单方选择条款的有效性审查概述（印度）

更新时间：2017-10-27 09:27:37  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：2013次

新加坡上诉法院在Wilson Taylor AsiaPacific Pte Ltd v. Dyna-Jet Pte Ltd ([2017] SGCA 32)一案的裁定中新增一章对合同中单方选择条款（或“仅一方选择条款”）的效力展开讨论。新加坡上诉法院重申了新加坡高院的裁定以支持单方选择条款的效力，并因此增加了自2010年以来各辖区对该问题的不同判决。在此期间，英国、意大利和西班牙的法院均认为该条款有效，但法国、俄罗斯、保加利亚、迪拜和波兰均否定该条款的效力。在本文中，作者将细述单方选择条款在各印度法院面临的质疑。

何为单方选择条款？

单方选择条款是一种争议解决条款，该条款仅授予一方当事人选择特定争议解决方式（即提供诉诸仲裁或诉讼的选择权）的专属权利。法院必须考虑是否应出于当事人意思自治对这种条款予以支持，或是出于公共政策的考虑而对其进行干预。

《高伟绅律师事务所单方选择条款——2017调查报告》指出，英国和其他几个普通法辖区的法院已支持单方选择条款，因为这种条款代表了当事人之间的契约，而不论条款是否为一方当事人授予了优势。另一方面，俄罗斯和波兰等一些辖区认为，该条款违反了双方平等和程序权利平等的原则，并认为这些条款应被视为“双方”而非“单方”选择条款。在其他司法辖区如保加利亚、中国以及美国某些州的法院，单方选择条款因违反“道德”、“诚信”、“公平”及“显失公平”的公共政策而被认为完全无效。其他的无效理由还包括缺乏义务方愿意实现的条件、存在法律不确定性以及缺乏对价。

印度的立场

有关单方选择条款有效性的裁定在印度十分罕见，其中唯一值得关注的一些裁定由德里高等法院及马德拉斯高等法院作出：

1.   在Bhartia Cutler Hammer v.AVN Tubes (1995 (33) DRJ 672)一案中，德里高院认为一方当事人不能享有提起仲裁的专属权，因《1996印度仲裁与调解法案》预设当事人之间须存在双边仲裁协议且须同时允许双方行使仲裁权。尽管该条款已通过双方的明确同意，但其仍不能被视为有效的仲裁协议。

2.   在Emmsons InternationalLtd. v. Metal Distributors (2005 (80) DRJ 256)一案中，德里高院基于不同的推理得出了与Bhartia Cutler案相同的结论。法院认为单方选择条款无效，因其限制了一方当事人寻求诉讼的权利并违反了《1872印度合同法》第28条。法院还指出（未证实）单方条款因违背印度的公共政策而无效。

3.   在Lucent Technology v.ICICI Bank (2009 SCC OnLine Del 3213)一案中，德里高院再次裁定单方选择条款无效。该法院同时依据Bhartia Cutler案和Emmsons International案的判例，并援引《1872印度合同法》第28条，指出当事人寻求诉讼的权利已被侵犯。

4.   马德拉斯高院在Castrol India Ltd. v. Apex ToolingSolutions ((2015) 1 LW 961 (DB))案中没有跟随趋势，并未对仲裁条款无需具有相互性的一般原则进行辩论。但该法院基于事实认为，试图通过单方选择权提起仲裁的一方当事人不能如此行事，如果其在诉讼初始阶段未能提出异议，或甚至已经参与了该阶段的诉讼。

5.   与上述判决略有差别，德里高院在Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd.v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (MANU/DE/3204/2009)一案中，支持了单方选择条款的有效性。然而，这些裁定对法院立场的影响并不明确，因为该条款并非根据印度法，而是根据所适用的英国法得到支持。

从上述裁定可看出，在印度法院成功对单方选择条款提起异议的三个理由为：缺乏相互性、基于公共政策以及存在对一方诉讼权利的限制。然而，马德拉斯高院对该条款的支持要求对这些理由进行进一步审查。如果印度最高院要根据印度法对单方选择条款的有效性进行审查，其可考虑的反对理由包括：

1.《1996印度仲裁与调解法案》未对相互性作明确要求。该法第7条列举了有效仲裁协议的要求，其中并不包括仲裁条款援引的相互性。第7条至多规定应存在 “双方协议”，该协议须经过当事人一致同意，但并不要求（对仲裁条款的）援引或对价具有相互性。尽管马德拉斯高院以缺乏对相互性的明确规定为由支持了单方选择条款，但德里高院认为，即使能够证明双方存在合意，单方选择条款仍然无效。德里高院对对价相互性的坚持似乎源于《印度合同法》第25条的规定，该规定认为缺乏对价的协议无效。这提出了仲裁协议可分性的有趣问题：主协议的对价对于仲裁协议是否已足够充分和广泛，又或者仲裁协议是否要求通过对共同权利的援引来实现不同的对价？采用后一种方式将导致如下情况：即对价与援引仲裁条款的相互性应优先于当事人对该条款的合意。此外，后一种方式也并未考虑如下情况：即通过向不具有单方选择权的一方作出实质让步或提供利益而在主协议中约定单方选择条款。《印度合同法》和《印度仲裁法》中的这些复杂问题值得最高法院认真考虑。

2. 最高法院对单方选择条款所采取的做法也可能受《1996印度仲裁与调解法》的2015修正案及其支持仲裁旨要的影响。具体而言，“公共政策”作为质疑裁决的理由，其范围已经在2015修正案中进行明确界定和详细列举。德里高院在该修正案颁布之前就曾以“公共政策”为由裁定单方选择条款无效。因此，重新评估这些条款是否违反最近修订的公共政策范围是必要的。此外，根据新制度基于公共政策提出异议时，单方选择条款商业接受度的提高也会得到考虑。

3.   《1872印度合同法》第28条规定，对诉讼程序进行限制的协议无效。但是该条款只有在对诉讼程序进行绝对限制（而非部分限制）的情况下才可以引用。在这方面，仅仅向一方提供选择权并不必然会对另一方的权利（将争议提交默认管辖地解决的权利）造成绝对损害。因此，印度法院在处理该问题时，可能需要对不同的案件和条款进行分析，并防止享有单方管辖选择权的一方对条款的误用、拖延以及模棱两可。

4.   除确认所涉条款是否属于第28条中的绝对限制之外，另一个需要严格审查的问题是第28条的例外情况。第28条允许将协议提交仲裁的例外之一是：对当事人诉讼权利的限制并不被认为是无效的。德里高院的所有判决均未对绝对限制的要求，或对第28条有关单方选择条款无效的例外情况予以考虑。因此，这需要最高法院进行澄清。

鉴于上述考虑，作者乐观地认为，单方选择条款在印度法下将被认为具有法律效力。事实上，一直对该条款持否认态度的德里高院已经在Fuerst Day Lawson一案中开始承认这些条款的效力，表明其立场的积极转变。此外，德里高院最近不愿允许基于公共政策对其遵循修正案作出的两项裁定提出异议，这种做法削弱了基于公共政策对单方选择条款提出异议的可能性。尽管有这些积极的进展，但在可能涉及印度法院时，当事人避免采用单方选择条款不失为一种谨慎做法。同时，当事人只能希望最高法院对上述三种异议理由进行彻底考察，以达到印度法律所代表的最佳水准并实现当事人的最大利益。

【英文版】

Examiningthe Validity of Unilateral Option Clauses in India: A Brief Overview

Nishanth Vasanth, Rishabh Raheja (NALSAR University of Law)

The decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Wilson Taylor Asia Pacific Pte Ltdv. Dyna-Jet Pte Ltd ([2017] SGCA 32) added another chapter to the debate on the validity of unilateral option clauses (or ‘sole option clauses’) in contracts.The Singapore Court of Appeal reaffirmed the Singapore High Court’s decision to uphold the validity of a unilateral option clause, thus adding to the varying decisions on this question across jurisdictions since 2010. During this period,courts in the UK, Italy and Spain have upheld such clauses as valid, while those in France, Russia, Bulgaria, Dubai and Poland have struck down such clauses. In this context, the authors consider the challenges faced by unilateral option clauses in various Indian courts.

What are unilateral option clausesand why are they controversial?

A unilateral option clause is a dispute resolution clause which confers an exclusive right to elect a specific dispute resolution method, i.e., it provides the option of resorting to arbitration or litigation; however, this option is conferred upon only one party. Courts have had to consider whether they should uphold such clauses in the interest of party autonomy or intervene due to public policy considerations.

In the Clifford Chance Unilateral Option Clauses – 2017 Survey, it is noted that courts in the UK and several other Common Law jurisdictions have upheld unilateral option clauses as they represent the bargain of the parties,irrespective of the advantage the clause confers on one side. On the other hand, some jurisdictions such as Russia and Poland have found such clauses to violate the parties’ equality of arms and procedural rights, reading these as ‘bilateral’ and not ‘unilateral’ option clauses. There have been other jurisdictions such as Bulgaria, China, and some US State courts, where these clauses have been wholly invalidated on public policy grounds of ‘morality’, ‘good faith’, ‘fairness’ and ‘unconscionability’. Some other grounds include the absence of a potestative condition, legal uncertainty, and lack of consideration.

Position in India:

Decisions on the validity of unilateral option clauses have been few and far between in India, with the only notable decisions being rendered by the Delhi and Madras High Courts (HC):

1.   In Bhartia Cutler Hammer v. AVN Tubes (1995(33) DRJ 672), the Delhi HC held that a party could not have an exclusive right to initiate arbitration as the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, presupposed that there must be a mutual arbitration agreement between the parties, and an opportunity for bilateral invocation. Notwithstanding parties’ express consent to such a clause, it would not be deemed a valid arbitration agreement.

2.   In Emmsons International Ltd. v. Metal Distributors (2005 (80) DRJ 256), the Delhi HC arrived at the same conclusionas in Bhartia Cutler, based on different reasoning. The court observed that unilateral option clauses were void as they restrained one party’s recourse to legal proceedings, in contravention of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act,1872. The court noted additionally (without substantiation) that a unilateral clause would be void for being contrary to the public policy of India.

3.   In Lucent Technology v. ICICI Bank (2009 SCCOnLine Del 3213), the Delhi HC again held a unilateral option clause to be invalid. The court relied on both Bhartia Cutler and Emmsons International and invoked Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, implying that the party’s right to recourse through legal proceedings had been infringed.

4.   The Madras HC decided to go against the tide in Castrol India Ltd. v. Apex Tooling Solutions ((2015) 1 LW 961 (DB)) and did not dispute the general principle that arbitration clauses need not necessarily have mutuality. However, on the facts, the court held that the party seeking to invoke arbitration through its sole option could not do so, having failed to object, and having even participated during the preliminary stages of litigation.

5.   In a slight deviation from its previous decisions, the Delhi HC in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.(MANU/DE/3204/2009), upheld the validity of a unilateral option clause.However, the impact of this decision on the position of the court is unclear,as the clause was upheld not under Indian law, but under applicable English law.

From the above decisions it would appear that the three grounds upon which unilateral clauses have been successfully challenged before the courts in India are – lack of mutuality, public policy, and restraint of a party’s right to legal proceedings. However, the Madras HC’s decision to uphold these clauses calls for closer scrutiny of these grounds. Should the Supreme Court of India examine the validity of unilateral option clauses under Indian law, some of the counter-grounds it could consider include:

1.   The absence of an explicit requirement for mutuality in the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 7 ofthe Act lists out the requirements for a valid arbitration agreement and does not include the mutuality of invocation of the arbitration clause among these. At the most, the stipulation under Section 7 for there to be an ‘agreement by the parties’ requires mutuality of consent, and not mutuality of invocation or consideration. While the Madras HC relied on this lack of an explicit requirement for mutuality to uphold unilateral option clauses, the Delhi HC invalidated unilateral option clauses even when the presence of mutual consent was proven. The Delhi HC’s insistence on mutuality of consideration appears to stem from Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, which invalidates agreements lacking consideration. This raises interesting questions of separability of the arbitration agreement— whether the consideration for the main agreement is sufficient for and coextensive with the arbitration agreement, or whether the arbitration agreement requires separate consideration through mutual rights of invocation? Adopting the latter approach could lead to an intriguing situation where the mutuality of consideration and invocation takes priority over the mutuality of consent to such a clause. The latter approach would also not account for a situation where the consideration for the unilateral option clause is present in the main agreement, through a substantive concession or benefit provided to the party without the unilateral option. These complex questions of Indian contract and arbitration law merit the careful consideration of the Supreme Court.

2.   The 2015 Amendment to the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and its pro-arbitration tenor could also have animpact on the Supreme Court’s approach to unilateral option clauses.Specifically, the scope of ‘public policy’ as a ground for challenge of awards has been defined explicitly and enumerated exhaustively under the 2015 Amendment. The Delhi HC’s decisions invalidating unilateral option clauses on grounds of ‘public policy’ were pronounced prior to the Amendment. Thus, are-evaluation of whether such clauses violate the recently revised ambit of public policy will be necessary. Moreover, the increasing commercial acceptance of unilateral clauses could also be a consideration under a public policy challenge in this new regime.

3.   Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,invalidates agreements in restraint of legal proceedings. The provision,however is attracted only when there is an absolute and not a partial restrainton legal proceedings. In this light, the mere provision of an option to one party does not necessarily and absolutely undermine the other party’s right to approach the default forum for dispute settlement. Thus, Indian courts may have to deal with this question on a case-by-case and clause-by-clause basis,preventing misuse, delay, and equivocation from the party with the unilateral option of forum.

4.   In addition to determining whether the clause in question is an absolute restraint in the terms of Section 28, another question demanding scrutiny is the stated exception to Section 28. Exception 1 to Section 28 permits an agreement to refer to arbitration – it would not be considered invalid for restraint of a party’s right to pursue legal proceedings. None of the Delhi HC decisions cited above considered either the requirement for an absolute restraint, or this exception to Section 28, in invalidating unilateral option clauses. This thus calls for clarification by the Supreme Court.

Given the above considerations, the authors are optimistic that unilateral option clauses will be held valid under Indian law. The fact that the Delhi HC — which had consistently invalidated these clauses — has taken a step towards accepting these clauses in Fuerst Day Lawson is indicative of a positive shift of stance.Moreover, the Delhi HC’s recent reluctance to allow public policy challenges to awards in two of its decisions following the Amendment weakens the likelihoodof a successful public policy challenge to unilateral option clauses. Despite these positive developments, it would be prudent for parties to avoid the incorporation of unilateral option clauses when there is a possibility that Indian courts may be involved. In the meantime, one can only hope that the Supreme Court thoroughly tests the above three grounds for challenge and arrives at a position best representative of Indian law, and most beneficial toparties.