利益冲突问题！仲裁员与其律师事务所的关系

更新时间：2018-06-25 15:55:43  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：2884次

仲裁员的独立性和公正性是有效和公平法律程序的基石。然而，公正的仲裁庭有许多必要条件，例如公平和及时地披露当事人和仲裁员的潜在冲突。在本文中，将探讨仲裁员律师事务所对仲裁员独立性认知的重要影响。

《国际律师协会利益冲突指南》（IBA《指南》）反映了律师事务所的发展情况以及围绕任命大型律事务所仲裁员的做法的商业现实。在这方面，《指南》规定，仲裁员原则上必须被视为具有其律师事务所的身份。《指南》在可撤销红目录和橙色目录下的多个条款中，讨论了聘请属于与案件一方当事人有固定联系的律师事务所的仲裁员的影响。

这是因为仲裁员对其律师事务所的生存和福祉（well-being）有着浓厚兴趣，并期望其律师事务所的积极代理人能够重视与律师事务所的专业关系。然而，这引起了人们对《指南》的推定法（presumptiveapproach）的关注，这与大多数国内仲裁规则甚至贸易法委员会（UNCITRAL）、国际商会（ICC）等的分析法（analytical approach）形成了鲜明的对比。

《指南》的适用

在Vivendi一案中，仲裁员因其律师事务所与一方当事人之间的关系而受到质疑。这项异议被驳回，理由是这种联系是次要的，而且是完全不相干的。然而，适用《指南》的设想是，仲裁员律师事务所与案件任何当事人的专业关系可能严重损害其在仲裁程序中的独立性。另指出，当仲裁员在律师事务所担任要职时，就其在任何仲裁中的独立性而言，仲裁员与其律师事务所之间存在利益奇点（singularityof interest）的法律推定 (KPMGAB v PROFILGRUPPEN AB (斯韦亚上诉法院), (案号：T 1085-11)).

在W v. M. Ltd一案中出现了不同的立场。争论的焦点是，是否“简明”（compendiously）对待仲裁员及其事务所，而不提及具体事实是否对仲裁员的公正性或独立性产生实际影响的问题，这符合从客观角度来评价公正案件的必要性。法官还陈述道，“如果事实符合《指南》中详细规定的情况，就会使一方更多地关注从事实中得出的假设，而较少关注具体案件的判决。”

对《指南》的动态解释

《指南》不是法律规定，并不是要超越当事人选择适用的国家法律或仲裁规则。工作组在制定该《指南》时，相信该《指南》将以稳健的常识加以适用，不存在迂腐和不适当的形式主义解释（formalisticinterpretation）。《指南》在详细说明实际处理利益冲突的范围时指出：“在每种情况下，都应考虑仲裁员所在的事务所活动的相关性，例如律师事务所工作的性质、时间安排和范围，以及仲裁员与律师事务所的关系。”

W诉M有限公司的案例所要求的具体案例分析，可能会妨碍《指南》所要实现的更大目标。分析法将会阻碍《指南》实现统一和一致性的目的。然而，全面接受《指南》将阻止任何与指定当事人有任何商业关系的仲裁者的任命，仅为避免《指南》的详细规定（narrow conduit）。

仲裁员的独立性和公正性受“法律传统和文化”以及每个案件的具体细微差别的影响（如Jung Science Information Technology Co. Ltd. v.ZTE Corp案）。鉴于这种明确的意见，在评估仲裁员律事务所的仲裁员公正性时，赋予仲裁员与法律事务所之间的关系以重大价值，可能为时尚早，必须先从法律上分析是否可能存在合理怀疑，而不能自然推定这些怀疑。

尽管仲裁庭一再指出，该《指南》仅具有指示性价值（indicative value），必须确保《指南》并非国际仲裁习惯法的立场(Will ShengWilson Koh, p. 720)。”总之，对仲裁员适当性的任何评估都必须考虑到动态的、以商业为导向的律师事务所与客户之间的关系，而不把法律的适用局限于先入为主（pre-conception）或归类（pigeon hole）。

  

【英文部分】

Relationship between the Arbitrators and their Law Firm

A case for Dynamic Application of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest

By SharanyaShivaraman

Independence and impartiality of an arbitrator form the bedrock of effective and fair legal proceeding. However, there are many requisites to an impartial tribunal such as fair and timely disclosures of potential conflicts by parties and the arbitrators. In this article, I shall explore the critical impact of the professional relationships of an arbitrator’s law firm on the perception of arbitrator’s independence.

The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest reflect on the growth of law firms and the commercial realities surrounding the practice of appointing arbitrators belonging to large law firms. In this regard, the Guidelines mandate that the arbitrator, in principle must be considered to bear the identity of his/her law firm. The Guidelines in multiple entries under waivable red list and orange list discuss the impact of engaging an arbitrator who belongs to the law firm with whom a party to the case has an established connection.

This is because the arbitrator has a substantial interest in his law firm’s sustenance and well-being and is expected to appreciate the professional relationships of his law firm as an active agent of the firm. However, this raises concerns on the presumptive approach under the Guidelines in stark contrast to the analytical approach under most of the domestic arbitration rules and even UNCITRAL, ICC etc.

Application of IBA Guidelines

In the case of Vivendi, the arbitrator was challenged on account of a connection between his law firm and a party. The challenge was dismissed on the ground that the connection was of minor value and wholly discrete. However, applying the IBA Guidelines, it was envisaged that an arbitrator’s law firm’s professional relationship with any party to the case may seriously impair his/her independence in the proceedings.It is further observed that where the arbitrator holds a key position in the law firm, there is a legal presumption on singularity of interest between arbitrator and his law firm so far as his independence in any arbitration is concerned (KPMG AB v PROFILGRUPPEN AB (Svea Court of Appeal), (Case no. T1085-11)).

A different position emerged in the caseof W v. M. Ltd. The point of contention was whether in treating the arbitrator and his or her firm as well ‘‘compendiously’’ without reference to the question of whether the particular facts could realistically have any effect on the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator is consistent with the need to evaluate cases of impartiality from an objective standpoint. The Judge even went on to state that where the facts fit the situation detailed under the IBA Guidelines, it ‘‘causes a party to be led to focus more on assumptions derived from the fact, and to focus less on a case-specific judgment.”

Dynamic interpretation of the IBA Guidelines

The IBA Guidelines are not legal provisions and are not meant to override any applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties. The Working Group while framing these guidelines trusted that they will be applied with robust common sense and without pedantic and unduly formalistic interpretation. While detailing the scope for a factual approach to conflicts of interest, the Guidelines state that “the relevance of the activities of the arbitrator’s firm, such as the nature, timing and scope of the work by the law firm, and the relationship of the arbitrator with the law firm, should be considered in each case.”

The case-specific analysis as the W v. M Ltd.case requires, might hinder the larger goal that the IBA Guidelines set out to achieve. An analytical approach will defeat the purpose of the Guidelines to achieve uniformity and consistency. However, blanket acceptance of these Guidelines will dissuade appointment of any arbitrator who has any semblance of a commercial relationship with appointing party merely to escape the narrow conduit under the Guidelines.

Independence and impartiality of arbitrator are shaped by the ‘legal traditions and culture’ along with the specific nuances of each case (Jung Science Information Technology Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp.). In thelight of such clear observations, it might be premature to accord significant value to the relationships of the law firm of arbitrator while assessing the arbitrator’s impartiality as the identity of an arbitrator with law firm has to be preceded by a legal analysis of the likelihood of justifiable doubt and cannot be naturally presumed.

Though tribunals have repeatedly stated that these Guidelines carry indicative value only, it must be ensured that the IBA Guidelines must not take the position of customary international arbitration law (Will ShengWilson Koh, p. 720). In conclusion, it would suffice to say that any assessment of an arbitrator’s propriety will have to take cognisance of the dynamic and commercially oriented law firm-client  relationship without restricting the application of law to any pre-conception or pigeon holes.