荷兰《双边投资条约范本草案》废除当事人指定仲裁员制度

更新时间：2018-07-06 14:10:44  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1739次

荷兰《双边投资条约范本草案》废除当事人指定仲裁员制度

一、背景

2018年5月16日，全球仲裁评论发表了一份关于荷兰新发布的《双边投资条约范本草案》的报告。新闻标题为“《荷兰双边投资条约范本草案》中的激进建议”。其中，激进建议指的是废除由当事人指定仲裁员的制度。但不要把激进和新颖混为一谈，因为有关废除由当事人指定仲裁员的辩论至少已持续八年。

二、Paulson观点：反对当事人指定仲裁员制度

这场辩论的热度始于2010年，当时Jan Paulson作为迈阿密大学 Michael R. Klein杰出学者主席发表就职演讲。Paulson认为，由当事人指定仲裁员的制度对国际纠纷解决是一种道德风险。在他看来，该制度会影响国际仲裁的合法性，因用户可能认为该制度不公正。对Paulson而言，由当事人指定仲裁员的制度为各方当事人打开了大门，使其能够指定“将有助于他们胜诉”的仲裁员，反之，仲裁员将感到有义务支持指定他们的当事人的主张。Paulson认为，这是由当事人指定仲裁员所面临的道德风险。

Paulson认为，已有证据表明这种道德风险的存在及其影响。Paulson介绍了一系列令人遗憾和不专业的当事人指定仲裁员的案例，这些案例有利于指定仲裁员的当事人的利益。他还指出，这种道德风险在缺乏一致性仲裁裁决时表现得更加明显。根据最近国际商事仲裁中的两项研究，Paulson认为，反对意见是由败诉方指定的仲裁员所撰写。

后来，在一篇为美国律师协会国际法部门撰写的文章中，Paulson在回应外界对其（关于当事人指定仲裁员的）立场提出的各种批评时表示，即使人们接受一致同意是仲裁裁决中的规则，“仍存在值得深切担忧的理由”。为支持其观点，Paulson争论道，一致性裁决并不总是以原则性的方式获得，由当事人指定仲裁员的制度会朝妥协的方向发展。Paulson认为，妥协不可避免地意味着仲裁制度缺乏合法性，因其影响了人们对仲裁员必须遵循的一致而严肃的法律推理作出裁决的印象。

此外，Paulson认为，支持由当事人指定仲裁员的理论（rationale）是错误的，或至少不再适用。Paulson在演讲中列举各种支持当事人指定制度的论点，并对其进行反驳。例如，Paulson指出，认为指定仲裁员是一种基本权利是一种错误的观念。这种权利并不存在，如果存在，也不是基本权利。他表示，由当事人指定仲裁员背后的原因是指定一名双方当事人都信任的仲裁员。然而，“任何一方当事人为什么会信任由其不喜欢的对方当事人挑选的仲裁员？”Paulson随后转向另一个论点，即由当事人指定仲裁员的制度减少了文化差异。Paulson回答说，不管曾出于何种需要，“文化冲突”的主题在当今仲裁中被夸大了。对Paulson而言，真正的担忧在于各方当事人“担心被当作局外人对待，而不在于文化特殊性的扩散。”Paulson随后得出结论，他没有为单方面任命进行辩护的唯一抗辩理由是，在实践中人们无法相信仲裁机构会任命优秀的仲裁员。

因此，对Paulson来说，理论上没有理由维持由当事人指定仲裁员的制度。然而，他承认，在非法仲裁机构的实际问题得到解决之前，他的建议在实践中不会有太大进展。

三、Charles Brower观点：支持当事人指定仲裁员制度

在讨论的另一面，还存在包括Charles Brower在内的同样有影响力的声音。与Paulson的观点相反，Brower指出，由当事人指定仲裁员的制度应当维持，Paulson所提倡的对该制度的废除将阻碍国际仲裁领域的发展。

首先，Brower认为当事人有权指定仲裁员，甚至进一步指出，“……该权利已成为国际仲裁的一项既定法律原则”。对Brower而言，有足够的历史背景来支持其观点。从1794年美国和大布里坦之间的《杰伊条约》开始，到最近的国家之间的双边投资条约，由当事人指定仲裁员的制度在国际仲裁领域一直存在。

此外，Brower认为，由当事人指定仲裁员能够增强仲裁程序公认的合法性（perceived legitimacy）。他指出，当事人将对其通过指定一名仲裁员而对程序有更大的信心。事实上，没有人比当事人自己更了解解决争端所需的具体知识。Brower随后补充道，若一方当事人在组成仲裁庭时发挥了作用，该当事人更不可能对仲裁庭的裁决和决策过程提出异议。因此，Brower认为，由当事人指定仲裁员的制度能促进人们对国际仲裁合法性的认识。

四、解决办法

但Paulson所谓的道德风险又该如何解决？Brower表示该问题的解决需依靠制度的自我约束。他认为，该制度的批评者“……忽略了内部控制的作用，这种控制实际上能够阻止这种不被允许的交换条件（quid pro quo）的产生。”Brower指出，大多数国际仲裁规则都作出规定，旨在维护仲裁员的独立性和公正性。此外，他还表示，这种不被允许的交换条件会被仲裁员声誉的重要性所阻止。在Brower看来，任何当事人都不愿任命一个不公正的仲裁员，因为仲裁用户知道“……雇佣枪手对他们而言弊大于利。”

五、仲裁员名单制并不可取

最后，Brower对Paulson提出的一些替代方案表示质疑。首先，他指出，采用仲裁员名单的方法不可取。Paulson的建议之一是，可以有一份仲裁员名单，由当事人指定其仲裁员。在Brower看来并不可取，因这种方法不可避免地将政治卷入制度中。他认为，这种做法鼓励将与国家或机构有密切联系的仲裁员列入机构名单。相反，目前的当事人指定仲裁员制度提供了真正的择优制度，因当事人可以根据仲裁员的知识进行指定。其次，Brower指出，当事人指定应优先于机构任命，因为“……任何机构所达到的用户信任程度，是否能接近有经验的当事人和律师作出的选择”，这一点非常令人怀疑。

总之，新公布的《荷兰双边投资条约范本》不过是仲裁长期争论的反映。然而，观察这场辩论如何影响实践，还是很有趣的。人们不禁要问，新的《荷兰双边投资条约范本》以及欧盟关于设立常设多边投资法院的提议，是否实现了Jan Paulson 在其就职演讲中表达的设想。在提出反对道德风险的论点之前，Jan Paulson认为单方面任命存在道德风险，他表示：“从我偶尔就这个话题发表的公开言论得到的一致反应来看，我提出的建议似乎使我成为少数人之一。但我认为，这些反应是基于现状的安慰，而非分析。所以我打算继续坚持下去，希望在2060年发现自己处在大多数的队伍之中。”

 

【英文部分】：

Draft Model BIT abandons Party-Appointed Arbitrators

Author: Antonio Perry and Jorge Valencia

On 16 May 2018, Global Arbitration Review published a report on the Netherlands newly published draft model BIT. The news heading was “Radical proposals in draft Netherlands Model BIT”. The radical proposal was the abandonment of the party-appointment arbitrator system. However, one must not mistake radical with novel because the debate on the elimination of party-appointed arbitrators is at least eight years old.

The heat of the debate started in 2010, when Jan Paulson launched his inaugural lecture as holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair of the University of Miami.[1] Paulson argued that the party-appointed arbitrator system was a moral hazard for international dispute resolution. In Paulson’s view the system affects the legitimacy of international arbitration because users may perceive the system as not being impartial. For Paulson the party-appointed arbitrator opens the door for parties to name arbitrators that “will help them win the case” and, in turn, arbitrators will feel obliged to support the claims of the party that appointed them. This is the moral hazard party-appointed arbitrators represent, according to Paulson.

Paulson argued that there was proof of the existence and effects of such moral hazard. Paulson presented a series of unfortunate and unprofessional examples of party-appointed arbitrators, favoring the interests of the party that appointed them. He also noted that the moral hazard was evident in the lack of unanimity of arbitration decisions. According to two recent studies in international commercial arbitration, Paulson argued, dissenting opinions were written by the arbitrator nominated by the losing party.

Later on, in an article written for the ABA Section of International Law[2], in response to various criticisms to his position towards party-appointed arbitrators, Paulson stated that even if one accepted that unanimity was the rule in arbitration decisions “there are still reasons for grave concern”.[3] To support his statement, Paulson argued that unanimity is not always obtained in principled ways, and that the party-appointed system militated toward compromise. Compromise, Paulson argued, inevitably meant lack of legitimacy for the arbitration system because it affected the perception of coherent and serious legal reasoning that arbitrators must follow to arrive to a decision.

Furthermore, Paulson argued that the rationale that supports the existence of the party-appointed arbitrator is wrong, or at least does not apply anymore. In his lecture, Paulson listed various arguments that supported a system of party-appointed arbitrators and refuted them. For instance, Paulson notes that the belief that a fundamental right to appoint one’s arbitrator is a false belief. There is no such right and, if there were, it would certainly not be fundamental. He states that the reason behind party-appointed arbitrators is the appointment of an arbitrator in which both parties have confidence. Yet, “why would any party have confidence in an arbitrator selected by its unloved opponent?”[4] Paulson then turns to the argument which suggests that the party-appointedarbitrator system mitigates cultural divide. Paulson responds that whatever the need may have been, the “clash of cultures” theme is exaggerated nowadays in arbitration. For Paulson, the true concern is parties’ “fear of being treated as an outsider, not so much about the diffusion of cultural particularities.”[5] He then concludes that the only defense for unilateral appointments to which he has no defense is that, in practice, there is an inability to trust that arbitration institutions will appoint good arbitrators.

Thus, for Paulson there is no reason in theory to maintain the figure of party-appointed arbitrators. However, he recognizes that in practice his proposal will not get far until the practical problem of illegitimate arbitral institutions is solved.

On the other side of the discussion there are equally influential voices, including Charles Brower’s. Contrary to Paulson’s view, Brower states that party appointments should be maintained in arbitration, and that its elimination, as promoted by Paulson, would rather block the development of the field of international arbitration.[6]

Firstly, in Brower’s opinion there is a right to party-appointed arbitrators, and he even goes as far to state that this right “(…) has become an established principle of law in international arbitration”.[7] For Brower there is more than enough historical background to back up his statement. Starting as early as the Jay Treaty between the United States and Great Brittan in 1794, to most of the recent BIT’s between states, the figure of party-appointed arbitrators has been present in international arbitration.

Additionally, Brower argues that party-appointed arbitrators enhance the perceived legitimacy of the arbitral proceedings. He notes that parties will have greater confidence in a proceeding in which they have invested through the appointment of an arbitrator. In fact, who knows better than the parties themselves which specific knowledge is required to solve the dispute? Brower then adds that a party is less likely to challenge a decision and the decision making process of an arbitral tribunal if the party has had a role in constituting the tribunal. Thus, in Brower’s view, the figure of party-appointed arbitrators promotes the perceived legitimacy of international arbitration.

But what about the moral hazard identified by Paulson? Brower addresses this issue by stating that the system is self-policing. He states that the system’s critics “(…) overlook the internal control that in practice prevent such an impermissible quid pro quo.”[8] Brower points out that most of the international arbitration rules provide for regulations which intend to preserve the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. Furthermore, he states that such impermissible quid pro quo is discouraged by the weight of an arbitrator’s reputation. No party will want to nominate a biased arbitrator, in Brower’s view, because users of arbitration are aware that “(…) hired guns do them more harm than good.”[9]

Finally, Brower challenges some of Paulson’s proposed alternatives. First, he states that the pre-exiting list approach is undesirable. One of Paulson’s proposals is that there could be a pre-exiting list of arbitrators, from which the party’s could nominate their arbitrators. In Brower’s view, this is undesirable because it unavoidably infuses politics into the system. He argues that this approach incentivizes that arbitrators with close connections with states or with institutions are added to the institutional lists. In contrast, the current system of party-appointed arbitrators provides for a true merit system because arbitrators stand for election by the parties in regards to their knowledge. Secondly, Brower states that party-appointments should be preferred over institutional appointments, because it is highly doubtful “(…) that any institution will achieve a level of user confidence that even approaches that of selections made by sophisticated parties and counsel.”[10]

In sum, the newly published Netherlands model BIT is but a reflection of a long standing debate in arbitration. Yet, it is interesting enough to see how the debate has influenced practice. One can only wonder if the Netherlands’ new model BIT, and the European Union’s proposal to create a standing multilateral investment court is the realization of Jan Paulson’s vision expressed in his inaugural lecture. Before presenting his argument against the moral hazard, which he believed unilateral appointments to be, Jan Paulson stated: “What I propose seems to put me in a minority of one, judging by the rather uniform reactions to my occasional public utterances on the topic. But these reactions, I believe, are based on comfort in the status quo – not analysis. So I intend to soldier on, and expect to find myself in the majority well before 2060″. [11]

 

[1] Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair University of Miami School of Law 29 April 2010.

[2] Jan Paulsson, Must We Live with Unilaterals?, in: Aba Section of International Law, 2013, Volume 1, Issue 1 pp. 5-9.

[3] Jan Paulsson, ibid. p. 6.

[4] Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair University of Miami School of Law 29 April 2010.

[5] Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair University of Miami School of Law 29 April 2010.

[6] Charles Brower, The (Abbreviated) Case for Party Appointments in International Arbitration, in: Aba Section of International Law, 2013, Volume 1, Issue 1 pp. 10-13.

[7] Charles Brower, ibid. p. 11.

[8] Charles Brower, ibid. p. 11.

[9] Charles Brower, ibid. p. 12.

[10] Charles Brower, ibid. p. 12,

[11] Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair University of Miami School of Law 29 April 2010.