间的争端，在公开任命的独立专业法官进行公开审理这样透明的方式处理潜在的案件”，并包括一个上诉机制。这表明欧洲议会否定了欧委会2015年5月概念文件（Concept Paper）的ISDS的修订版本。一旦欧洲议会的大多数否决了ISDS，委员会就必须作出相应的修改，因为国际条约需要欧洲议会的批准。因此，欧委会发展了多年以来一直的想法，即最终建立多边投资法院的承诺。此外，它还举行了若干成员国会议（stakeholder meetings），在会员国层面获得了对MIC的支持，并确实利用机会在国际上扩大这种支持。

2018年3月20日，欧盟理事会发布了《谈判指令》“Negotiating Directives”，授权欧盟委员会谈判设立一个多边法院公约，以解决投资者与东道国之间的投资争端。《谈判指令》的基础是欧委会为理事会决定提供建议，授权就2017年9月公布的关于设立多边投资法院的公约展开谈判。然而，不能忽视公布的时间和《谈判指令》对欧盟在贸易法委员会讨论中立场的重要性。欧盟本身不是贸易法委员会的成员–但其成员国是。

《谈判指令》中记载：“根据《条约》规定的真诚合作和统一对外代表原则，欧盟和参加谈判的联盟成员国应充分协调立场，并在整个谈判过程中采取相应行动”，并进一步确认“在表决的情况下，作为联合国国际贸易法委员会成员的成员国应根据这些指示和欧盟先前商定的立场行使其表决权“(着重强调)。因此，欧委会似乎处于一种强有力的立场：至少在理论上，委员会可以预期，目前拥有28个成员的集团将在贸易法委员会第三工作组的讨论中支持和推进多边投资法院的提案。鉴于理事会由欧盟成员国的国家元首或政府首脑组成，这种支持可被视为符合理事会首先批准《谈判指令》的要求。

欧盟-新加坡投资促进机构（ IPA）：欧委会的“胜利”？

欧委会有许多机会来检验其他国家是否愿意放弃投资仲裁来解决投资者与东道国之间的争端。最近，委员会通过《欧盟-新加坡自由贸易协定》和《欧盟-新加坡投资保护协定》“EUSIPA”，与新加坡缔结了一项重要的贸易和投资伙伴关系。[6]根据EUSIPA，投资者与东道国之间的争端将由为此目的设立的一个永久性的两级（two-tier）投资法院解决。此外，欧盟和新加坡都承诺“彼此和其他感兴趣的贸易伙伴一道，建立一个多边投资法院和上诉机制，以解决国际投资争端”。

这项承诺非常重要。就人均GDP来说世界最富裕的国家之一，新加坡可能会发现自己对任何MIC的贡献与其对ISDS的历史使用完全不相称（无论是作为被申请国还是作为投资者）。这可能意味着它倾向于拒绝该提议。但是新加坡没有这样做，作为东盟成员国和目前的东盟主席国，新加坡可能能够影响本区域其他国家走同样的道路。

然而，EUSIPA不一定代表新加坡全盘拒绝投资仲裁，也不一定表明亚洲和平与安全理事会地区（Asia-Pac region）的投资仲裁已经改变。在该区域缔结另一项重要的贸易协定——《跨太平洋伙伴关系全面和渐进协定》（简称CPTPP）之后不久就完成了EUSIPA的文本。在CPTPP中，从较传统的双边投资条约（BITs）和多边投资条（MITs）约–所载文本中发展起来的实质性投资者保护和解决争端的程序框架，都可被视为对国家利益的更大保护。这可能是也可能不是，11个国家（特别是包括新加坡和东盟10个成员国中的其他3个国家）同意通过临时仲裁解决投资者与东道国之间争端的原因。有趣的是，韩国政府已提议在第三工作组第三十六届会议之前举行一次关于ISDS改革的闭会期间（intersessional）亚太会议：这次会议可能进一步阐明该区域各国政府之间目前的想法。

EUSIPA 文本之所以重要还有另一个原因：强制执行。《谈判指令》承认有效执行投资法院裁决的重要性，但没有说明欧盟将如何做到这一点。EUSIPA第3.22条规定，当事各方承诺承认根据EUSIPA作出的裁决具有约束力，并“在其境内强制执行金钱义务，如同该裁决是该方法院的终局判决”（措辞几乎逐字地照搬《ICSID公约》的措词）。文本还确认，最终裁决将被认为是《纽约公约》的商事关系而产生的有关索赔的仲裁裁决。这并不能为执行EUSIPA投资法院的裁决提供完美的解决办法–非EUSIPA成员的国家不受其条款的约束，因此其国内法院不得以这种方式承认法院判决为仲裁裁决。然而，它确实表明，欧盟–贸易专员对投资者与东道国仲裁的消极看法，将ISDS描述为“欧洲最毒的首字母缩写”–并没有阻止欧盟使用现行制度来执行仲裁裁决，以符合投资法院的议程。

继续测试–欧盟-日本

欧盟继续在与日本的经济伙伴协议中讨论ISDS内容。欧盟—日本经济伙伴关系协定（EUJEPA）的文本已经商定，唯一有待解决的悬而未决问题是投资保护和ISDS。显然，投资法院的建议引起了一些不安。多年来，日本对ISDS（和投资保护）的看法存在一些不一致之处。此外，日本在将传统的ISDS条款纳入其贸易和投资协定方面表现出了一定的灵活性（或者没有），其决定显然是根据具体情况而不是原则作出的。

最近的轶事证据表明，日本仍然不相信为EUJEPA设立一个投资法院或更广泛的MIC倡议（initiative）：常设多边法院可能会给日本（作为东道国，从未面临过投资索赔）带来沉重的财政负担，而且可能并不是日本投资者的最佳制度。后者对资本输出国来说是一个重大问题。2018年4月26日，欧盟确认，尚未就“解决投资保护争端的机制”达成任何结论。鉴于投资章节已经剥离（hived off），这些分歧不应妨碍欧盟-日本EPA其他部门的迅速批准。然而，各方已确认，将在2018年夏季休假之前再举行一次会议，以解决这一问题。值得注意的是，日本代表在第三十四届会议上明确表示，他的任务是在“逐步”的基础上进行讨论，日本代表团虽然愿意在今后讨论ISDS的改革问题，但不准备过早地讨论未来的解决办法，包括常设法院的问题。

贸易法委员会第三工作组：分歧大于共识和早期的两极分化（polarisation）

第三十四届会议的目的是要把重点放在评价和确定问题而不是解决办法上，但无论如何，贸法会成员国之间存在一定程度的两极分化现象，部分认为目前制度应当是具体改进的重点，其他国家则认为应当采取更全面的体制改革。录音（audio recordings）显示，尽管欧盟可能已经获得了对体制改革的一些支持（并在其观察中继续推动这一改革），但要说服一些国家，尤其是美国，仍有大量工作要做。

第三十五届会议的报告刚刚发布。从表面上看，从第三十四届会议的报告不能看出明显的意见两极分化。相反，人们从最近的报告中得到的普遍感觉是，更加一贯地注重修订目前的制度，以应对关心的问题。虽然报告指出对设立一个常设司法机构的一些支持，但这始终没有引起共鸣。录音资料尚未提供：各代表团之间对话更详细的考虑，将使人们对 ISDS改革的方向有更深入的了解。如果第三工作组的结果不是设立一个多边投资法院，欧盟仍可寻求设立一个多边法院，以取代为根据其各项自由贸易和投资协定确定投资者与东道国之间争端而设立的独立投资法院。这些协定相对方（counter-parties）的支持可能得不到保障。

【英文部分】

Progress towards a Multilateral Investment Court? EU-momentum building and divisions in UNCITRAL Working Group III

By Andrew Cannon

In the past few years, discontent about Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS, a recognised shorthand for ad hoc arbitration of investor-state disputes) has been fomenting in various parts of the world but nowhere more so than within the EU. The European Commission’s focus on ISDS has been so intense that far-reaching reform has been portrayed by many as inevitable. The Commission’s proposal is for the development of a multilateral investment court system (MIC). The proposal is ambitious, but may not be realistic or achievable. Last year, the ISDS debate moved into the auspices of UNCITRAL Working Group III (WGIII). It is recognised in the report of the 35th session of WGIII[1] that this “constitute[s] a unique opportunity to make meaningful reforms in the field”. Certainly the involvement of high level government representatives from across the world and the transparent nature of WGIII’s process suggest this forum provides the conditions for systemic reform. However, the features of the WG III process expose the Commission’s plans to global scrutiny at a relatively early stage in their development, potentially before the Commission has managed to gain significant support for wholesale change. One of the EU delegation, in its capacity as an observer, noted in the 34th session[2] that the EU was “confident that UNCITRAL is a forum where a solution can be found” even where the delegates start from different positions. The question will be whether the conclusion of the deliberations will lead to the reform that the Commission wants.

The EU’s “positioning”

In the past few years, the EU institutions have devoted significant capacity to the reform of ISDS. Discussions about ISDS have taken place within the European Parliament (EP) – with numerous questions having been tabled on the topic. In its resolution of July 2015, the EP “stressed the need to… replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where potential cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent professional judges in public hearings” and include an appellate mechanism.[3] This represented a rejection by the EP of the reformed version of ISDS contained in the Commission’s May 2015 Concept Paper. Once the majority of the EP rejected ISDS, the Commission had to react accordingly as the approval of the EP is required for international agreements. The Commission has thus developed its thinking over a number of years towards a commitment to the eventual establishment of an MIC. Moreover, it has held a number of stakeholder meetings, garnered support for the MIC at Member State level and indeed taken opportunities to extend this support internationally.[4]

On 20 March, 2018 the EU Council published Negotiating Directives authorising the Commission to negotiate a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes between investors and states. The Negotiating Directives have their foundation in the Commission’s Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral investment court, published in September 2017. However, the timing of the publication and the significance of the Negotiating Directives in terms of the EU’s position in the UNCITRAL discussions cannot be overlooked. The EU itself is not a member of UNCITRAL – but its member states are. It is recorded in the Negotiating Directives that “[i]n accordance with the principles of sincere cooperation and of unity of external representation as laid down in the Treaties, the Union and the Member States of the Union participating in the negotiations shall fully coordinate positions and act accordingly throughout the negotiations” and further confirmed that “[i]n the event of a vote, the Member States which are Members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law shall exercise their voting rights in accordance with these directives and previously agreed EU positions” (emphasis added). The Commission therefore appears to be in a strong position: in theory at least, it can anticipate that the currently 28-strong bloc will support and progress its MIC proposal within the discussions in the UNCITRAL WG III.[5] Such support may be considered to be consistent with the approval of the Negotiating Directives by the Council in the first place, given the Council is comprised of the heads of state or head of government of the EU member states.

EU-Singapore IPA: a “win” for the Commission?

There have been a number of opportunities for the Commission to test the appetite of other countries for a move away from investment arbitration for resolution of investor-state disputes. Most recently, the Commission has concluded an important trading and investment partnership with Singapore by way of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (the EUSIPA).[6] Under the EUSIPA, investor-state disputes will be resolved by a permanent two-tier investment court established for that purpose.[7] Moreover, both the EU and Singapore commit to “pursue with each other and other interested trading partners, the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of international investment disputes”.

This commitment is significant. As one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita, Singapore may find itself contributing to any MIC in a way which is wholly disproportionate to its historic use of ISDS (either as respondent or by its investors). This may have suggested it would be predisposed to reject the proposal. It has not done so and, as a member of ASEAN and current ASEAN chair, Singapore may be able to influence other countries in the region to take the same path.

However, the EUSIPA does not necessarily represent the wholesale rejection of investment arbitration by Singapore or indeed indicate a shift away from investment arbitration in the Asia-Pac region. Finalisation of the text of the EUSIPA comes shortly after the conclusion of another important trade agreement in that region, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. In the CPTPP, both the substantive investor protections and the procedural framework for dispute resolution have developed from those contained in more traditional BITs and MITs – both could be seen to be more protective of state interests. This may or may not be why eleven states (notably including Singapore and three other of the ten ASEAN member states) have agreed that investor-state disputes under the CPTPP will be resolved by ad hoc arbitration.[8] Interestingly, the Government of Korea has proposed an intersessional Asia-Pacific meeting on ISDS reform in advance of the 36th Session of WGIII: this meeting may shed further light on current thinking amongst the governments in the region.

The EUSIPA text is significant for another reason: enforcement. The Negotiating Directives recognise the importance of an effective way of enforcing the decisions of an investment court but do not indicate how the EU envisages this will be achieved. Article 3.22 of the EUSIPA contains a commitment by the parties to recognise an award rendered pursuant to the EUSIPA as binding and “enforce the pecuniary obligation within its territory as if it were a final judgment of a court in that party” (language transposed almost word for word from the ICSID Convention). The text also confirms that final awards are arbitral awards relating to claims that are considered to arise out of a commercial relationship for the purposes of the New York Convention. This does not provide a perfect solution for enforcement of decisions of the EUSIPA investment court – states which are not party to the EUSIPA are not bound by its terms and therefore their domestic courts may not recognise a decision of the court as an arbitral award in this way. However, it does indicate that the negative view of investor-state arbitration within the EU – Trade Commissioner Malmström has described ISDS as “the most toxic acronym in Europe” – has not dissuaded the EU from using current systems for the enforcement of arbitral awards to suit the investment court agenda.

A bigger test – EU-Japan

The EU continues to discuss ISDS in the context of its negotiation of an economic partnership agreement with Japan. The text of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (the EUJEPA) has been agreed with the only outstanding issues to be resolved being investment protection and ISDS. It is apparent that the investment court proposal is causing some disquiet. Over the years, there has been some inconsistency in the way ISDS (and investment protection) has been viewed by Japan.[9] Further, Japan has demonstrated some flexibility towards the inclusion (or not) of traditional ISDS provisions in its trade and investment agreements, with the decision apparently based on circumstance rather than principle.[10] More recent anecdotal evidence suggests that Japan remains as yet unconvinced about an investment court for the EUJEPA or the broader MIC initiative: the permanent multilateral court will likely place a significant financial burden on Japan (which, as host state, has never faced an investment claim) and may not represent the best system for Japanese investors. This latter point is a significant concern for a capital-exporting nation. On 26 April, the EU confirmed that no conclusion has been reached on “the mechanism for resolving investment protection disputes“. Given that the investment chapter is already hived off, the differences should not interfere with the swift ratification of the rest of the EU-Japan EPA. However, the parties have confirmed that a further meeting will take place before the summer break 2018 with the ambition of resolving the issue. Notably, the Japanese delegate made clear during the 34th Session of WGIII that his mandate was to engage in discussion on a “step by step” basis and that, whilst the Japanese delegation was open to future discussion about the reform of ISDS, Japan was not prepared to talk to a future solution, including a permanent court, prematurely.

UNCITRAL WG III: more division than consensus and an early polarisation of the debate?

The 34th Session of WGIII was intended to focus on evaluation and identification of problems rather than solutions, but in any case saw a degree of polarisation between groups of member states which considered that the current system should be the focus of specific improvements, and those which wish to adopt a more wholesale systemic reform. The audio recordings reveal that, whilst the EU may have garnered some support for systemic reform (and continued to push for this in its observations), there remained considerable work to be done in convincing a number of states, not least the US.

The report from the 35th Session has just been published. At a superficial level, there is less evidence of the apparent polarisation of opinion perceptible from the report of the 34th Session. On the contrary, the general sense one gets from the more recent report is of a more consistent focus on shaping the current system to address concerns. Whilst the report indicates some support for creation of a permanent judicial body, this does not resonate throughout. The audio recordings are not yet available – a more detailed consideration of the dialogue amongst the delegations will give more insight into the direction which reform of ISDS may take. If the outcome of WGIII is not to establish an MIC, the EU may nonetheless seek to establish a plurilateral court to replace the separate investment courts set up to determine investor-state disputes under various of its free trade and investment agreements.[11] The support of its counter-parties to those agreements may not be guaranteed.