程租合同约定的索赔时限问题（英国判例）

更新时间：2018-06-19 11:42:41  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1690次

英国商事法庭裁定驳回

部分申请人关于延长索赔时限的主张

2018年6月11日，英国商事法庭作出裁定，该裁定涉及到背对背程租租约的索赔时限问题，以及超过索赔时限是否可以延期仲裁的问题，先简要介绍如下。

判决内容请见:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2018/1399.html

 

基本案情-货损（货主告船东）

海豚运输公司（Dolphin Shipping Ltd）作为承运人将52000吨的玉米干酒粕（"DDGS"）运交收货人厦门农业产品有限责任公司（Xiamen C & DAgricultural Product Co Ltd）。该批酒粕于2015年10月16日在南沙港口完成卸货。

2016年9月9日，厦门农业产品有限责任公司向厦门海事法院提起诉讼，要求海豚运输公司赔偿因不当运输（高温）导致的货物损失。

租约链（期租链+程租链）

海豚运输公司作为船东（Head Owners）与泛洋海运公司（Pan Ocean Shipping）签订期租合同，泛洋海运公司与韩国北极星航运公司（Polaris Shipping）签订期租合同。【3】在程租合同部分，北京租船公司（"Sinochart Beijing"）作为二船东与P公司签订程租合同，P公司作为二船东与Q公司签订程租合同，Q公司作为二船东与R公司签订程租合同，R公司作为二船东与S公司签订程租合同。

程租租约仲裁条款

仲裁各方当事人根据北美谷物租船合同订立了背靠背的程租合同，合同第44b条约定了仲裁条款：“London. All disputes arising out of this contract shall be arbitrated at London and, unless the parties agree forthwith on a single Arbitrator, be referred to the final arbitrament of two Arbitrators carrying on business in London who shall be Members of the Baltic Mercantile & Shipping Exchange and engaged in the Shipping and/or Grain Trades, one to be appointed by each of the parties, with power to such Arbitrators to appoint an Umpire. No award shall be questioned or invalidated on the ground that any of the Arbitrators is not qualified as above, unless objection to his action be taken before the award is made. Any disputes arising under this Charter partyshall be governed by English law”.

索赔时限条款

租约第67条约定了索赔时限条款：即除滞期费索赔外，应当自卸货之日起13个月之内向其他合同当事人书面提起所有索赔并指定仲裁员，否则视为放弃索赔权。“Any claim other than the demurrage claim under this contract must benotified in writing to the other party and claimant's arbitrator appointed within thirteen (13) months of the final discharge of the cargo and where this provision is not complied with, the claim shall be deemed to be waived and absolutely barred. ”

仲裁时间

2016年11月16日，北极星公司向北京租船公司发出索赔通知。2016年11月16日下午6时44分，北京租船公司向P公司发出发生争议和指定仲裁员通知。

2016年11月17日早晨，P公司查看该通知，但此时已超过合同第67条约定的13个月的诉讼期限。

2016年11月17日P公司告知Q公司其收到北京租船公司的索赔通知。

2017年11月17日，Q公司告知R公司其收到索赔和仲裁通知。

2016年12月1日，R公司律师向S发出索赔和仲裁通知。

申请人观点

由于相知相通，所有申请人由一个律师代理（二船东:P v Q、Q v R、R v S）认为：

（1）尽管有第67条的13个月的规定，其发出的索赔通知均在有效的期间内，

（2）另外，即使该索赔通知超出了诉讼期间，申请人申请适用1996年仲裁法案第12节规定延长提起仲裁的时效期间。

争议点一：诉讼期间的解释

申请人认为：

案件中索赔和仲裁申请的通知是有效的，尽管该时间超过了第67条约定的自卸货之日起13个月的诉讼时效期限。第67条应当放在背对背程租合同条款设立的背景中去解释，即涉案索赔请求应视为送达至整个程租合同相关方。从侧面来看，第67条不得被适用于在规定时间内无法送达索赔和仲裁通知的情形。

被申请人则认为：

该索赔和仲裁通知因超过约定的期限而无效，应予驳回。第67条应当与Himmerland、Stephanos和Evje案件中的Centrocon仲裁条款作相同解释。该条款的表述明确，应属有效。该条款属于背靠背程租合同的组成部分，非属不适用上述案例解释的理由。其次，P公司和Q公司于2015年4月订立合同，在此合同之下的合同关系尚在订立过程中，没有理由认为，合同相关方已经意识到P公司和Q公司之间的合同将成为背对背程租合同的组成部分。合同相关方在背对背运输合同中的预见性和利益与独立于该合同的预见性和利益并无实质性的区别。合同相关方应当意识到索赔和仲裁申请可能存在有效时间内发出，但超出规定时间才能接收到的情形。

法官认为：

第67条的表述是明白无误的，应当与Himmerland、Stephanos和Evje中的Centrocon仲裁条款作相同解释。合同相关方对于其属于背靠背程租合同中的组成部分和独立于该程租合同的预期没有实质性的区别。合同相关方为谋求商业利益而约定第67条，就应当承受索赔通知无法在13个月内有效送达的风险。如果要避免此类风险，合同相关方就应当修改第67条的约定。

被申请人律师认为，根据1950年仲裁法案的第27节关于延期的规定，仲裁条款应当从字面意义上进行解释。申请人律师认为应当考虑该法案第12节的规定，以确定是否对第67条进行字面意义上的解释。

法官认为，被申请人律师有过度解读之嫌，对条款进行字面意义的解读，与第27节的规定无关。

争议点二：第12节规定的适用

根据仲裁法案第12条的第3款规定，法庭只有在下列条件下才可判令延长诉讼时效期限：

（a）该情况超出了当事人的合理预期，且延长期限符合公平；

（b）一方当事人的行为使对方严格遵守期限规定的行为是不公平的。

法官认为，第12节的解释应当建立在合同当事人对于时间的预测判断的基础上，即当事人在约定时能够预见到在商业活动中出现意外情形时，会导致无法适用约定的条款而无法索赔。法官对于被申请人的意见，即合同相关方对于可能出现的货物索赔无法得到获偿的情况是明知的，不予采纳，法官认为没有充分的证据反驳，申请人并不知晓可能出现索赔通知的送达会超出规定的时间。其次，对于被申请人律师关于北京租船公司于最后期限当天下午6.44发出索赔的通知并未超出最终截止日期的意见，法官也不予采纳，其原因是，从此后的送达情况来看，即使该通知是在规定时间内送达P公司，其后的送达仍然会超出规定时间。法官认为，上述情形是合同相关方在约定第67条时无法合理预见到的情形，此类情况是极其特殊的，在此情形下，可以合理推断合同相关方无法在预期的时间内送达索赔通知。因此，将考虑同意延期请求。

法官认定

P公司：

对于P公司的申请延长期限的请求，法官认为，P公司在北京租船公司送达的索赔通知时并未迅速采取应有的商业行动，P公司申请延长期限的请求会造成不公，不应适用第12节的规定，故驳回P公司的请求。

Q公司：

对于Q公司的申请延长期限的请求，考虑到Q公司及时指定律师和仲裁员并向R公司发出索赔通知等因素，同意Q公司申请延长期限的请求。

R公司：

对于R公司的申请延长期限的请求，R公司同样在收到索赔通知时并未迅速采取应有的商业行动，不应适用第12节的规定，故驳回R公司的请求。

法官的认定原文如下：

64. I therefore turn to consider in respect of  each of the applicants whether it would be just to grant the extension of  time sought.

    P

65. In my opinion, at the very least, it will only be just to extend time under section 12 on the application of a party in a charter chain if the applicant has acted expeditiously and in a commercially appropriate fashion to commence proceedings once he (it) has become aware that a claim is being made against the applicant under the charterparty above or below in the chain. I say this bearing in mind that the parties will have agreed to the time bar in question and any extension will therefore be to the detriment of the party against whom the applicant wishes to take proceedings.

66. In my judgment, P did not act expeditiously and in a commercially appropriate fashion when dealing with Sinochart Beijing's claim from 17 November 2016. Charterparties, including in particular voyage charters, invariably include a time bar and in my view, one of the first things that P's operational staff should have done on 17 November 2016 was to investigate what time bar had been incorporated into the contract, either by perusing the contract themselves or by informing P's legal department and/or the company's P & I Club of what had happened and asking for urgent advice on what action should be taken. In my judgment, if this step had been taken and then followed by appropriately expeditious action, an arbitrator would have been appointed and Q notified thereof and of P's claim on 20 November 2016 at the latest, instead of on 25 November 2016 as in fact was the case.

67. For these reasons I am of the view that it would not be just to extend time under section 12 on P 's application for an extension to 25 November 2016 and that application is accordingly refused.

    Q

68. In contrast to P, on 17 November 2016, the day after the expiry of the time limit, Q appointed solicitors who in turn appointed Mr Rayment as Q's arbitrator and served notice on R of its claim and the commencement of an arbitration. Q seeks an extension of time to 30 November 2016 to cover the fresh service of its notice in an email of that date to R's solicitors, Reed Smith, without prejudice to the contention that the notice sent via B & J Shipping on 17 November 2016 was a validly served notice. In my judgment, it is just and appropriate to grant Q the extension it seeks. Whatever the niceties of the argument as to B  & J Shipping's authority to receive the notice sent on 17 November 2016, that notice was received by R and read on 18 November 2016 and thus I conclude that it would be just to extend time to 30 November 2016 as sought by Q.

    R

69. The issue here is whether R's delay between 18 November and 1 December 2006 in serving its notice of claim and commencement of arbitration on S is such as to render it unjust to grant the extension sought. As I have said in paragraph 65 above, in my opinion, at the very least, it will only be just to extend time under section 12 on the application of a party in a charter chain if the applicant has acted expeditiously and in a commercially appropriate fashion to commence proceedings once he (it) has become aware that a claim is being made against him (it) under the charterparty above or below in the chain. Despite the fact that R became aware of Sinochart Beijing's claim against P at 1102 hours on 17 November 2016 and in the morning of 18 November 2016 read Q's notice of claim against R received at 6.43 pm the previous evening, R waited until 28 November 2016 to instruct Reed Smith as their solicitors and it was only on 29 November 2016 that Reed Smith appointed Mr Clive Aston as R's arbitrator in the dispute with S and on 1 December 2016 that Reed Smith served notice on S of R's claim and the commencement of arbitration.

70. In my judgment, R failed expeditiously and in a commercially appropriate fashion to commence proceedings against S once it had become aware on 18 November 2016 that it had been served with Q's notice of claim and commencement of arbitration. In my view, a notice of claim and commencement of arbitration should have been served by R on S by no later than 22 November 2016. I am therefore of the opinion that it would not be just to extend time to 1 December 2016 as requested by R and accordingly, R's application under section 12 is refused.