印度执行仲裁裁决的最新进展和相关判例

更新时间：2018-06-07 11:21:26  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1690次

在最近的五项判决中，印度法院为国内和国际仲裁裁决的执行提供了重要指导。

本文首先讨论了印度最高法院（“Supreme Court“）的三项判决，根据最近的修订，澄清了对1996年《仲裁与调解法》（“Arbitration Act“）的解释，目的是简化执行程序。

其次，本文涉及德里高等法院和拉贾斯坦邦高等法院（Rajasthan High Court）关于挑战执行裁决的两项判决，为法院考量公共政策问题提供了有益指导。

最高法院关于执行程序修正案的判决

(i) Kandla Export Corporation and Another v OCI Corporation and another

Kandla Export涉及一项在伦敦作出的仲裁裁决。古吉拉特邦商事法庭（the Gujarat Commercial Court）批准了裁决债权人执行裁决的申请后，裁决债务人(先前曾就裁决向英国高等法院和上诉法庭提出上诉，但均未获胜诉)试图就该裁决向古吉拉特邦高等法院商事上诉庭（根据《商事法庭法》设立）提出上诉。债务人依据该法案第13(1)条，该条款赋予当事人就商事法院的判决向高等法院的商事上诉庭提出上诉的权利。

最高法院面临的问题是，第13(1)条中的上诉权是否适用于商事法庭执行仲裁裁决的决定。最高法院认为，《商事法庭法》的目标是“迅速解决具有商业性质的纠纷”，而形成进一步上诉权的任何解释都将违反《商事法庭法》和《仲裁法》的宗旨。法院的结论是，在这种情况下，根据《商事法庭法》没有进一步的上诉权。这是一个受欢迎的判决，因为它澄清了在商事法院制度下，裁决债务人没有任何上诉的'第二个机会'（a second‘bite of the cherry’）。

 (ii) Board of Control for Cricket in India vKochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd

在2015年对《仲裁法》进行修订时，对涉及裁决执行的第36条做了一项重要的修正。它现在规定，在根据第34条提出的撤销裁决的申请尚未审理期间，不存在自动中止执行的情况，除非提出并经法院批准关于中止执行的单独申请，否则裁决将具有可执行性。法院拥有对申请中止施加条件的自由裁量权，例如包括要求将全部或部分裁决金额交存法院。

2015年对《仲裁法》的修正于2015年10月23日生效。BCCI的问题在于，新的第36条是否也适用于2015年10月23日之前提交的对裁决的异议（根据第34条）。各高等法院在这一问题上作出了相互矛盾的裁定。

最高法院认定，新的第36条将适用于2015年10月23日之前提出并在该日仍在审理中的的执行异议。法院指出，执行是一个程序性（不是实质性）问题，因此，2015年的修正案可适用于待决异议。

有趣的是，最高法院提到了政府发布的新闻稿，政府在新闻稿中宣布打算修正《仲裁法》，以澄清这一问题。法院注意到，政府显然打算将新的第36条仅适用于2015年10月23日之后开始的仲裁，但指出，如果该意图得到实现，“那么颁布该修正案的目的就会落空”。

 (iii) Sundaram Finance Limited v Abdul Samad

在本案中，最高法院解决了另一个重要问题，这一问题一直是高等法院裁决冲突的主题。《仲裁法》第42条规定，如果与仲裁协议有关的申请是向某法院提出时，则只有该法院对仲裁程序和随后的任何申请拥有管辖权。这样做是为了避免在不同的高等法院就同一仲裁协议进行多项诉讼。

Sundaram Finance一案的问题是，执行裁决的申请是否也必须向这一法院提出，然后申请将该判决（decree）移交给拟执行的财产所在地的法院；或者是否可以将该申请直接提交该法院（各）。最高法院裁定，第42条不适用于仲裁程序已经终止的情况，因此并不影响执行。当事人可以直接向任何法院提出申请，要求就该法院管辖范围内的财产执行裁决，而不必首先申请将该裁决移交该法院。这是一个受欢迎的决定。它使各方当事人明确可以到哪个法院申请强制执行，并在这个过程中减少了一个步骤。

高等法院关于公共政策异议的裁定

(i) Daiichi Sankyo Company Limited v Malvinder Mohan Singh and others

Daiichi Sankyo 是德里高等法院的一项裁定，该裁定允许执行国际仲裁裁决的一部分，但拒绝执行涉及某些未成年（minors）裁决债务人的裁决。仲裁产生于将裁决债务人（Singh先生和其他人）在Ranbaxy Laboratories有限公司的股份出售给裁决债权人（Daiichi Sankyo）的协议。仲裁地点在新加坡，仲裁规则国际商会规则（ICC Rules）。裁决债权人辩称，它是通过欺诈性不实陈述（fraudulent misrepresentation）而被诱购买这些股份的，仲裁庭裁定赔偿债权人损失。

裁决债务人对该裁决的执行提出异议，理由是该裁决违反了印度的基本政策。特别是，对以下问题提出了异议：(一) 裁定的损害赔偿额；(二) 仲裁庭根据合同裁定间接损害赔偿（consequential damages）；(三) 仲裁庭关于时效的决定；(四) 仲裁庭关于利息的裁定；(五) 裁定对未成年被申请人的损害赔偿。法院驳回了所有异议除了最后一项，指出作为一般原则，印度法律的基本政策“并不是指成文法的规定，而是作为印度法律基础的基本原则（substratal principles）。”在审议对仲裁庭关于损害赔偿的裁决提出的异议时，法院指出：“在案件的事实和情节中必须考虑到的损害赔偿的量化问题和各种因素，必然是基于事实的调查，而且必然属于仲裁庭的职权范围”。法院指出，“本法院在审议根据《仲裁法》第48条提出的异议时，不应深入讨论这些方面”，并驳回了异议。

对于执行的最后一项异议（关于其中一些裁决债务人是未成年人的事实），法院认定，仲裁庭的裁决违反了印度法律，因为未成年人不能被视为通过代理人实施了欺诈。接着指出，考虑到其他立法，保护未成年人是印度法律的基本政策的一部分，因此，不能对未成年的裁决债务人强制执行该裁决。

 (ii) Django Navigation Ltd v Indo Ferro Metal Private Ltd

在Django Navigation一案中，裁决债务人对伦敦的一个仲裁庭根据LMAA规则作出的裁决提出异议。当事人订立了租船合同，其证据是一项租船确认书（Fixture Recap），内容如下：“20)英国法律/伦敦仲裁/适用LMAA规则”.船东（裁决债权人）声称，租船人（裁决债务人）没有提供货物而放弃或终止了租船合同。

租船人没有参加仲裁，并辩称，裁决应当撤销，理由是：（一）未订立仲裁协议；（二）裁决违背印度的公共政策。拉贾斯坦邦高等法院驳回了这两个论点。它认为，航运业的通常做法是通过电子邮件往来和祖传确认书订立运输合同，仲裁协议中没有含糊不清之处。法院还认为，在根据《仲裁法》第48条对裁决提出异议时，法院“不能进行实体审查”。它指出，租船人本可以根据1996年《英国仲裁法》参加仲裁或提出上诉，但却选择不这样做。因此，禁止其在该申请书中就裁决的是非曲直提出争论。

评   论

最高法院的判决澄清了与印度执行裁决有关的重要问题。这些问题受到高级法院多项冲突裁决的制约，最高法院的裁决结束了这种不确定性。BCCI 的判决对目前在印度法院对仲裁裁决提出异议进行辩护的当事人具有重要意义。关于新的第36条与这些申请相关的裁定意味着，中止执行（可能需要很长时间）不再是默认立场。在 Kandla Exports 和Sundaram Finance案中，最高法院的裁决为更简单的执行程序铺平了道路，拒绝了分别在执行过程中增加一轮上诉和采取进一步措施的企图。

最后，Django Sankyo和Django Navigation在审查以公共政策为由撤销裁决的申请时均展现一种有力的做法，同时也指出，在某些情况下（这里指未成年人的参与），公共政策确实可以发挥作用。

【英文部分】

Indian Courts settle key issues relating to enforcement of awards

By Donny Surtani

In five recent judgments, the Indian courts have offered important guidance on the enforcement of both domestic and international awards in India.

This post first discusses three judgments of the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court“), clarifying the interpretationof the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act“), in light of recent amendments intended to simplify the enforcement process.

Next, the post covers two judgments of the Delhi High Court and Rajasthan High Court on challenges to enforcement of awards, which offer useful guidance on the courts’ approach to issues of public policy.

Supreme Court judgments on amendments to the enforcement process

(i) Kandla Export Corporation and Another v OCI Corporation and another

Kandla Export related to an arbitration award issued in London.When the Gujarat Commercial Court granted the award creditor’s application to enforce the award, the award debtor (who had previously appealed the award,without success, to both the English High Court and the Court of Appeal) sought to appeal that decision to the Commercial Appellate Division of the Gujarat High Court (created pursuant to the Commercial Courts Act[1]).The debtor relied on section 13(1) of that Act, which allows parties a right of appeal from a judgment of a Commercial Court to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the right of appeal in section 13(1) was applicable in the context of a decision by a Commercial Court to enforce an arbitral award. The Supreme Court considered that the objective of the Commercial Courts Act was a “speedy resolution of disputes of a commercial nature” and any construction that created a further right of appeal would be contrary the purpose of both the Commercial Courts Act and the Arbitration Act. It concluded that there was no further right of appeal under the Commercial Courts Act in this context. This is a welcome judgment as it clarifies that award debtors do not have a second ‘bite of the cherry’ under the Commercial Court regime.

(ii) Board of Control for Cricket in India v Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd

When the Arbitration Act was amended in 2015, one important amendment was to Section 36, which relates to enforcement of awards.It now provides that there is no automatic stay of enforcement whilst an application to set aside an award under Section 34 is pending, and the award will be enforceable unless a separate application to stay enforcement is made and granted by the court. The court has the discretion to impose conditions on the stay including, for example, a requirement to deposit all or part of the award amount at court.

The 2015 amendments to the Arbitration Act came into effect on 23 October 2015. The issue in BCCI was whether the new Section 36 also applied to challenges to awards (under Section 34) filed before 23 October 2015.  Various High Courts had reached conflicting decisions on this issue.

The Supreme Court found that the new Section 36 would apply to challenges filed before 23 October 2015 and were pending at that date.It observed that execution was a procedural (not substantive) matter and so the 2015 amendment could apply to extant challenges.

Interestingly, the Supreme Court referred to the Government’s press release (discussed here) where the Government announced its intention to amend the Arbitration Act to clarify this issue. The court noted the Government’s apparent intention to make the new Section 36 only applicable to arbitrations commenced after 23 October 2015, but noted that “the very object of the enactment of the Amendment Act would otherwise be defeated” if that intention was given effect.

(iii) Sundaram Finance Limited v Abdul Samad

In this case, the Supreme Court settled another important issue that had been the subject of conflicting High Court decisions.Section 42 of the Arbitration Act states that where an application relating to an arbitration agreement is made to one court, only that court would have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and any subsequent applications. It was meant to avoid multiple proceedings in different High Courts relating to the same arbitration agreement.

The issue in Sundaram Finance was whether an application to enforce an award must also be made to this one court, followed by an application to transfer the decree to the court(s) of the place where the assets targeted for enforcement are located; or whether the application can be made directly to such court(s). The Supreme Court found that Section 42 did not apply where arbitration proceedings had been terminated and therefore did not affect enforcement. Parties could apply directly to any court to execute the award in respect of assets within that court’s jurisdiction, without having to first apply to transfer the decree to that court. This is a welcome decision.It gives parties clarity on which court to approach for enforcement and cuts out one step in the process.

High Court decisions on public policy challenges to awards

(i) Daiichi Sankyo Company Limited v Malvinder Mohan Singh and others

Daiichi Sankyo is a decision of the Delhi High Court where the court allowed the enforcement of an international arbitration award in part but refused enforcement in relation to certain award debtors who were minors. The arbitration arose out of an agreement to sell the award debtors’ (Mr Singh andothers’) shares in Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited to the award creditor (Daiichi Sankyo). The arbitration was seated in Singapore and under the ICC Rules. The award creditor argued that it was induced to purchase the shares by afraudulent misrepresentation, and the tribunal awarded the creditor damages.

The award debtors challenged the enforcement of the award on the grounds that the award was contrary to the fundamental policy of India. In particular, it challenged: (i) the quantum of damages awarded; (ii)the tribunal’s decision to award consequential damages under the contract;(iii) the tribunal’s decision on limitation; (iv) the tribunal’s award of interest; and (v) the award of damages against respondents who were minors. The court dismissed all but the last objection, noting that as a general principle,fundamental policy of Indian law “does not mean provisions of the statutebut substratal principles on which Indian Law is founded.” In considering the challenges to the tribunal’s decision on damages, the court observed: “The quantification of the damages and the various factors that would have to be taken in account in the facts and circumstances of a case would necessarily be a fact based enquiry and would necessarily be within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal“. It noted that it “is not for this Court to dwell deep into these aspects while considering objections under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act” and dismissed the objection.

On the final objection to enforcement (relating to the fact that some of the award debtors were minors), the court found that the tribunal’s decision was contrary to Indian law in that a minor could not beheld to have committed fraud through an agent. It then observed, considering other legislation, that that protection of minors was part of the fundamental policy of Indian law and therefore the award was not enforceable against the award debtors who were minors.

(ii) Django Navigation Ltd v Indo Ferro Metal Private Ltd

In Django Navigation, the award debtor challenged an award passed by an arbitral tribunal seated in London under the LMAA Rules. The parties entered into a charterparty evidenced by a fixture recap that stated: “20) English Law/ Arb London/ LMAA Rules to Apply“. The vessel owner (award creditor) alleged that the charterer (award debtor) had renounced or terminated the charterparty by failing to provide the cargo.

The charterer did not participate in the arbitration and argued that the award should be set aside on the basis that: (i) no arbitration agreement was concluded; and (ii) the award was contrary to the public policy of India. The Rajasthan High Court rejected both arguments. It held that it was common practice in the shipping industry to conclude contracts of carriage by email exchange and a fixture recap and that there was no ambiguity in the arbitration agreement. The court also held that in a challenge to an award under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act it “cannot look into the merits of the case“. It observed that the charterer could have participated in the arbitration or filed an appeal under the English Arbitration Act, 1996 but had chosen not to do so. It was therefore estopped from raising arguments on the merits of the award in this application.

Comment

The Supreme Court judgments offer clarity on important issues relating to enforcement of awards in India. These issues were subject to multiple conflicting High Court decisions and the Supreme Court’s decisions put an end to this uncertainty. The BCCI judgment will be of great significance to parties currently defending a challenge to an arbitration award in the Indian courts.  The ruling that the new Section 36 is relevant to these applications means that a (potentially lengthy) stay of enforcement is no longer the default position. In Kandla Exports and Sundaram Finance,the Supreme Court’s decisions pave the way for a simpler enforcement process,rejecting the attempts to add another round of appeal and a further step in the enforcement process respectively.

Lastly, both Daiichi Sankyo and Django Navigationdemonstrate a robust approach to examining applications to set aside awards on public policy grounds whilst noting that in certain instances (here, the involvement of minors) public policy does have a role to play.