新的荷兰双边投资条约草案：对信箱公司投资者意味着什么？

更新时间：2018-06-07 11:19:45  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：2292次

新的荷兰双边投资条约草案：对信箱公司投资者意味着什么？

荷兰公布了一份新的《双边投资条约草案》（“Draft BIT”）供公众评论。《双边投资草案》如果获得通过，可能会使人们对长期以来通过在荷兰设立公司，以利用荷兰保护条约保护外国投资者的吸引力产生疑问。荷兰建议以这一新范本为基础，与非欧盟国家重新谈判现有的《双边投资条约》（BIT），因此，新草案中更具限制性的规定可能对受现有《双边投资条约》保护的现有投资者以及考虑未来投资的投资者具有重要意义。下文讨论《双边投资条约草案》的主要特点。

背 景

荷兰目前签署了100多项《双边投资条约》，其中许多是以其2004年《双边投资条约范本》为基础的。根据欧洲法院（the European Court of Justice）最近的一项裁定，即欧盟内部《双边投资条约》中的国际仲裁条款不符合欧盟法律，荷兰希望终止这类《双边投资条约》。然而，据信它仍然热衷于与非欧盟国家谈判《双边投资条约》，前提是这些国家不是欧盟与之有现行或未来贸易协定的贸易（external trading）当事方，例如加拿大、新加坡和墨西哥。

尽管《双边投资条约草案》有许多通常的实体性和程序性保护(公平和公正待遇保证(FET)、国民待遇(NT)、最惠国待遇(MFN)、限制征收以及投资者对政府提起仲裁程序的权利)，但对这些保护有着潜在的重大限制，如下文所述。

新的《双边投资条约草案》的主要特点

§  “投资者”和“投资”的定义：双边投资条约草案通过规定法人必须在其本国境内开展“实质性商业活动”，才有资格获得双边投资条约规定的保护(第1条(b)款(二)项)，缩小了2004年《双边投资条约范本》对投资者的保护范围。此外，《双边投资条约草案》规定了符合条件投资的特征，即“一定期限”、“资本或其他资源的承诺”和“风险承担”，以及对“预期收益或利润”更不寻常的要求。

§  范围：《双边投资条约草案》允许缔约国通过立法追求“合法的政策目标”，包括保护公共健康和环境（第2.2条），即所谓的“监管权”（ “right to regulate“）。因此，仅仅因为缔约国可能以对投资产生不利影响或干扰投资者期望的方式进行管制，不必然等同于对《双边投资条约》的违反。此外，缔约国可以引入或维持竞争方面的措施(第2.3条)，并可以停止或收回补贴（subsidies），但前提是这种措施是缔约国之间遵守国际义务所必需的，或者是有管辖权的法院或机关下令采取的措施。这些规定可能会影响到《双边投资条约》所提供的针对监管变化的保护程度。

§  法治、可持续发展及企业社会责任：《双边投资条约草案》十分重视保护环境和人权。它载有关于法治的明文规定。此外，《双边投资条约草案》载有关于“可持续发展”的新条款，要求缔约国确保“高水平的环境和劳动保护”，而不是降低这些领域的保护水平，以鼓励投资。缔约国还必须“重申”根据环境、劳工和人权条约所承担的义务。在裁决赔偿时，仲裁庭可将投资者不遵守《联合国企业与人权指导原则》和《经合组织准则》（OECD Guidelines）的情况考虑在内(第23条)。

§  MFN和其他实质性保护：对NT和MFN的保护实行限制。特别是，草案旨在防止投资者在其他条约中主张实体性义务或更有利的争端解决机制（第8.3条）。

§  FET / 合法预期：FET遵循CETA（《综合性经济贸易协定》），列出了构成违反义务的措施，其中包括缺乏公平正义、对正当程序的根本性违反和明显的任意性（arbitrariness）（第8条）。在考虑是否违反了FET的规定时，仲裁庭还可以将对投资者为吸引投产生合法预期的投资，投资者依赖该合法预期，而陈述随后改变政策的作出的任何具体陈述考虑在内。

§  保护伞条款：《双边投资条约草案》的保护伞条款似乎比先前条款的范围窄。第9.5条防止合同缔约方政府违反其与另一缔约方投资者就一项“具体投资”所作的“书面承诺”，从而对投资者或投资造成损失或损害。这与2004年《双边投资条约范本》相反，后者要求缔约方“遵守其就另一缔约方国民的投资可能承担的任何义务”。

§  征收：包括直接和间接征收，后者指的是对投资产生相当于直接征收影响的措施。间接征收将根据具体情况逐案确定，并考虑所采取措施的经济影响、期限和性质，并要求将“财产的基本属性”视为有资格获得补偿。国家可以采取为了保护合法利益而制定和实施的非歧视性（non-discriminatory）措施，只要这些措施不是过分严厉。

§  可仲裁的索赔和补救措施：草案的目的是限制投资者对违反双边投资条约核心保护条款(MFN、NT、FET、与投资有关的自由转让支付和征收)提出索赔。相比之下，现有的荷兰双边投资条约通常允许对任何“法律纠纷”进行仲裁。如果投资是通过欺诈性的陈述、隐瞒、腐败或类似的不诚信行为进行的，投资者不得提出索赔。除非争端各方就赔偿达成一致，仲裁庭可以裁决赔偿。

§  委任仲裁员/不允许‘双重身份’（‘double-hatting’）：值得注意的是，《双边投资条约草案》取消了当事人选定的仲裁员。如果根据ICSID或ICSID AF规则提起仲裁，仲裁庭成员将由ICSID秘书长委任；如果根据UNCITRAL规则提起仲裁，则由常设仲裁院（PCA）秘书长委任。仲裁员必须在其国家具备担任司法职务所需的资格，或者是具有“公认能力”的法学家。不允许“双重身份”；仲裁员不得担任代理律师，而且不得在过去五年中根据本协定或任何其他协定在投资争端中担任代理律师。

讨  论

《双边投资条约草案》如果获得通过，有可能大大改变荷兰现有和未来投资者的投资前景。此外，鉴于双边投资条约历来是被视为相对“投资者友好”标准的一个重要参照点，在这方面的任何后退（retreat）都进一步表明各国正在如何适应投资仲裁的发展。

在依赖现有双边投资条约的保护时，投资者往往从日落条款（sunset provisions）中得到安慰，这些条款规定，条约的保护在一方终止条约之后继续长期(10年或更长时间)适用。然而，如果按照当前的设想，荷兰利用《双边投资条约草案》重新谈判现有的双边投资条约，那么国家之间就有可能通过协议取消这种日落条款，使现有的投资者只能依赖新的保护办法。

此外，如果取消对空壳公司和特殊目的公司（SPVs）的保护在最后版本中保留下来，通过在荷兰设立的离岸公司而通过荷兰双边投资条约保护的标准投资路线可能会受到影响。关于《双边投资条约草案》的磋商将于2018年6月18日结束。

【英文部分】

The new draft Dutch BIT: what does it mean for investor mailbox companies?

By Andrew Cannon

The Netherlands has released a new draft investment treaty for public comment (“DraftBIT“).  If adopted, the Draft BIT may raise questions about the Kingdom’s attractiveness for foreign investors who have long taken advantage of Dutch treaty protections by structuring their investment via companies in the Netherlands.  The Netherlands proposes to use the new model as a basis for renegotiating its existing BITs with non-EU states, and, as such, the new draft’s more restrictive provisions may be significant for existing investors with protection under existing BITs, as well as those considering future investments. Key features of the Draft BIT are considered below.

Background

The Netherlands iscurrently signatory to over 100 BITs, many of which are based on its 2004 Model BIT.  Following the European Court of Justice’s recent decision thatinternational arbitration provisions in intra-EU BITs are incompatible with EU law, the Netherlands is understood to be looking to terminate such BITs. However, it is believed still to be keen to negotiate BITs with non-EU countries, provided that such countries are not external trading parties with which the EU has an existing or prospective trade agreement, such as Canada,Singapore and Mexico.

While the Draft BIT contains many of the usual substantive and procedural protections (guarantees of Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), National Treatment (NT),Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN), limitations on expropriation, and the right for an investor to bring arbitration proceedings against the government), there are potentially significant restrictions on these protections, as outlined below.

Key features of the new draft BIT

§  Definition of ‘Investor’ and ‘Investment’: The Draft BIT narrows its coverageof investors from that of the 2004 Model BIT, by providing that legal persons must have “substantial business activities” in their home territory toqualify for protection under the BIT (Article 1(b)(ii)). Further, the Draft BIT stipulates characteristics for a qualifying investment, namely “certain duration“, “commitment of capital or other resources” and “the assumption of risk“, as well as the more unusual requirement for an “expectation of gain or profit“.

§  Scope: The Draft BIT permits state parties to pursue “legitimate policy objectives” via regulation,including the protection of public health and the environment (Article 2.2),known as a “right to regulate“.  Accordingly, just because a stateparty may regulate in a manner which negatively affects an investment or interferes with an investor’s expectations this may not necessarily equate to a breach of the BIT.  Additionally, state parties may introduce or maintain measures in respect of competition (Article 2.3) and may discontinue or recover subsidies, provided such measure(s) is necessary to comply with international obligations between the state parties, or where it has been ordered by a competent court or authority. These provisions may affect the degree of protection against regulatory change afforded by the BIT.

§  Rule of law,sustainable development and corporate social responsibility: The Draft BIT places significant emphasis on the protection of environmental and human rights. It contains an express provision in respect of the rule of law. Further, the Draft BIT contains a new set of provisions entitled “Sustainable Development”,obliging the state parties to ensure “high levels of environment and labor protection” and not to lower levels of protection in these areas in order to encourage investment. State parties must also “reaffirm” their obligations under environmental, labour and human rights treaties. When awarding compensation, the Tribunal may take into account an investor’s non-compliance with the UN Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights,and the OECD Guidelines (Article 23).

§  MFN and othersubstantive protections: Limitations are imposed on the NTand MFN protections. In particular, the draft seeks to prevent investors from claiming the benefit of substantive obligations or more favourable dispute settlement mechanisms in other treaties (Article 8.3).

§  FET / Legitimateexpectations: FET follows the CETA[1]by listing measures which will constitute a breach of the obligation, including a denial of justice, a fundamental breach of due process and manifest arbitrariness (Article 8). In considering whether the FET provision has been breached, the Tribunal may also take into account any specific representation made to an investor to induce an investment that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor relied, and which the representor party subsequently frustrated.

§  Umbrella: The Draft BIT’s umbrella clause appears narrower than that of its predecessor. Article 9.5 prevents the government of a Contracting Party from breaching a “written commitment” it has made with investors of the other contracting party regarding a “specific investment” in such a way as to cause loss or damage to the investor or the investment.  This contrasts with the 2004 Model BIT which required parties to “observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party“.

§  Expropriation: Both direct and indirect expropriation is expressly referenced, with the latter amounting to measures which have an effect on the investment equivalent to that of direct expropriation. Indirect expropriation will be determined on a case-by-case,fact-specific basis and considering the economic impact, the duration and the character of the measure(s) taken, and will require that “fundamental attributes of property” be taken to be eligible for compensation. The statemay take non-discriminatory measures which are designed and applied in good faith to protect legitimate interests, provided such measures are not excessively severe.

§  Arbitrable claims and remedies: The draft seeks to restrict investors to bringing claims for breach of the Draft BIT’s core protections only (MFN, NT, FET, free transfer of payments relating to an investment, and expropriation). In contrast, existing Dutch BITs often permit arbitration of any “legal dispute”.  An investor may not bring a claim if the investment has been made through fraudulent representation, concealment, corruption or similar bad faith conduct. Tribunals may award compensation only, unless the disputing parties agree on restitution.

§  Appointment of arbitrators / no ‘double-hatting’:Significantly, the Draft BIT doesaway with party-appointed arbitrators. Tribunal members are to be appointed by either the Secretary-General of ICSID, if proceedings are brought pursuant to the ICSID or ICSID AF rules, or the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, if proceedings are brought under the UNCITRAL rules. Arbitrators must possess the required qualifications in their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be jurists of “recognized competence“. ‘Double-hatting’ is not permitted; arbitrators are precluded from acting as legal counsel and must not have acted as legal counsel for the last five yearsin investment disputes under this or any other international agreement.

 Discussion

If adopted, the Draft BIT has the potential to change the investment landscape in the Netherlands significantly, both for existing and future investors.  In addition, giventhe Dutch BIT has traditionally been an important reference point for what is seen as a relatively “investor friendly” standard, any retreat in this regard is a further telling indication of how States are adapting to developments ininvestment arbitration.

When relying on the protection of existing BITs, investors often take comfort in sunset provisions which provide that the treaty’s protection continues to apply for a long period(10 years or more) after the treaty is terminated by one party.  However,if, as currently intended, the Draft BIT were used by the Netherlands to renegotiate existing BITs, then it is possible that such sunset clauses may be dis-applied by agreement between states, leaving existing investors to rely only on the new protections.

Further, if the removal of protection for shell companies and SPVs is retained in the final version, then the standard Dutch route for BIT protection could be affected for companies without a substantial presence in the Netherlands.  The consultation on the Draft BIT will close on 18 June 2018.