美国地方法院拒绝允许非仲裁当事人介入执行程序

更新时间：2018-07-06 14:08:07  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1349次

美国地方法院拒绝允许非仲裁当事人介入执行程序，

尽管非当事人对裁决可能负人格混同责任

在Eddystone Rail Co. v. Jamex Transfer Servs., LLC, No. 17-cv-1266 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018) 案中，纽约南区某地方法院最近拒绝允许一批潜在介入者，即Jamex Transfer Services公司（“Jamex”）的所有前子公司和管理人，介入Eddystone Rail公司为执行由Jamex向 Eddystone支付1.39亿美元的仲裁裁决而提起的诉讼。法院驳回了介入者的请求，尽管事实上Eddystone已经单独向宾夕法尼亚洲东区提出诉讼（“宾夕法尼亚洲诉讼”），指控介入者剥夺Jamex的资产，继而策划一场虚假交易将其卖给一家空壳公司。法院认定，Eddystone提起宾夕法尼亚诉讼旨在请求法院宣布介入者是Jamex的另一自我（alter-egos），以便“进一步执行已确认的对介入者不利的仲裁裁决”，但仍将介入者排除在执行程序之外。

用地方法院自己的话说，介入者不是Edyystone和Jamex之间的仲裁程序的当事人，其提出的法律问题是，“非仲裁当事人是否可以为质疑仲裁裁决的有效性而介入联邦诉讼程序”。法院出于多种原因拒绝允许介入：

首先，地方法院认为，介入者没有资格干预执法程序，因其缺乏宪法要求的事实上的损害。介入者声称的损害是指其可能在宾夕法尼亚洲诉讼中被宣布为Jamex的另一自我，并随后对裁决数额承担责任。法院认为，“拟议的介入者请求撤销仲裁裁决，作为宾夕法尼亚州诉讼抗辩策略的一部分……但仅凭这个理由不足以证明存在事实上的损害，因为诉讼当事人根本不可能事先证明司法系统将对其案件作出任何特定结果。”

同样，地方法院认为，介入者对仲裁的干预缺乏必要的“实质利益”。法院指出，作为一般规则，“仲裁的非当事人不得请求推翻其结果。”法院随后审议该一般规则的例外，该例外适用于第二巡回法院各法庭，其中裁定，“在某些有限的情况下，非当事人在仲裁中可能具有重大利益，因此应允许其在随后的联邦确认程序中享有介入权。”法院主张，介入者缺乏这种利益，主要是由于其在宾夕法尼亚洲诉讼中的地位，即他们并不是Jamex的另一自我，且对仲裁裁决不负任何责任。法院指出，介入者“立场不坚定”，即一方面声称对仲裁和裁决具有重大利益，但另一方面否认与Jamex有任何联系或对裁决承担责任。

最后，法院指出，执行诉讼旨在成为直截了当的程序，“邀请非当事人参与仲裁确认程序，而该非当事人的利益取决于另一个司法管辖区一个独立待决诉讼的结果，这将过度拖延本应直截了当的诉讼。”

总之，法院认为介入者在执行诉讼中的唯一利益是“一种过早的担心，即如果Eddystone在宾夕法尼亚洲诉讼中胜诉，任何确认仲裁裁决的判决都可能被执行”，并拒绝允许介入。从地方法院的裁定来看，担心为仲裁裁决承担人格混同责任的当事人应考虑介入基础仲裁本身，以避免非当事人对执行程序的干预。

 

【英文部分】：

U.S.: District court refuses to allow non-parties to arbitration to intervene in enforcement proceedings, despite non-parties’ potential alter-ego liability for award.

Author: Brandon Caire and David Zaslowsky

Eddystone Rail Co. v. Jamex Transfer Servs., LLC, No. 17-cv-1266 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018)

A district court in the Southern District of New York recently refused to allow a group of would-be Intervenors, all former affiliates and/or officers of Jamex Transfer Services, LLC (“Jamex”), to intervene in a proceeding brought by Eddystone Rail Company, LLC, to enforce $139 million agreed arbitration award in Eddystone’s favor against Jamex. The Court rejected the Intervenors’ request in spite of the fact that Eddystone had separately filed an action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Action”), alleging that the Intervenors stripped Jamex of its assets before orchestrating a sham transaction in which Jamex was sold to a shell company. The Court recognized that Eddystone aimed in the Pennsylvania Action to have the Intervenors declared to be alter-egos of Jamex, in order to “move one step closer to enforcing a confirmed arbitration award” against the Intervenors, but nevertheless excluded the Intervenors from enforcement proceedings.

In the district court’s own words, the legal question presented by the Intervenors, who were not parties to the arbitration proceedings between Edyystone and Jamex, was “whether a non-party to an underlying arbitration may intervene in a federal proceeding for the purpose of challenging the validity of an arbitration award.” The court refused to allow an intervention for multiple reasons.

First, the district court held that the Intervenors had no standing to intervene in enforcement proceedings because they had not established a constitutionally-required injury in fact. The Intervenors’ alleged injury amounted to the possibility that they might be declared alter egos of Jamex in the Pennsylvania Action, and subsequently be responsible for the award amount. The court held, “The proposed intervenors seek to vacate the arbitration award as part of their defense strategy in the Pennsylvania Action … [b]ut that reason alone is insufficient to demonstrate an injury in fact because it is just not possible for a litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case.”

Similarly, the district court held that the Intervenors lacked a requisite “substantial interest” in the arbitration to intervene. In doing so, the court observed that, as a general rule, “a non-party to the arbitration may not seek to overturn its outcome.” The court then considered one exception to this general rule, applied by various courts in the Second Circuit, which had determined that, “in certain limited situations, a non-party may have so substantial an interest in an arbitration that it should be permitted to intervene as of right in a subsequent federal confirmation proceeding.” The court held that the Intervenors lacked such an interest, largely due to their position in the Pennsylvania Action that they were not alter egos of Jamex and that they bore no responsibility for the arbitration award. The court pointed out that the Intervenors “straddle[d] untenable positions”; that is, on the one hand, they claimed a substantial interest in the arbitration and award, but, on the other, they disavowed any affiliation with Jamex or liability for the award.

Finally, the court noted that enforcement actions are designed to be straightforward proceedings. In the court’s words, “Inviting non-parties to this arbitration confirmation proceeding, whose interests are conditioned on the outcome of a separate, pending action in another jurisdiction, would unduly delay what is otherwise supposed to be a straightforward action.”

In sum, the court viewed the Intervenors’ only interest in the enforcement action as “an inchoate fear that any judgment confirming the Arbitration Award may be enforced against them if Eddystone is successful in the Pennsylvania Action,” and refused to allow an intervention. In view of the district court’s holdings, parties concerned about possible alter ego liability for an arbitration award should consider intervening in the underlying arbitration itself, thereby avoiding any bar on intervention by non-parties in enforcement proceedings.