仲裁员的披露义务的原则（英国P v Q案例）

更新时间：2018-02-06 17:25:02  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：2539次

英国高等法院在P v Q[2017]EWHC148（Comm.）和[2017] EWHC 194（Comm.）案件判决强化了支持仲裁的立场，驳回了申请人根据根据1996年《英国仲裁法》（法案）第24条的规定申请解除仲裁庭请求，该请求认为仲裁庭对秘书授权过度。

本文重点讨论该案件涉及的有关仲裁庭和LCIA秘书之间的文件披露问题。 就当事各方提出的争论问题，法官采取相对简单的做法，认为“代理律师的研究并没有发现裁定仲裁员披露与解聘仲裁员相关的信息…”。

案件背景

该案首席仲裁员无意中向当事人P的代理律师发送了一份电子邮件，要求仲裁庭秘书对电子邮件作出回应，为此另一方提出质疑并要求解聘仲裁员。

信息披露申请

根据仲裁法第24条规定P公司提出质疑的附带申请，要求披露仲裁庭与秘书之间有关委任秘书职责和任务的一系列往来文件。

首先，P公司主张披露申请的相关原则依据英国民事诉讼规则（“CPR”）CPR 31.12，即披露具体事项的申请。换言之，只要所要求的文件具有相关性（就可以适用CPR 31.6规定的要求），法院有自由裁量权裁定进行披露。P公司的律师认为仲裁庭的合议意见关键内容可以进行修改。

其次，而选定仲裁员的代理律师则提出质疑，他引用案例Locabail(UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB451，认为首先一方当事人不能在质疑裁决者（decisionmaker）公正性的情况下要去其披露信息，此外，1998年LCIA仲裁规则规则第30.2条规定仲裁庭合议记录的保密性，因此，双方约定法院对质疑的文件披露问题没有管辖权。

第三，Q公司认为只有在极少且有说服力的情况下才能裁定披露信息，而且仅在以下情况下：（1）根据第24条有申请披露的初步证据，以及（2）披露是公正处理该申请的必要条件。

适用的原则

基于三个争议焦点，法官提出了三个问题：

1.法院是否应该适用是非曲直标准（merit threshold），如果是的话，什么标准？

2.法院是否应该对相关问题进行更严格的测试，如果是，应该如何测试？

3.法院如何行使披露的自由裁量权？

关于第一个问题，法院指出，期望被申请人在仲裁的简易程序中驳回申请，是不切合实际的，这一点与高等法院诉讼完全不同。但是，法官认为没有理由背离默示原则，也就是法院临时申请的决定不考虑事实争议实体问题。法官明确指出，虽然他没有允许提交本案件有关申请的实质性争议证据，但法院在对披露裁定行使自由裁量权时可以考虑要求披露文件的相关性和性质。

关于相关性问题，法院同意Q公司的意见，认为所要求的披露文件对公正解决基于第24条提起的申请所必须。法院认为根据该法第24条规定解聘仲裁员的申请属于临时申请，因此该程序必须考虑最终目标。如果法院支持临时申请而裁定披露时，那么会大大增加诉累（satellite litigation）、拖延以及费用风险。

法官认为，法院解决仲裁方面的纠纷时不能有不必要的拖延或费用，并将法院干预最小化，这进一步证明提高相关性标准的合理性。

此外，法院将仲裁员的披露申请等同于法院诉讼中对非当事人的披露申请（也要满足必要性要求）。尽管这个对比不太恰当，但法院承认，仲裁员与非当事人在披露某些文件时处于不同地位（在英文程序中，指的是NorwichPharmacal申请，当事人常常通过这一申请请求赔偿）。特别是，仲裁员以维护双方当事人之间的公正性和独立性的方式需要对申请作出回应，因为仲裁员有可能在实质性争议中继续发挥作用。

最后，关于如何行使自由裁量权裁定披露这些文件。除了最终目标（时间、费用和比例）所需的默示考虑之外，法官还要考虑申请披露引起的一系列其他相关注意事项，包括：

1.根据CPR第八部分提起申请。实际上第八部分通常是没有实质性争议的情况下提出索赔的一种替代程序。这是一个指标----尽管不是决定性的----披露通常是不恰当的。此外，法院最低程度干预意味着在仲裁请求中的披露只能在特殊情况下才能准许。

 

2.如果当事人授权有权裁定披露的仲裁机构拒绝披露申请，那么法院就不能裁定披露。

3.强有力的索赔申请，在本案是基于第24条的申请，尽管这可能会导致各方付出额外代价，但可能会为信息披露提供正当理由。

4.只有极少数情况下，仲裁员才会被要求披露信息。Locabail 案的法官披露豁免权同样适用于仲裁员，使其能够自由履行其职能。

评论

法院驳回了披露申请。法院否定了选定的仲裁员提出的观点，即LCIA规则完全排除了法院就披露问题的管辖权。尽管如此，P公司未能满足的必要要素--这些文件就根据第24条提出的申请作出裁定并非所需，没有令人信服的理由背离Locabail原则，并且双方同意LCIA规则条款的情况下：仲裁员的合议意见应当对当事人保密。法院认识到，下令披露可能会对国际仲裁产生广泛影响，特别是可能潜在仲裁员履职，并可能影响他们适当履行判决职能的能力。选定的仲裁员的代理律师对申请进行抗辩的事实可以视为仲裁领域的共识。

法院并驳回P公司认为的观点，即合议核心内容与仲裁庭秘书被赋予的职责或任务相关的过多程序性文件交流是有所区别的。然而，判决书并对要求披露的文件属于第30.2条“合议意见”这一问题进行论述。可以认为，如果LCIA规则打算涵盖程序性来文的披露问题，如P v.Q案中遇到的问题，规则总可以使用“所有通讯”或“所有文件”等内容。关于这一问题，法官并没有依赖广泛使用的Locabail原则，诸如为合议目的的所有交流文件以及合议的所有文件对当事人有披露豁免权。

法院的做法具有政策上的优势，因为每次申请披露时如果法院或仲裁庭都必须考虑程序与实质内容的争论，就可能出现潜在的问题。但是，鉴于第30.2条豁免保护源自当事人的合意，而不是出于公共政策考虑，这种做法不能使人完全信服。

此外，法院认为Locabail原则同样适用于仲裁庭和法官。法官履行着重要的公共职能，其管辖权与仲裁庭的管辖权截然不同。仲裁员契约赋予权力，而他们的职能是准司法的，其管辖来源于双方的协议。不能说法官和仲裁员的职能是完全重叠的。法官在很大程度上被迫遵循严格的民事诉讼程序规则，而仲裁员则有望管理仲裁程序。从这个意义上说，仲裁员既具有裁判职能，又具有程序或行政职能。另外，仲裁员职能的私人性质也可能是法官和仲裁员之间待遇不同的原因。例如，虽然该法第29条规定仲裁员履行职能过程中任何行为的都享有豁免权，除非存在恶意行为，但在许多大陆法系国家，司法责任相关的法律不适用于只享有有限豁免权的仲裁员（在某些法域，没有豁免权），有可能仲裁员要对违反合同职责承担民事责任。因此，不一定将广泛适用的Locoail原则适用于仲裁员。仲裁员文书的披露在对仲裁员的任何诉请中都可能具有证明力。

法院适用的原则大受欢迎，因为它尊重当事人意思自治原则。然而，法院的推理回避了一个问题，即申请是在当事人对审议的保密性没有协议的情况下提出，当事人在临时仲裁中是否会处于不利地位。虽然这只是法院在行使自由裁量权时应该考虑的一个因素，而且法院不可能自行改变结果，需要更多的指导性案例将。

[英文原文]

P v Q: A Principled Approach to Disclosure fromArbitrators?

Michael McErlaine (Herbert Smith Freehills)

 

The English High Court has reinforced its pro-arbitration stance in tworecent judgments in the case of P v Q [2017] EWHC148 (Comm.) and [2017] EWHC 194 (Comm.). Much attention has been devoted to thefailed application under section 24 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (the“Act”) to remove the arbitral tribunal on the basis of alleged“over-delegation” of their duties to their secretary (see, for example, here). However, this article focuses on the application brought for disclosureof documents passing between the arbitral tribunal and the LCIA secretary. TheCourt had a relatively carte blanche given the competing approaches put forwardby the parties and that, as the judge noted, “the researches of counsel havenot identified any case in which an arbitrator has been ordered to givedisclosure in connection with a removal application…”.

Background to the case

The case involved a challenge to the tribunal which arose after theChairman of an arbitral tribunal inadvertently sending an email to P’s legalteam intended for the Tribunal Secretary asking for the Tribunal Secretary’sreaction to the email. Full details of the background to the case can be found here.

The disclosure application

P’s challenge, brought under section24 of the Act, was made with an ancillary application for disclosure of a rangeof communications between the Tribunal and the Secretary relating to theSecretary’s role and tasks delegated to him.

First, P submitted that the relevantprinciples governing the disclosure application were those found in the EnglishCivil Procedure Rules (the “CPR”), CPR 31.12 i.e. an application for specificdisclosure. In other words, as long as the documents sought were relevant(applying the test in CPR 31.6), the Court has discretion to order theirdisclosure. P’s lawyers accepted that the substance of the Tribunal’sdeliberations would need to be redacted.

Secondly, the co-arbitrators’counsel put forward a different test. The starting point was that a partycannot seek disclosure from a decision maker in the context of a challenge tosuch a person’s impartiality citing the case of Locabail (UK) Limited vBayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451. In addition, Article 30.2 of the1998 version of the LCIA Rules, which governed the arbitration, also providedprotection for the confidential nature of an arbitral tribunal’s deliberations.As such, the parties had contracted out of any jurisdiction the Court may haveto order disclosure of the documents in issue.

Thirdly, Q submitted that disclosureshould only be granted in rare and compelling cases and then only where: (i)there was a strong prima facie case on the merits of the connected section 24application and (ii) disclosure was strictly necessary for the fair disposal ofthat application

The principles to be applied

Faced with these three competingviews, the judge posed three questions:

1. Should the Court apply any meritsthreshold and, if so, what should the threshold be?
2. Should the Court apply a heightened test of relevant and, if so, whatshould the test be?
3. How should the Court approach the exercise of its discretion to orderdisclosure?

As to the first question, the Courtnoted that in an arbitration context it is not always realistic to expect arespondent to engage a summary procedure for strike-out or dismissal of anapplication – unlike in High Court litigation. However, the judge. saw noreason to depart from the default position that the Court does not address themerits of a substantive dispute when determining an interim application. Thejudge explicitly stated that, while he was not opening the door to the filingof evidence on the merits of the substantial disputes in applications such asthe present one, the relevance and nature of the material sought could be takeninto account by the Court when it exercises its discretion to order disclosure.

On the relevance question, the Court agreed with Q that the documentssought should be strictly necessary for the fair resolution of the section 24application. The Court was satisfied that an application to remove anarbitrator under section 24 of the Act was an interlocutory application. Thejudge noted that interlocutory proceedings needed to be conducted in accordancewith the overriding objective. If the Court started to award disclosure insupport of interim applications then the risk of satellite litigation andincreased delay and expense would only rise.

The judge held that the Court was required to resolve disputes arising inan arbitration context without unnecessary delay or expense and with minimalCourt-intervention. This further justified a heightened standard of relevance.

Furthermore, the Court equated an application for disclosure from anarbitrator with an application against a non-party in Court proceedings, whichalso imported a test of necessity. Although a slightly odd comparison, theCourt did acknowledge that an arbitrator is in a different position from anon-party on the receiving end of an application for disclosure of certaindocuments (in English procedure, referred to as a Norwich Pharmacalapplication and often made to enable a party to plead a claim). In particular,the arbitrators need to respond to the application in a way that maintainsfairness and impartiality between the parties given the possibility they willmaintain an on-going role in the substantive dispute.

Finally, the Court turned to the issue of how to exercise its discretionto order disclosure of the documents. In addition to the default considerationsnecessitated by the overriding objective – such as time, expense andproportionality – the judge identified a number of other relevantconsiderations arising from the disclosure application. These were:

1. The proceedings were brought underPart 8 of the CPR. Part 8 is an alternative procedure for bringing claims wherethere is usually no substantial dispute in fact. This was an indicator – thoughnot determinative – that disclosure will normally be inappropriate.Furthermore, the notion of minimal intervention from the Court meant thatdisclosure in the context of arbitration claims should only be awarded inexceptional cases.
2. If an arbitral institution has been vested by the parties with thepower to order the disclosure being sought and declines to do so then the Courtshould be reluctant to order disclosure.
3. An application in support of a strong claim – in this case thesection 24 application – may potentially justify disclosure in support eventhough this could result in the parties incurring additional costs.
4. It can only be in the rarest of cases that arbitrators should berequired to give disclosure. The Locabail case granting immunity to ajudge from such disclosure applies equally to members of an arbitral tribunalto allow them the freedom to carry out their functions.

Commentary

The Court dismissed the disclosure application. The Court did not acceptthe argument put forward by the co-arbitrators that the LCIA Rules had excludedin its entirety the Court’s jurisdiction to award disclosure. Nonetheless, Phad failed to meet the requisite elements of the test – the documents were notstrictly necessary to determine the section 24 application, there were no compellingreasons to depart from the Locabail principle, and under the parties’agreement in the form of the LCIA Rules that the arbitrator’s deliberationsshould be confidential from the parties. The Court recognised that ordering thedisclosure could have wider repercussions for international arbitration. Inparticular, it could discourage potential arbitrators from serving on tribunalsas well as potentially affecting their ability to carry out their adjudicativerole properly. The fact that the application was defended by theco-arbitrators’ counsel may be seen as indicative of the general feeling of thearbitration market.

The Court was not persuaded by P’s arguments that there was a distinctionbetween the substance of deliberations and more procedural communicationsrelating to the role of the Tribunal Secretary or tasks to be delegated to theTribunal Secretary. However, the judgment does not indicate significantanalysis of the question of whether the documents sought actually fell withinthe meaning of “deliberations” in Article 30.2. It could be suggested that, ifthe LCIA Rules intended to cover procedural communications, such as those atissue in P v Q, the drafters could have used a phrase like “all communications”or “all documents”. The Court did not consider this when relying on the widescope of the Locabail principle such that all communications for thepurposes of the process of deliberation and all documents brought intoexistence for such purpose are immune from disclosure to the parties.

The Court’s approach has policy advantages in light of the potentialproblems that could arise if courts or tribunals had to consider process versussubstance arguments each time an application for disclosure was made. However,the approach is not wholly satisfactory given that the protection in Article30.2 derives from the parties’ agreement rather than public policyconsiderations.

Moreover, the Court proceeded on the basis that the Locabailprincipleapplies as much to arbitral tribunals as it does to judges. Judges perform animportant public function and their jurisdiction derives in a very differentway to that of an arbitral tribunal. Arbitrators “contract in” to the role and,whilst their function is quasi-judicial, the genesis of their jurisdiction isthe parties’ agreement. It cannot be said that there is a complete overlap inthe functions of a judge and an arbitrator. Judges are largely compelled tofollow rigid civil procedure rules whereas arbitrators are expected to managethe arbitral process. In this sense, arbitrators have both an adjudicatoryfunction as well as a procedural or administrative function. This, and theprivate nature of the arbitrator’s role, may justify differences in treatmentbetween judges and arbitrators. For example, whilst section 29 of the Act givesan arbitrator immunity for anything done in the discharge of his function asarbitrator unless he or she is acting in bad faith, in many civil lawjurisdictions, legislation relating to judicial liability does not apply to arbitratorswho enjoy only qualified immunity (and in some jurisdictions, no immunity), andcan be held liable for breaches of contract in relation to the discharge oftheir duties. It therefore did not necessarily need to follow that Locabailwouldapply to arbitral tribunals or apply so widely. Disclosure of the arbitrator’sdocuments would likely have probative value in the context of any claim againstthe arbitrator.

The principles adopted by the Court are largely to be welcomed asrespecting the principle of party autonomy. However, the Court’s reasoning begsthe question as to whether parties engaging in ad hoc arbitrations are at adisadvantage when it comes to such applications on the basis that there may beno party agreement on the confidentiality of deliberations. Although it is justone factor to be taken account by the Court when exercising is discretion – andwould unlikely on its own change the outcome – more guidance would be welcome.