印度最高法院支持英国高等法院对仲裁地的裁定（印度案例）

更新时间：2017-10-30 10:17:36   张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1641次

印度最高法院在Roger Shashoua v Mukesh Sharma案（以下简称“Shashoua”案）中，进一步阐明了法院解释仲裁协议（特别是关于当事人对仲裁地的默示选择）的方法。最高法院认为，在当事人未对仲裁地进行明确指定的情况下，将伦敦指定为仲裁开庭地，就表明双方同意指定伦敦为仲裁地（若无相反情况）。值得注意的是，印度最高法院在该问题上明显遵循了英国法院的处理方式。“Shashoua”案特别涉及印度当事人之间的合同（其中包含仲裁条款），这些合同的签订日期均在Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.案（2012年9月6号作出裁定，以下简称“BALCO”案）的裁定作出之前。如下文详述，对于“BALCO”案之前的合同，该案的判决结果会对印度法院权力行使的程度（包括干涉仲裁程序、给予临时救济、任命仲裁员或撤销裁决）产生极大影响。

1．事实背景

“Shashuoa”案的当事人约定“仲裁开庭地为英国伦敦”，并约定按照《国际商会仲裁规则》进行仲裁，且合同适用的实体法为印度法律，但并未明确选择仲裁地。在仲裁庭作出裁决之后，裁决债务人根据《印度1996仲裁和调解法》第34条申请撤销裁决。裁决债务人（被申请人）辩称双方并没有明确指定仲裁地，法院应查明印度才是合适的仲裁地，因此，印度法院拥有撤销裁决的管辖权。

2．英国高等法院诉讼过程

 “Shashoua”案的被告并非首次试图争辩印度（而非伦敦）才是仲裁地。被告曾根据英国《仲裁法》第44条向英国高等法院申请临时措施，认为印度才是正确的仲裁地，其理由是当事人选择适用印度法解决协议中的实体问题，而仅指定伦敦作为仲裁开庭地。Cooke法官在Shashoua v Sharma 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm)案的裁定中认为伦敦才是仲裁地，因协议中明确指定伦敦为仲裁开庭地点而没有指定仲裁地，且当事人都接受适用超国家机构的规则（即《ICC规则》）进行仲裁。该法官认为“伦敦仲裁”是一个众所周知的现象，经常结合不同的实体法被外国当事人采用。因此，该法官并未对当事人的选择（选择印度法作为实体法）进行特别强调。

在仲裁庭根据高等法院的裁定作出仲裁裁决之后，被申请人根据印度法申请撤销仲裁裁决并再次辩称印度才是仲裁地。

3．最高法院的裁定

在审理本案之前，印度最高法院已经在其他几个案件中（包括“BALCO”案）引用了Cooke法官在Shashouav Sharma案中的推理。被申请人辩称，最高法院对Cooke法官所作裁定的引用并不构成这些案件的判决理由，无论如何，考虑到这只是英国高等法院作出的初步裁定，该案不应被给予过多关注。

最高法院驳回了被告的上述论点，认为其先前裁定不仅援引并认同“Shashoua”案的观点，而且还根据该案的推理作出裁定。该法院还认为Cooke法官的裁定是 “意见金字塔”（作为印度之前裁定的基础）的组成部分。

4．产生的影响

 “BALCO”案的裁定对印度当事人之间的合同（包含仲裁条款的）非常重要。在该案之前，印度法院曾认为《仲裁法》第一部分适用于所有（以印度或国外为仲裁地）仲裁程序，除非当事人以默示或明示方式排除适用。这意味着印度当事人可以要求印度法院对非本国的仲裁（与印度有足够联系）行使监督管辖权。关键是，印度法院能够撤销裁决，如果其发现《仲裁法》第一部分并没有被当事人排除适用。“BALCO”案改变了这种做法并表明法院根据《仲裁法》第一部分所能行使的监督权并不适用于非本国的仲裁，这意味着2012年9月6日之前签订的合同适用（并继续适用）旧的规则，正如“Shashoua”案所述。

如“Shashoua”案及其他案件所示，在当事人是否排除《仲裁法》第一部分的适用尚不明确的情况下，2012年之前签订的合同依然可以诉讼。“Shashoua”案的裁定将受到欢迎，因其表明最高法院即使对于2012年之前签订的合同也开始采用务实的做法。尽管“Shashoua”案的事实可能是独一无二的（即英国法院先前已经就相同当事人之间的同一问题作出裁定），该案再一次显示出印度法院在裁定与国际商事仲裁相关的问题时，对国际惯例和规范加以考虑的意愿。

【英文版】

Indian Supreme Court upholds English High Court’s decision on parties’ choice of London seat

The Indian Supreme Court’s judgmentin Roger Shashoua v Mukesh Sharma sheds further light on the court’s approach to interpreting arbitration agreements, particularly regarding the parties’ implied choice of seat. The court found that the designation of London as the “venue” of the arbitration in the absence of any express designation of a seat would suggest that the parties agreed that London would be the seat of the arbitration (in the absence of any thing to the contrary). It is also notable that the court expressly followed the English courts’ approach to the same question. Shashoua is particularly relevant to contracts with Indian parties providing for arbitration that were concluded prior to 6 September 2012, the date of the court’s judgment in Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (“BALCO“) (discussed here). As we consider in further detail below, this can have significant implications on the degree of Indian courts’ powers to interfere in arbitration proceedings,grant interim relief, appoint arbitrators or set aside an award, in connection with pre-BALCO agreements.

Background and facts

The parties in Shashoua provided that “the venue of the arbitration shall be London, United Kingdom”. They also provided for arbitration in accordance withthe arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, and that the substantive law of the contract would be Indian law. There was no express choice of seat. After an arbitral tribunal had rendered its award, the award debtor applied to have the award set aside under Section 34 of India’s Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Arbitration Act“). The award debtor (the respondent) argued that the parties had not expressly designated a seat and the courts should find that India was the proper seat of the arbitration, and consequently, the Indian courts had jurisdiction to set aside the award.

English High Court proceedings

This was not the first attempt by the respondent in Shashoua to argue that India and not London was the seat of arbitration. In an application for interim measures under Section 44 of the (English) Arbitration Act, the respondent argued that India was the correct seat of the arbitration as the parties applied Indian law to the substantive aspects of the agreement and only designated London as the location for the arbitration hearings. In his judgment (Shashoua v Sharma2009 EWHC 957 (Comm)), Cooke J held that London was the seat of the arbitration since there was an express designation of London as the venue, no alternative designation of a seat and the parties had adopted a supranational body of rules(ie, the ICC Rules). He observed that “London arbitration” was a well-known phenomenon that was often chosen by foreign parties together with a different governing law, and did not place much emphasis on the choice of Indian law as the substantive law.

Afterthe tribunal issued its award following the High Court’s judgment, the respondent applied to set aside the award under Indian law, arguing again that India was the seat of the arbitration.

The Supreme Court’s decision

Prior to hearing this matter, the Indian Supreme Court had already cited Cooke J’s reasoning in Shashoua v Sharma in several other cases, including in BALCO. The respondent argued that the Supreme Court’s references to Cooke J’s decision did not form part of the ratio of those cases, and that in any event, given that the decision was an interim decision of the English High Court, it should not be given substantial weight.

The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments holding that its previous decisions had not only cited Shashoua v Sharma with approval but had relied on its reasoning.It found that Cooke J’s decision was part of the “propositional pyramid” upon which the previous Indian judgments were based.

Implications for pre-BALCO contracts

As we note in our blogpost here,BALCO is an important decision for contracts with Indian parties providing for arbitration. Prior to BALCO, Indian courts held that Part I of the Arbitration Act applied to all arbitrations, seated in India or abroad, unless it was impliedly or expressly excluded by the parties. This meant that it was open to an Indian party to request that the Indian courts exercise their supervisory jurisdiction over offshore arbitrations that had sufficient connections to India. Crucially, an Indian court could set aside such an award if it found that Part I of the Arbitration Act was not excluded by the parties. BALCO changed this and held that the court’s supervisory power under Part I of the Arbitration Act did not apply to offshore arbitrations meaning that the old rule applied (and continues to apply to) contracts entered into prior to 6 September2012, such as the one in Shashoua.

As Shashoua and other cases show, pre-2012 contracts can still be the subject of considerable litigation where it is not clear whether the parties intended to exclude Part I of the Arbitration Act. Shashoua is a welcome decision as it shows that the Supreme Court is adopting a pragmatic approach even when it comes to pre-2012 contracts. While the facts of Shashoua are likely to be unique (ie, a prior English judgment on the same issue between the sameparties) it is another example of the willingness of the Indian courts to take into account international practices and norms when deciding issues relating to international commercial arbitration.