英国高等法院准予禁诉令，并确认仲裁地选择条款“类似于专属管辖权条款”

更新时间：2018-06-19 11:37:24  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1945次

在Atlas Power v National Transmission and Despatch Company Ltd [2018] EWHC 1052一案中，英国高等法院批准了一项终局性的禁诉令，永久性地禁止巴基斯坦政府所有的国家电网公司（“NTDC”） 在巴基斯坦境内（或除了英国和威尔士以外的任何地方）对一项LCIA部分最终裁决提出异议。

准予禁诉令完全基于仲裁地是伦敦。Phillips法官驳回了NTDC的如下主张，即巴基斯坦法院也同时拥有管辖权或仲裁地是巴基斯坦拉合尔，并确认双方对仲裁地的约定也是对裁决提出异议的管辖法院的约定。

背景

基础争议涉及NTDC对在巴基斯坦境内注册的九个独立电力生产商（“申请人”）的欠款，这些生产商分别根据各自的购电协议（“购电协议”）排他性地向NTDC提供能源。

购电协议均包含了类似的争议解决条款（“争议解决条款”）。争议解决条款包含了“双边讨论”和专家决定的界限，所有未决争议（包括那些通过其他方式未能解决的争议）将在伦敦国际仲裁院仲裁解决。

争议解决条款还规定，“仲裁应在巴基斯坦拉合尔进行”，但（除此之外）如争议金额超过400万美元，“任何一方可[…]，要求在伦敦进行仲裁[…]。”

专家决定程序

最初，争议被提交专家决定。该专家认为NTDC非法扣留了购电协议下对申请人的多项欠款。

申请人寻求予以支付专家决定中规定的款项。然而，巴基斯坦政府寻求巴基斯坦法院声明该决定无效且为非法的，并获得了一项禁止申请人和NTDC在后续裁定作出前对决定采取法律措施。

仲裁程序

每个申请人此前均已提起了单独的LCIA仲裁程序，并中止了这些程序以等待专家决定的结果。

在禁诉令作出后，2015年11月，申请人向LCIA发函请求：（1）恢复仲裁，基于该决定（Determination）是终局性的且有约束力的；以及（ii）确认决定（Determination）的有效性以及对指定金额支付的赔偿请求。

仲裁地

根据争议解决条款的规定以及索赔的金额，申请人确定仲裁地为伦敦。

NTDC在其仲裁的答辩中辩称，争议解决条款仅赋予了申请人选择仲裁开庭地点而不是仲裁地的权利。NTDC认为仲裁地是巴基斯坦的拉合尔。

2015年12月31日，申请人再次发函给LCIA主张，如果NTDC的解释是正确的：（1）那么双方根本未就仲裁地达成一致；及（2）因此，仲裁地将根据1998年LCIA规则第16（1）条确定，该条规定了在双方未达成任何协议的情况下：“仲裁地应为伦敦，除非LCIA仲裁院决定……另一个仲裁地更合适”。

LCIA仲裁院裁决仲裁地应为伦敦。

部分终局性裁决

NTDC未能成功阻止仲裁程序，巴基斯坦政府寻求巴基斯坦法院的仲裁禁止令。

独任仲裁员裁决（现在已合并）仲裁可以继续进行。然而，很多初步问题的决定都是根据书面的意见书作出的，因为NTDC认为由于在巴基斯坦的临时禁令无法参加庭审

2017年6月8日，仲裁员作出了部分终局性裁决，认为：

申请人已根据购电协议有效地行使了一项变更仲裁地的附条件性选择，但无论如何，LCIA均已通过终局性和有约束力的方式确定了该仲裁地；

该决定是终局性的且对当事人均有约束力；并且

NTDC应为申请人的索赔支付临时保证金。

2017年7月，NTDC请求巴基斯坦法院作出撤销部分终局性裁决的裁定。2017年8月，申请人在英国高等法院申请了一项禁诉令。

判决

NTDC认为，根据巴基斯坦法律，各方不能通过双方订立的受巴基斯坦法律约束的合同排除巴基斯坦法院的监督管辖权。因此，在NTDC案件中，选择伦敦作为仲裁地不能产生一个“假定的意图”，即英国法院拥有专属的监督管辖权。NTDC认为，巴基斯坦法院至少一定对该争议同时拥有管辖权，禁诉令是不适当的。

另外，NTDC认为，如果只能存在一个监督管辖权（如仲裁地法院的管辖权），那么将伦敦作为仲裁地的选择必须无效，因为它违反了巴基斯坦的法律。

然而，申请人成功地主张了仲裁地是伦敦（如LCIA仲裁院和仲裁员决定的那样），并依据上诉法院在C v D [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239一案中作出的判决，认为英国法院确实对仲裁拥有专属的监督管辖权。

Phillips法官认为（适用C v D一案时）对仲裁地的选择决定了仲裁的“仲裁法”（“curial law”）（即仲裁程序的法律），这将包括对裁决提起任何异议所依据的法律。特别地，Phillips J引用了Cooke 法官在C v D [2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm)一案中的一审判决（第42段）（经上诉法院批准）：

“英国法律是否是仲裁协议的准据法并不重要，关键是英国法律是裁决有效性及撤销仲裁裁决的适用法律。”

因此，NTDC试图基于购电协议受巴基斯坦法律约束而不受C v D案件制约的尝试被驳回。

Phillips法官进一步确认了，英国法院将对仲裁地的选择视为“类似于专属管辖权条款”，以支持仲裁地的法院的管辖权，并驳回了“极不令人满意”的另一主张即不止一个法院有撤销裁决的管辖权。

NTDC另一关于巴基斯坦为仲裁地的替代性主张也未被支持，因为其没有就LCIA关于仲裁地为伦敦的裁决及时提起异议。Phillips法官驳回了NTDC认为其不能在未被明确认可作为仲裁地的英格兰提起异议，并主张对管辖权异议的申请或对仲裁地异议的申请“显然”不等同于认可该管辖权或仲裁地。因此， NTDC应受LCIA仲裁院所做的裁决约束。

因此，Phillips法官认为英国法院是可对裁决提起异议并准予禁诉令的唯一法院。

评 论

这是确认英国法院将仲裁地的选择视为等同于专属管辖权条款，以支持仲裁地所在法院的管辖权之判例法中最新判决。Atlas Power一案作为一个受人欢迎的提示，提示着英国法院根据1996年仲裁法行使其监督权所采取的强势立场，以及英国判例法的一致性。

该案还强调了下述事项的重要性：（i）明确定义仲裁协议中的仲裁地；（二）明确起草仲裁条款，特别是在当事人自定义仲裁条款的情况下，双方对变更仲裁地的双边选择权。英国和巴基斯坦同时进行的诉讼表明了尽管后发生的诉讼是因仲裁协议的条款产生的，仍可能会发生时间拖延以及双方仍可能需要支付额外费用的情况。

 该案还提醒当事人在提出关于仲裁地的异议时应及时向法院提出申请。NTDC因为当时没有及时对LCIA做出的仲裁地决定提出异议，因此其主张仲裁地是巴基斯坦就面临了困境，而且，不能基于仲裁地不是伦敦而要求巴基斯坦法院撤销该部分终局性裁决。

[英文原文]

English High Court grants an anti-suit injunction and confirms that the choice of arbitral seat is “analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause”

By Chris Parker

In Atlas Power v National Transmission and Despatch Company Ltd [2018] EWHC 1052 the English High Court granted a final anti-suit injunction to permanently restrain a national grid company owned by the Government of Pakistan (“NTDC“) from challenging an LCIA Partial Final Award in Pakistan (or anywhere other than England and Wales).

The injunction was granted on the “entirely straightforward” basis that the seat of the arbitration was London.  Phillips J rejected NTDC’s arguments that the courts of Pakistan had concurrent jurisdiction or that the seat of the arbitration was Lahore, Pakistan, and confirmed that an agreement on the seat of the arbitration is also an agreement on the forum for any challenges to an award. 

Background

The underlying dispute concerned sums owed by NTDC to nine independent power producers registered in Pakistan (“Claimants“) who supplied energy exclusively to NTDC under individual Power Purchasing Agreements (“PPAs“).

The PPAs all contained a similar dispute resolution clause (“DR Clause“).  The DR Clause contained carve outs for “mutual discussions” and expert determination, with all remaining disputes (including those left unresolved by other methods) to be “settled by arbitration in accordance with the London Court of International Arbitration“.

The DR Clause further stated that “the arbitration shall be conducted in Lahore, Pakistan” provided that if (among others) the amount in dispute exceeded $4 million “either Party may […], require that the arbitration be conducted in London […].”

Expert determination process

Initially the dispute was referred to expert determination.  The expert found that NTDC had unlawfully withheld various sums owed to the Claimants under the PPAs (“Determination”).

The Claimants sought payment of the sums specified in the Determination.  However, the Government of Pakistan sought a declaration from the courts of Pakistan that the Determination was null, void and illegal, and obtained an injunction preventing the Claimants and NTDC from acting upon the Determination until further order.

Arbitration proceedings

Each of the Claimants had commenced separate LCIA arbitration proceedings and stayed them pending the outcome of the expert determination process.

Following the injunction, in November 2015, the Claimants wrote to the LCIA asking for: (i) the arbitrations to be resumed on the basis that the Determination was final and binding; and (ii) declaratory relief as to the validity of the Determination and payment of the specified sums.

Seat of the arbitration

Relying on the provisions of the DR Clause and the value of the claim, the Claimants designated London as the seat of the arbitration.

NTDC argued in its Responses to the arbitrations that the DR Clause only entitled the Claimants to select the venue of the arbitrations and not the seat.  NTDC maintained that the seat of the arbitrations was Lahore, Pakistan.

On 31 December 2015 the Claimants wrote again to the LCIA asserting that, if NTDC’s interpretation was correct: (1) the parties had not agreed on a seat at all; and (2) the seat accordingly fell to be determined under article 16(1) of the LCIA Rules 1998, which provides that in the absence of any agreement between the parties: “the seat of the arbitration shall be London unless and until the LCIA court determines […] that another seat is more appropriate“.

The LCIA Court determined that the seat of the arbitrations was London.

Partial Final Award

NTDC unsuccessfully applied to stay the arbitrations.  The Government of Pakistan sought further injunctive relief against the arbitrations from the courts of Pakistan.

The sole arbitrator ruled that the (by now consolidated) arbitration could proceed nonetheless.  However various preliminary issues were determined on the basis of written submissions as NTDC considered itself unable to participate in a hearing due to interim orders granted in Pakistan.

On 8 June 2017 the arbitrator issued a Partial Final Award finding that:

§  the Claimants had validly exercised a conditional option under the PPAs to vary the seat of the arbitration, but, in any event, the LCIA had determined the seat in a manner that was final and binding;

§  the Determination was final and binding on the parties; and

§  NTDC should pay interim security for the Claimants’ claims.

In July 2017 NTDC sought an order from the courts of Pakistan setting aside the Partial Final Award.  In August 2017 the Claimants filed an application in the English High Court for an anti-suit injunction.

Decision

NTDC argued that under the law of Pakistan, the parties could not exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of Pakistan from a contract concluded between Pakistani parties and governed by Pakistani law. Therefore, on NTDC’s case, the choice of a London seat could not give rise to a “presumed intention” that the English courts had exclusive supervisory jurisdiction.  NTDC maintained that the courts of Pakistan must have at least concurrent jurisdiction over the dispute and that an anti-suit injunction was inappropriate.

In the alternative, NTDC argued that if there could only be one supervisory jurisdiction, (i.e. the jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration) then the choice of a London seat must be invalid as it was contrary to the law of Pakistan.

However, the Claimants successfully argued that the seat of the arbitration was London (as determined by the LCIA Court and the arbitrator) and relied on the Court of Appeal decision in C v D [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239, to assert that the English courts did have exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration.

Phillips J held (applying C v D) that the choice of the seat determined the “curial law” of the arbitration (i.e. the law governing the arbitration proceedings), which would include any challenge to an award.  In particular, Phillips J referred to paragraph 42 of the first instance judgment of Cooke J in C v D [2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm) (approved by the Court of Appeal):

“it does not matter whether English law is or is not the governing law of the agreement to arbitrate.  It is the curial law which governs the question of the validity of the award and challenges to it“.

NTDC’s attempts to distinguish C v D on the basis that the PPAs were governed by the law of Pakistan were therefore rejected.

Phillips J further confirmed that the English courts regard the choice of arbitral seat as “analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause” in favour of the courts of the seat, and rejected the “highly unsatisfactory” alternative where more than one jurisdiction could hear challenges to an award.

NTDC’s alternative argument that the seat was in Pakistan also failed, as it had not made a timely challenge to the LCIA’s determination that the seat was in London.  Phillips J rejected NTDC’s argument that it could not have brought a challenge within the jurisdiction without implicitly accepting that the seat of the Arbitration was in England, holding that an application to challenge jurisdiction or the seat of an arbitration “plainly” does not amount to an acceptance of that jurisdiction or seat.  NTDC was therefore bound by the decision of the LCIA Court.

Accordingly, Phillips J held that the English courts represented the only venue in which the Award could be challenged and granted the anti-suit injunction.

Comment

This is the latest decision in a line of case law confirming that the English courts will treat a choice of seat as akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of the seat.  Atlas Power acts as a welcome reminder of the robust position that the English courts will take towards their supervisory powers under the Arbitration Act 1996, and the consistency of English case law in this area.

The case also highlights the importance of: (i) clearly defining the seat of the arbitration in the arbitration agreement; and (ii) clear drafting, particularly where the parties seek to customise an arbitration clause – in this case the bilateral option to vary the seat of the arbitration.  The concurrent proceedings in England and Pakistan demonstrate the additional delay and costs that can be incurred by parties though satellite litigation over the terms of the arbitration agreement.

The case also acts as a reminder for parties to bring a timely application if challenging an arbitral seat.  NTDC faced difficulties with its alternative argument that the arbitration was seated in Pakistan as it had not challenged the LCIA’s determination at the time, and there was no pending challenge to the Partial Final Award on the basis that the seat was not London.