国际仲裁的利益冲突问题（英国）

更新时间：2017-09-12 17:13:36  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1527次

英国律师纪律法庭（相当于法国律师纪律委员会）在其2017年7月18日所作的裁决中，对一家知名律师事务所及其一名合伙人处以大笔罚款，因其没有发现客户之间存在利益冲突并且未能对获得的机密信息进行保护。这份远在英国的裁决提示了利益冲突问题在律师日常实践中的重要性，并强调如果出现利益冲突或者缺乏足够的远见，都可能陷入无法摆脱的困境。此外，这一裁决向专门从事国际仲裁实践的律师事务所提出了有关利益冲突的问题，尤其是当涉及国际层面时：他们更须予以高度重视，因为这些案件往往涉及几个不同国家的办事处和律师。

一、案件事实

案件虽然复杂，但还是应准确报告相关事实以便对裁决范围进行评定。

2010年，一家大型律师事务所，通过其伦敦办事处及其在国际仲裁领域的合伙人，向客户建议提起仲裁程序（以下简称“案件A”），该仲裁请求起初针对两个人，后来扩展到另外两名被申请人（以下简称“C”和“D”），特别是涉及两人间接持有的美国公司。2011年，就某一起完全不同的案件（以下简称“案件B”），C和D间接持有的公司向该律师事务所纽约办事处征询意见，在同意接受案件B之前，该律师事务所实施了内部利益冲突检查程序，其结果显示案件A与案件B之间存在关联。由于案件A已事先被解决，该律师事务所认为这与接受案件B没有利益冲突。但是在接受案件B后不久，案件A又有了新的进展。因此，2012年5月，案件A的客户针对C、D向伦敦办事处及其合伙人发出了新指示。

2013年3月至2013年8月期间，负责案件A的合伙人先后开始了针对C、D的仲裁程序和在高等法院的诉讼程序；此外，为支持仲裁程序，该合伙人在美国提交了针对“案件B”所涉公司的调查申请。

应该指出的是，在此期间，该律师事务所实施了新的内部利益冲突检查程序：（1）第一次于2012年11月由负责案件A的合伙人提议实施；（2）随后于2013年第两次实施了该程序。这两次检查中，案件A和案件B之间的潜在的利益冲突都被系统地排除了。特别是在2013年初，负责案件B的纽约办事处认为根据《纽约律师协会规则》不需要撤回案件B，而只需考虑道德层面的问题并防止负责案件A和案件B的两个团队之间互相披露机密信息。因此，该律师事务所通过其伦敦办事处继续作为案件A客户的代理人，尽管其已通过纽约办事处代表其潜在的对手。2014年，C和D在诉讼程序中请求高等法院签发针对该律师事务所的禁令并阻止其继续代理案件A。英国法院在其2014年1月31日作出的裁决中支持了该请求，其理由是该律师事务所可能会侵犯对案件B机密信息的保护。在上述情况下，律师监管机构要求律师纪律法庭对该律师事务所及其负责案件A的合伙人就其违反其道德义务的行为进行处罚。

二、当事人主张

律师监管机构就负责案件A的合伙人接受客户委托的行为，以及律师事务所授权代理这些客户的行为进行训诫，因其没有采取必要措施对明显的利益冲突或利益冲突风险进行识别，也没有确保客户机密信息的安全。但在该事务所和该律师看来，他们已经在进行补救，同时也承认其因忽视了利益冲突情况（根据《2011年SRA行为规范》第O（3.5）条和《2011年SRA行为原则》第6条）和未对机密信息进行保护（根据《2011年SRA行为准则》第O（4.4）条和《2011年SRA行为原则》第6条）而违反了道德义务。具体来说，该律师承认在以下场合没有谨慎行事：

（1）2012年5月，当案件A有了新进展时，忘记了律师事务所已经接受了案件B（第34.1段）；

（2）在准备调查申请时，没有注意确认涉案人员是否是案件B的客户（第34.5段）；

（3）在冲突检查程序期间向涉及案件B的另一名合伙人提供机密信息（第34.3和第41段）。

但是负责案件B的合伙人则辩称，其从未获知被披露的有关案件B的任何机密信息（第37段）。类似地，尽管该合伙人承认他对履行其职业义务负有个人责任（第34.5段），但其指出，截至2012年11月，他都根据公司的决策（第43段）行事。涉案律师事务所大体上承认了错误，特别是在调查利益冲突方法的失败方面（第52段），并对“不再犯同样错误”作出了保证（第55段），继而提出新措施对未来可能发生的利益冲突进行更有效的管理（第53段及以下）。

三、纪律法庭的裁决

若仔细推敲纪律法庭于2017年7月18日作出的裁决，就能发现其中微妙。纪律法庭认定，涉案律师和事务所的行为都非出于故意因此并未违反信赖义务（第59、60段），但同时也认为该律师和事务所的行为存在疏忽：即忽视了本对其是显而易见的客户间利益冲突问题。关于律师的行为，法庭认为其应该在2012年5月至11月期间实施冲突检查。事实上，在国际事务领域，每个律师对可能存在的利益冲突尤其需要警惕。法庭表示，虽然该律师在客户关系复杂的国际事务中有丰富的经验，但实际上其成为合伙人的时间还不是很长（第59段）。关于律师事务所的行为，法庭最后强调，该律师事务所为处理潜在的或真正的利益冲突已采取了“强有力的”程序。此外，该事务所有经验和资源来保护客户并防止利益冲突问题（第60段）。法庭认为涉案律师事务所及律师各自的行为，已经对该行业的声誉和信任造成了损害（第59、60段），其中该事务所造成的损害 “远远超过”这名律师造成的损害（第60条）。

最后，该律师事务被处罚款25万英镑，相当于处罚参考清单上的第5级，该律师被处罚款50,000英镑，相当于处罚参考清单的第4级。

利益冲突是存在于国际仲裁领域的复杂问题。

利益冲突可能涉及仲裁员、仲裁机构本身，也可能出现在国际仲裁的律师和仲裁员之间（关于最后一种冲突，参见之前报道）。律师纪律法庭的这份裁决揭示了此复杂性的一个新方面。

不容置疑，这些处理的都是传统问题：根据英国法以及法国法（RIN第4.1和4.2条），律师被禁止将其自身置于可能使客户之间发生利益冲突的地位。当争议出现时，律师应将自己从案件中抽离出来，否则可能因利用客户获得的信息而违反保密义务。

然而，在国际仲裁领域，管理客户之间的利益冲突可能面临困难。

国际仲裁由于其国际性，往往在全球范围内实行，涉及多个国家，多个办事处，成千上万的律师以及众多不同的客户，国际仲裁中的执业律师本身所获得的授权也经常会超越国界。

 无论律师机构的规模、大小如何，利益冲突和保密规则都应适用；事实上，法律职业本身需通过其成员参与法律实践。

为了避免利益冲突风险，大型国际事务所会设定专门的内部程序，尽管这些程序能够稳健并有力地发挥作用，但却并不总是可靠的，本案就是一个例证。

在国际仲裁市场中，律师事务所要参与全球竞争，对利益冲突进行预防显得尤为重要，这种重要性要求大型机构不断调整内部制度，尽管这种调整有时会存在困难，近年来，这种困难也促进了国际仲裁市场中小型机构的出现，因其与国际网络无关，从而减少了利益冲突的风险。

 

【英文版】

 

CONFLICTOF INTEREST RISKS FOR COUNSEL IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

5 September 2017 ·      by altanapolearbitrage · in Legal News

Decisionof the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal of 18 July 2017, case No. 11592-2016

 

In its decision of 18 July 2017, the English Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, the equivalent in France of the conseil de discipline des avocats, ordered a prestigious law firm and one of its partners to pay a substantial fine for not having identified a conflict of interest between clients and not having protected the confidentiality of the information obtained. The decision rendered across the Channel serves as a reminder of the importance of conflict of interest issues in the daily practice of lawyers; it emphasizes the inextricable difficulties which can arise if a conflict of interest appears or is not anticipated with sufficient foresight. But beyond this, the decision raises questions about the conflict of interest problem in law firms specializing in the practice of international arbitration, particularly when their structure of practice has an international dimension: they must pay greater attention since their cases often involve offices and lawyers in several countries.

The Facts:

Although complex, the facts must be accurately reported in order to assess the scope of the decision.

In 2010, a major international firm advised a client, through its London office and its partner in international arbitration, on a request for arbitration(“case A”).The request for arbitration, initiated against two private persons,was subsequently extended to two other defendants (“persons C and D”), inparticular involving companies owned indirectly by them in the United States.In 2011, the New York office of the same firm was solicited by the companies indirectly held by persons C and D in a completely different case (“caseB”).Before agreeing to accept case B, the law firm implemented their internal conflict of interest procedure which revealed a link between case A and case B.Since case A was a priori settled, the law firm considered that it could accept case B without a conflict of interest.However, shortly after the acceptance of case B, there were new developments in case A.Thus, in May 2012,new instructions were given by the client of case A to the London office and its partner, against persons C and D.

Then,between March 2013 and August 2013, the partner in charge of case A (i) caused the commencement of arbitration proceedings and proceedings before the High Court against persons C and D and (ii) in support of the arbitration triggered a discovery application in the United States against companies involved in case B.

It should be noted that during this period, the law firm had implemented, a new,the internal conflict of interest procedure, (i) initially in November 2012 on the initiative of the partner in charge of case A, and then (ii) twice in the course of 2013. The potential for a conflict of interest between cases A and B was systematically ruled out.In particular, in early 2013, the New York office in charge of case B considered that it was not required to withdraw from case B under the New York Bar rules; only ethical screens had to be taken in order to prevent disclosures of confidential information between the teams handling the A Matter and B Matter. Accordingly, the law firm, through its London office,continued to act on behalf of the client of case A, even though it represented,through its New York office, its potential opponents in case B.In 2014, persons C and D, in the course of the judicial proceedings against them, sought an injunction from the High Court to prohibit the law firm from continuing to act in case A.That request was upheld by the English court in its decision of 31January 2014 on the grounds that the law firm might infringe on the protection of confidential information in case B.It is in this context that the Solicitors Regulation Authority asked the Disciplinary Tribunal to sanction the law firm and its partner in charge of case A for breach of their ethical obligations.

Claims of the parties:

The Solicitors Regulation Authority admonished the partner in charge of case A for having accepted clients and the law firm for giving authorization to act on behalf of those clients, without either of them taking the necessary measures to (i) identify an apparent conflict of interest or a risk of conflict of interest and to (ii) ensure the confidentiality of clients’ information. For their part, the lawyer and the law firm were making amends.They acknowledged that they had breached their ethical obligations by overlooking a situation of conflict of interest (Article O (3.5.) of the 2011 SRA Code of Conduct and Principle 6 of the 2011 SRA Principles of Conduct) and by not protecting confidential information (Article O (4.4) of the 2011 SRA Code of Conduct and Principle 4 and Principle 6 of the 2011 SRA Principles of Conduct).Specifically, the lawyer admitted he acted recklessly on several occasions:

by forgetting, in May 2012, at the time when case A had undergone new developments, that the law firm had accepted case B (§34.1);

by preparing the discovery application without taking care to verify that the persons concerned were not the clients of case B (§ 34.5);

by providing confidential information to a partner involved in case B during a conflict check procedure (§34.3 and §41).

However,in his defense, the partner in charge of case A argued that at no time he had been informed of any confidential information disclosed in case B(§37). Similarly, although he acknowledged that he bears personal responsibility for compliance with his professional obligations (§34.5), he pointed out that he had acted, as of  November 2012, in reliance on decisions taken by the firm (§43). The law firm generally acknowledged its errors, in particular the failure of its methods to investigate the existence of a conflict of interest (§52), and to ensure that “the errors…are not repeated” (§55), it presented the new measures taken to effectively manage future conflicts of interest (§ 53 et seq.).

The Decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal:

The decision rendered on 18 July 2017 by the Disciplinary Tribunal is more nuanced than it seems at first sight.Indeed, the Disciplinary Tribunal recognizes that neither the lawyer nor the law firm had acted deliberately; there was no breach of trust (§59 and §60). However, the Disciplinary Tribunal found that they were negligent: they had missed a conflict of interest issue between clients that should have been apparent to them.As regards the conduct of the lawyer, theTribunal considers that the latter should have carried out a conflict check between May and November 2012. Indeed, in the field of international affairs,the individual solicitor must be particularly alert to the existence of a conflict of interest; the Tribunal acknowledges that the lawyer was experienced in international matters with complex client relationships but at the materialtime he had not been a partner for very long (§59). As regards the conduct ofthe law firm, the Tribunal stresses at length that the law firm had “robust” procedures in places to handle potential or real conflict-of-interest;moreover, it had the experience and resources to protect its clients and prevent such problems (§60). The Tribunal found that the law firm and the lawyer, by their respective conduct, had caused damage to the reputation and trust placed in the profession (§59 and §60); the damage caused by the law firm being regarded as “considerably greater than that of one individual” (§60).

As a result, the law firm was fined £ 250,000, which corresponds to level 5 on the indicative list of fines, and the lawyer was personally fined £ 50,000, which corresponds to level 4 on the indicative list of fines.

 

The issue of conflict of interest is complex in international arbitration.

The conflict of interest may concern the arbitrator, the arbitration institution itself or may appear between the counsel in international arbitration and the arbitrator (on this last point, see our previous post). The  Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s judgment reveals a new aspect of this complexity.

Afortiori, the issues dealt with were classical: in English law as well as in French law (Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the RIN), lawyers are prohibited from placing themselves in a position that may generate a conflict of interest between clients. When the dispute arises, lawyers must divest themselves of the case; failure to do so may result in breach of confidentiality by taking advantage of information obtained by either client.

In the area of international arbitration, however, the management of a conflict of interest between clients may be difficult.

International arbitration, because of its international dimension, is often practiced instructures of global scope, present in many countries, in multiple offices,with thousands of lawyers and numerous and varied clients; lawyers practicing international arbitration themselves have an authority that often transcends borders.

Whatever the scale of the lawyers’ structure, whatever its size, the rules of conflictof interest and confidentiality apply to it; in fact, the legal profession itself practices law through its members.

Inorder to avoid any risk of a conflict of interest, the large international firms thus have specific internal procedures which, despite their vigor and robustness,are not always infallible. The present case is a topical illustration.

In a context of global competition among law firms in the international arbitration market, the prevention of conflicts of interest is a distinctive element that requires large structures to constantly adjust their internal systems which is sometimes difficult to achieve; a difficulty that has contributed in recent years to the emergence  of smaller structures in the international arbitration market which are not linked to international networks, thus limiting the risk of conflicts of interest.