国际仲裁代理人的统一道德标准问题

更新时间：2018-01-08 16:09:42   编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1259次

长期以来国际仲裁律师行为缺乏道德标准共识导致两个问题。首先，律师可能很难知道如果他们本国司法管辖区与仲裁所在地的专业规则不同或相冲突时应该如何行事。其次，在当事人律师的道德责任比对方的律师要求更为严格的情况下，当事人自己可能由于不公平而处于劣势。

律师在实践中面临道德挑战的常见情况准备证人。在英国，律师的行为守则禁止律师准备证人。这一限制也适用于许多其他普通法司法管辖区的律师。相比之下，美国律师则是允许准备证人。在国际仲裁中，谨慎的美国律师会照常为他的证人提供证词；然而，英国律师却有可能因同样的行为被取消律师资格。在这种情况下，英国律师的委托人可能处于不利地位，因为根据国内管辖的专业规则，他们的律师在与证人打交道时将会受到更多的限制。

这显然是一种令人不快的事态。相反，在不违反当地行为准则的情况下，在国际仲裁中公平地履行道德义务是更可取的。我们应该如何做到这一点，仍然是一个挑战。

全球仲裁道德委员会

瑞士仲裁协会(“ASA”)提出的一个潜在解决方案是建立一个跨国机构——全球仲裁道德委员会，它有一套自己的核心伦理原则。委员会将由主要国际仲裁协会和机构的仲裁从业人员组成。它的主要责任是解决国际仲裁中所有关于道德不当行为的指控，并考虑到案件的文化、地域和其他特点。向委员会提出的申诉将与主要的仲裁程序完全分开。

将监管职能转移到一个单一的跨国机构，也将消除分散和不一致的风险。此外，如果主要的仲裁机构和协会支持委员会，委员会可以获得比目前提供给法庭更广泛的制裁范围。

但是，这个提案的根本缺陷是，国际上主要的仲裁机构和协会能够立刻就国际仲裁中的道德行为的“核心原则”达成共识，这未免过于理想化。正如这一提议中可能出现的呼吁，它对目前所处的主要国际仲裁机构和协会的期望过高。

其他未解决的问题涉及委员会的管辖权和委员会的惩戒权。这个想法的支持者认为，只需要主要的仲裁机构要求按照其规则参与仲裁的律师服从委员会的管辖权。但这个司法管辖区的范围有多大呢？即使这种行为根据律师当地的律师禁止守则是允许的，委员会是否有权处罚律师违反委员会核心原则的行为？委员会的权力是否仅限于训诫或者是否包括将律师排除在未来仲裁之外？显然，在建立跨国机构如全球仲裁道德委员会之前，需要解决许多重要问题，或许更重要的是要获得全球认可。

道德行为的约束性规范

另一个可能的解决办法是由主要仲裁机构单独采用有约束力的道德行为准则，这些准则自动纳入其仲裁规则。其中一个例子是LCIA的“双方法律代表人通用指南”（2014）。LCIA指南对任何根据LCIA规则进行仲裁的律师都具有约束力。他们在一些领域提供指导，如与仲裁员的提前沟通、向法庭提交文件、披露和准备证据等。如果违反，LCIA指南授权仲裁庭谴责相关律师，并采取其他措施履行仲裁庭在LCIA规则下的一般职责。

这种做法的好处是，如果主要国际仲裁机构采取类似的具有约束力的行为准则，越来越多的机构仲裁当事人将被迫采用它们，从而熟悉它们。这反过来又会使得国际仲裁行为的道德标准更加趋于统一。

但是，这个建议的关键问题是，一个强制性、有约束力的行为准则可能与仲裁固有的灵活性不相符。此外，迫使当事人代表遵守有约束力的行为守则似乎忽略了道德行为标准可能因区域和司法管辖区而异的事实。这并不能解决缩小道德差距的紧迫问题。虽然最终目标是建立一个通用的，统一的道德行为准则，但是我们不应该为了达到这个目标，认为道德行为的标准是独立于文化和背景的。

仲裁庭利用做出不利成本裁定作为对律师不合理行为的制裁，可以成为规范程序行为的有力工具，尽管这种指令本质上惩罚的是最终委托人，而不是他们的律师。因此，另一个问题是，有权对仲裁当事人进行裁决的仲裁庭是否也有权裁决当事人代表的行为。反对这种做法的人认为，有关律师道德行为的裁定与仲裁程序是不相容的，应该与之分离。在这个观点上，仲裁庭的责任就是有秩序的解决仲裁程序;关于律师是否做出不道德行为的裁定应留给当地的律师协会。的确，当涉及到案件的实体问题时，要求法庭判决律师是否做出不道德的行为，可能会影响法庭的公正性和独立性。

无约束力的道德行为准则

第三个可能的解决方案是国际仲裁机构采用非约束性的道德行为准则，这一方案最近得到了前新加坡总检察长V.K. Rajah的支持。国际仲裁IBA指南(2013年)中关于当事人代表的规定就是这样一个例子。IBA指南涵盖了与LCIA指南相同的领域，尽管它们提供了更广泛的制裁措施，包括不利成本裁定。两者的主要区别在于其法律效力。与“LCIA指南”不同的是，IBA指南只能在当事人或仲裁庭同意他们适用的情况下适用，并服从可能作出的任何修改。

以非约束力的文书为基础这一做法的主要好处是，这将有利于道德标准更加统一，同时保留当事人通过和修改这些文书的自由。但是，这种方法确实有其局限性。首先，IBA指南旨在为当事人代表通常遇到的某种程度的道德不确定性方面提供指导。但是，它们并没有涵盖国际仲裁中当事人代表行为的各个方面。其次，如果该机构的行为准则与通行的国家条令规定所涵盖的领域相冲突或保持沉默，那么冲突的道德义务风险仍然存在。第三，IBA指南对法庭的制裁主要是针对当事人而非律师。因此，关于这些指导方针是否能有效地影响当事人代表的行为，仍然存有一些疑问。最后，正如ASA所指出的那样，IBA指南主要依据普通法实践来起草的，从而限制了它在大陆法管辖区的适用性。这样的指导方针能够在多大程度上弥合普通法与大陆法之间的鸿沟，仍有待观察。

未来发展

显然，IBA指南并不完美。但是，他们确实为一个实用的短期方法提供了蓝图，从长远来看，这将有助于使当事人代表对应该做什么和不应该做什么进一步达成共识。不可否认，仍然会有一些实践，比如证人准备方面难以达成共识。话虽如此，非约束力性行为准则也应该如此，帮助在国际仲裁的许多其他领域建立共同基础。当前的挑战在于争取获得SIAC等主要国际仲裁机构对非约束性行为准则的支持。从长远来看，这种做法可以通过使行为准则更加全面来加以改善，确保它们既能够依据普通法和大陆法的实践，又能将监管职能从仲裁庭转移到仲裁机构本身。虽然非约束性道德行为守则不一定能在一夜之间达成国际共识，但它为达成国际仲裁中当事人代表道德标准的统一提供了有意义的方式。

 [英文内容]

 

The Quest for Uniformity in Ethical Standards

for Party Representatives in International Arbitration

 

By Daniel Waldek (Herbert Smith FreehillsLLP)

The lack of consensus on ethical standards of conduct for counsel in international arbitration has given rise to two enduring problems. First, lawyers may find it hard to know how they should act where the professional rules of their home jurisdiction differ from, or conflict with, those at the seat of arbitration. Second, parties themselves maybe unfairly disadvantaged where their counsel is subject to more restrictive ethical obligations than counsel for the other side.

 

A common example of the ethical challenges faced by counsel in practice is witness preparation. In the United Kingdom, the solicitors’ code of conduct prohibits lawyers from preparing their witnesses for testimony. This restriction is also imposed upon lawyers from many other common law jurisdictions. By contrast, lawyers in the United States are allowed, and indeed expected, to do so. In an international arbitration, a prudent U.S. counsel will thus proceed as usual and prepare his witnesses for testimony; the U.K. lawyer, on the other hand, could be disbarred for the same conduct. In this case, the U.K. lawyer’s client could be disadvantaged for no other reason than that, under the professional rules of his home jurisdiction,their counsel is more restricted when it comes to their dealings with witnesses.

 

This is clearly an undesirable state of affairs. It would instead be preferable to level the playing field of ethical obligations in international arbitration without offending local codes of conduct. Precisely how we should do this remains the challenge to the question.

 

A Global Arbitration Ethics Council

One potential solution that has been put forward by the Swiss Arbitration Association (“ASA”) is to create a transnational body – the Global Arbitration Ethics Council – with its own set of core ethical principles. The council would comprise arbitration practitioners from the major international arbitration associations and institutions. Its primary responsibility would be to resolve all claims of ethical misconduct in international arbitration, taking into account the cultural, geographical and other idiosyncrasies of the case. A complaint brought before the council would be entirely separate from the main arbitration proceeding.

Vesting the regulatory function in a single, transnational body would also remove the risk of fragmentation and inconsistency. Also, if the major arbitration institutions and associations were to endorse the council, the council could have access to a far broader range of sanctions than is currently available to tribunals.

However, the fundamental flaw in this proposal is that it is overly idealistic to suggest that the major international arbitration institutions and associations would be able to suddenly reach a consensus as to the “core principles” of ethical conduct in international arbitration. As appealing as this proposal might appear, it expects too much of the major international arbitration institutions and associations as things currently stand.

Other unanswered questions involve the council’s jurisdiction and the extent of the council’s disciplinary powers.Proponents of the idea have suggested that all that is needed would be for themajor arbitration institutions to require lawyers participating in arbitrations under their rules to be subject to the council’s jurisdiction. But how far would this jurisdiction reach? Would the council have the power to sanction lawyers for conduct that is in breach of the council’s core principles, even though such conduct is permitted under the counsel’s local bar rules? And would the council’s powers be limited to admonishment or would they include the power to exclude counsel from future arbitrations? Clearly there are many importan tissues that would need to be addressed before a transnational body such as the Global Arbitration Ethics Council can be established and, perhaps more importantly, obtain global recognition.

 

Binding Codes of Ethical Conduct

Another potential solution would be for the major arbitration institutions to individually adopt binding codes of ethical conduct which would automatically be incorporated into their rules of arbitration. One such example is the LCIA’s General Guidelines for the Parties Legal Representatives (2014). The LCIA Guidelines are binding on any counsel who appears in an arbitration administered under the LCIA Rules. They provide guidance in areas such as ex parte communications with arbitrators, submissions to the tribunal, disclosure and the preparation of evidence. In the event of abreach, the LCIA Guidelines empower the tribunal to reprimand the relevant counsel and take any other measure to fulfil the tribunal’s general duties under the LCIA Rules.

The benefit of such an approach is that if key international arbitration institutions were to adopt similar binding codes of conduct, more and more parties to institutional arbitration would be forced to adopt them and thus become familiar with them. This, in turn, would lead to greater uniformity in ethical standards of conduct in international arbitration.

However, the key problem with this proposal is that a mandatory, binding code of conduct may not cohere well with the inherently flexible nature of arbitration. Moreover, compelling party representatives to comply with a binding code of conduct seems to overlook the fact that standards of ethical conduct may vary across regions and jurisdictions. This does not solve the immediate problem of bridging the ethical gap. While the end goal would be the creation of a universal and uniform code of ethical conduct, we should not, in our attempts to move towards that goal, think that standards of ethical conduct are independent of culture and context.

The ability of a tribunal to use adverse costs orders as a sanction for unreasonable conduct by counsel can be a powerful tool to regulate procedural conduct – although such orders inherently penalise the end user, not their lawyer. Therefore, another problem is whethe ra tribunal, which has power over the parties to an arbitration, should also have the power to adjudicate on the conduct of the parties’ representatives.Critics of this approach argue that decisions regarding the ethical conduct of counsel are alien to the arbitral process and should remain separate from it.On this view, the responsibility of the tribunal is simply to resolve the arbitration proceedings in an orderly manner; decisions about whether a lawyer has acted unethically should be left to the local bar association. Indeed, one concern is that requiring tribunals to determine whether counsel have acted unethically may compromise the impartiality and independence of the tribunal when it comes to deciding on the merits of the case.

 

Non-Binding Codes of Ethical Conduct

A third potential solution, which has drawn recent support from former Singaporean attorney-general V.K. Rajah, would befor international arbitration institutions to adopt non-binding ethical codes of conduct. The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration (2013) are one such example. The IBA Guidelines cover similar areas to the LCIA Guidelines, though they provide for broader sanctions including adverse costs orders. The key difference between the two is their legal force.Unlike the LCIA Guidelines, the IBA Guidelines only apply where the parties or tribunal agree that they shall apply, and subject to any amendments that they might make.

The main benefit of an approach based on non-binding instruments is that it would facilitate greater uniformity in ethical standards while preserving the parties’ freedom to adopt and amend them. However, this approach does have its limitations. First, the IBAGuidelines were intended to provide guidance in areas where party representatives commonly encounter some degree of ethical uncertainty. They donot, however, cover all aspects of party representative conduct in international arbitration. Second, there is still the risk of conflicting ethical obligations where the institution’s code of conduct conflicts with or remains silent on areas covered by applicable national bar rules. Third, the sanctions available to a tribunal under the IBA Guidelines are directed largely at the parties rather than their counsel. There therefore remains some doubt as to the efficacy of such guidelines in actually shaping the conduct of party representatives. Finally, as the ASA has pointed out, there is the concern that the IBA Guidelines draw primarily on common law practices, thereby limiting its applicability in civil law jurisdictions. The extent to which such guidelines can bridge the common and civil law divide, remains to be seen.

 

The Future

Clearly, the IBA Guidelines are not perfect. However, they do provide a blueprint for a practical, short-term approach, which, in the long run, will help bring party representatives closer to a common understanding of what should and should not be done. Admittedly,there will be some practices, such as witness preparation, on which a consensus will not easily be reached. That being said, non-binding codes of conduct should go so way to helping establish a common ground in many other areas of practice in international arbitration. The immediate challenge lies in garnering support for non-binding codes of conduct among major international arbitration institutions like the SIAC. In the longer term, this approach could be improved by making the codes of conduct more comprehensive, ensuring that they draw on both common law and civil law practices, and transferring the regulatory function from tribunals to the arbitration institutions themselves.Though non-binding codes of ethical conduct may not create international consensus overnight, they provide a meaningful way forward in the quest for uniformity in ethical standards for party representatives in international arbitration.