更新时间:2018-07-06 14:11:46  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑:lianluobu  点击次数:3206次
WEST TANKERS案原则不受重编(Recast)的《布鲁塞尔规则》影响;强制性外国管辖规则不违反措辞宽泛的仲裁条款范围。
在Nori Holdings Limited et al v PJSC Bank OkritieFinancial Corporation [2018] EWHC 1343 (Comm)案中,英国法院适用重编的《布鲁塞尔规则》,认为WEST TANKERS案的原则仍可适用,因而拒绝授予有关欧盟法院平行程序的禁诉令。
同时,该法院认为所谓的俄罗斯强制管辖规则涉及一个提交给莫斯科仲裁院解决的破产争议,该规则不足以取代仲裁条款中宽泛和笼统的措辞,因此其授予了针对非欧盟诉讼程序的禁诉令。
一、背景
注册于俄罗斯的被申请人(“银行”)通过短期贷款方式向一些企业提供了超过5亿美元的贷款,并由三个申请人(“申请人”)通过五份《股权质押协议》以其持有的股权作为担保。这些《股权质押协议》均包含LCIA/仲裁地为伦敦的仲裁条款。2017年8月,当事人进行一系列交易(“八月交易”),其实际影响在于用无担保的长期债券取代以股权质押为担保的短期贷款。《股权质押协议》据称已通过五份《质押终止协议》终止,这些终止协议由塞浦路斯的法律管辖,且均援引了《股权质押协议》中的仲裁条款。
对于八月交易是真实商业安排还是对银行的欺诈行为,当事人之间存在争议,但均认为这一实质性问题不应由英国法院认定。法院还确认仲裁条款不受欺诈指控影响的传统立场。
在八月交易后,申请人将原先作为股权质押标的的股权转让给其他公司,这些公司随后又将该股权质押给其他银行作为其他贷款的担保。
八月交易发生三周后,俄罗斯央行任命一名临时管理人管理银行。
二、俄罗斯诉讼程序
该银行——由临时管理人代理——在莫斯科仲裁院对十名被告(其中包含本案申请人)提起诉讼,试图对包括《质押终止协议》在内的许多交易请求宣告无效并予以撤销。这将导致《股权质押协议》的恢复。管理人声称:(1)根据《俄罗斯破产法》第189.40条,八月交易涉及不平等的对价——类似于英国交易价值过低的概念——并且根据俄罗斯法应由莫斯科仲裁院管辖;(2)八月交易违反《俄罗斯民法典》第10条和第168条的规定,构成对权利的滥用。
二、塞浦路斯诉讼程序
注册于塞浦路斯的第一申请人和第二申请人,根据俄罗斯仲裁程序请求塞浦路斯法院签发命令,阻止银行采取任何措施对《股权质押协议》进行登记。与此同时,该银行在塞浦路斯提起实体诉讼(substantive proceedings),指控存在欺诈阴谋并请求法院撤销某些交易,恢复《股权质押协议》并授予损害赔偿金。尽管不存在破产争议,但诉请大体上与俄罗斯的仲裁程序请求相同。
三、LCIA仲裁
同时,各申请人根据各《股权质押协议》及相关《质押终止协议》,向银行提起(或声称提起)十个仲裁。每个仲裁案件的仲裁庭均相同,各方同意合并仲裁。申请人请求仲裁庭宣告《质押终止协议》有效并签发禁诉令,与向英国法院提出的禁诉令请求相似。
四、英国法院诉讼程序
申请人向英国法院提交终局的禁诉令申请,以禁止俄罗斯和塞浦路斯法院的诉讼程序,其声称俄罗斯和塞浦路斯的诉讼程序违反了《股权质押协议》和《质押终止协议》中的仲裁条款。
五、法院的裁定
1、法院签发禁诉令的一般权力
法院根据《1981年高等法院法》第37条授予禁诉令以支持仲裁,并指出该权力不取决于仲裁是否已经或即将开始。
2、申请无需向仲裁员提出
银行认为禁诉申请应向已组成的仲裁庭提出而不应向法院提出,法院对该立场未表示认同,并指出,在被申请人未根据第9条请求中止诉讼的情况下,“法院没有理由不行使其无疑拥有的授予禁诉救济的管辖权”。The Angelic Grace [1995] 1Lloyd’s Rep 87 案和AES Ust-KamenogorskHydropower Plant LLP v Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC [2013] UKSC 35案的影响是,从仲裁员处获得禁诉救济并非是法院拒绝授予禁诉令或仅签发临时(而非终局)禁诉令的理由。另一方面,法院指出,在实践中被申请人很少根据第9条请求法院中止其支持仲裁的禁诉程序。仅凭平行诉讼程序的事实就可表明,第9条的假定请求人对仲裁条款的效力存在争议。因此,该申请人不太可能请求法院中止程序而允许仲裁庭(其管辖权被认为具有争议)签发禁诉令。
3、俄罗斯的诉讼程序违反了仲裁协议
法院认为,在俄罗斯提起的“滥用权利”索赔是一般民事请求,与破产法没有任何关系,因此显然属于仲裁协议范围。
至于破产请求,银行辩称其要么不属于仲裁协议的范围,要么根本不可仲裁。法院基于如下原因驳回这两个主张并因此授予禁令:
4、俄罗斯破产程序属于仲裁协议的范围
对于在没有明确措辞时,应推定将破产程序排除在仲裁协议范围外(如新加坡已有案例)的提议,法院予以驳回并指出一个“现代观点”,即同意仲裁的商事当事人并未剥夺其自身向法院提起诉讼的基本权利,此外,法院还认为限制仲裁条款范围的必要性标准也不适用。
5、俄罗斯的诉讼程序可以仲裁
法官强调实质重于形式,因而不难认定,无论人们多希望对这一争议进行定性,该争议“显然”可以在仲裁中予以确定。
6、不应签发禁止塞浦路斯诉讼的禁令——West Tankers案的原则
在查阅West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA (Case C-185/07)[2009] AC 1138, 以及判例Gazprom OAO (Case C-536/13)案以及AG Wathelet’s Opinion in Gazprom后,法院认为重编的《布鲁塞尔规则》(Council Regulation 1215/2012)的效力是“明确”的。
7、禁诉令不损害《布鲁塞尔规则》的效力
法官认为,并没有损害或甚至提及“《布鲁塞尔规则》有效性的基本原则,这些原则在West Tankers 案被确认并在Gazprom案中重申”。相关原则是,针对欧盟成员国法院诉讼的禁诉令,虽然不属于《布鲁塞尔规则》的范围,但损害了该规则的效力,因此应被禁止。法官进一步指出,重编的规则本身或其序言并未明确规定这些原则不再适用,也未明确规定应优先考虑禁诉令。
法官分析Gazprom案中AG Waelelt的意见(该意见未被欧盟法院采纳),在几个方面作出强烈反对并认为:“重编规则中不存在任何规定质疑West Tankers案裁定的持续效力”。
8、不应签发关于塞浦路斯诉讼的禁令
由于塞浦路斯是欧盟成员国,法院不能对塞浦路斯的诉讼签发禁诉令。法院指出可能终止这些诉讼的几种可能情况:(i)塞浦路斯法院本身可以签发中止裁定(ii)仲裁庭可以签发禁止塞浦路斯诉讼的裁令,继Gazprom案件后,该命令将有权获得《纽约公约》的承认与执行,即使在欧盟成员国也是如此。然而,第二种可能情况的前提是,该命令为《纽约公约》之目的将被视为“裁决”。
9、重编规则的效力:具有管辖权的仲裁裁决将优先于法院认定不存在有效仲裁协议的裁定
法院进一步指出,该规则的框架规定了法院可能作出裁定,否定仲裁协议和具有仲裁管辖权的仲裁裁决的效力。在这种情况下,法官认为“应优先根据《纽约公约》承认和执行裁决”,并指出当前案件很可能出现这种情况。
法院认为,没有其他情有可原的情况或理由能拒绝对俄罗斯诉讼程序授予禁诉令。法院还推迟(deferred)了申请人主张赔偿塞浦路斯诉讼费用的请求。
六、评论
这份重要判决对一些法律问题作出了受人欢迎的澄清:
1、在这篇对重编的《布鲁塞尔规则》中与仲裁相关的规定进行仔细合理权衡的解释中,应特别注意:
(1)法院有权审理中止诉讼程序申请;
(2)支持仲裁管辖权的仲裁裁决优先于法院否定当事人仲裁管辖的判决;
(3) West Tankers原则(要求《布鲁塞尔规则》的有效性)的持续效力不受重编的《布鲁塞尔规则》的影响。这意味着禁诉令在欧盟法院诉讼程序中仍不可用。
2、尽管存在强制性的外国管辖规则,英国法院仍不愿意将一些争议类别从广泛起草的仲裁条款中排除。
3、在面对一份明确的仲裁协议时,同意仲裁的商事当事人之间不存在一项可向法院起诉的基本权利可产生支持法院诉权的推定。
法官对West Tankers案的解释以及对Gazprom案中AG Wathelet分析的拒绝适用,是否将在英国和威尔士得到更广泛的遵从并被其他欧盟管辖区效仿仍有待观察。虽然禁诉令历来是普通法的产物,但在整个欧盟越来越多地被适用(二者的目的均在于根据支持仲裁的未决诉讼程序和非欧盟法院诉讼程序对随后的法院程序进行限制)。
有趣的是,法院认为塞浦路斯的诉讼程序可通过仲裁庭的“命令”终止。也许此处措辞非有意为之,但若是如此,其前提是这样的命令能被视为《纽约公约》下的“裁决”。这仍是一个未决领域,司法声明(judicial pronouncements)很少。例如,新加坡上诉法院认为临时裁决可以执行,因其是对初步问题的最终决定(并将临时裁决与仍有待更改的“暂时性”裁决进行区分)。可以认为,仲裁庭的终局禁诉令具备终局性的必要方面,而法院的裁定与Gazprom案的判决一样,似乎支持这一观点。试图通过《纽约公约》执行裁定的当事人应请求仲裁庭以部分裁决的形式作出,而不是以程序令(通常情况下的)的形式。
【英文原文】:
West Tankers principle unaffected by Recast Brussels Regulation; mandatory foreign jurisdictional rules do not encroach on scope of widely worded arbitration clause
By Adam Johnson
In Nori Holdings Limited et al v PJSC Bank Okritie Financial Corporation [2018] EWHC 1343 (Comm) the English court has applied the Recast Brussels Regulation, finding that the West Tankers principle remains applicable and, as a consequence, refused to grant an anti-suit injunction in relation to parallel EU court proceedings.
At the same time, it found alleged Russian mandatory jurisdictional rules referring an insolvency dispute to the Moscow Arbitrazh Court insufficient to displace the wide and general wording of an arbitration clause, with the result that it granted an anti-suit injunction in relation to non-EU proceedings.
Background
The Russia-incorporated Defendant (the “Bank“) advanced over US$500m by way of short-term loans to a number of entities which were secured by five Share Pledges over shares owned by the three Claimants (the “Claimants“). These Share Pledges all contained an LCIA / London seat arbitration clause. There was then a series of transactions in August 2017 (the “August Transactions”), whose net effect was to replace the short-term loans secured by Share Pledges with long-term unsecured bonds. The Share Pledges were allegedly terminated by five Pledge Terminations which were governed by the laws of Cyprus and contained a reference to the arbitration clause of the Share Pledges.
The parties disputed whether the August Transactions were a genuine commercial arrangement or a fraud on the Bank. It was, however, common ground that determination of this substantive issue was not for the English court. The court also confirmed the traditional position that arbitration clauses are untainted by allegations of fraud.
Following the August Transactions, the Claimants transferred the shares which had been the subject of the earlier Share Pledges to other companies, who then pledged them to another bank as security for other loans.
Three weeks after the August Transactions, the Central Bank of Russia appointed a temporary administrator to manage the Bank.
Russian proceedings
The Bank – acting by the temporary administrator – commenced proceedings in the Moscow Arbitrazh Court against ten defendants, including the Claimants, seeking invalidation and reversal of various transactions including the Pledge Terminations. This would result in the reinstatement of the Share Pledges. The administrator claimed that the August Transactions (i) involved unequal consideration pursuant to Art 189.40 of the Russian Bankruptcy Law – something akin to the English concept of a transaction at an undervalue – and, under Russian law, subject to Moscow Arbitrazh Court jurisdiction; and (ii) constituted an abuse of rights contrary to Arts 10 and 168 of the Russian Civil Code.
Cypriot proceedings
The First and Second Claimants, incorporated in Cyprus, sought an order from the Cypriot court preventing the Bank from taking any steps to register the Share Pledges pursuant to the Russian proceedings. Meanwhile, the Bank commenced substantive proceedings in Cyprus alleging a fraudulent conspiracy and seeking orders annulling certain transactions and restoring the Share Pledges and / or damages. These broadly mirrored the Russian proceedings, albeit there are no insolvency issues.
LCIA arbitrations
At the same time, the Claimants commenced (or purported to commence) ten arbitrations against the Bank, one under each Share Pledge and related Pledge Termination. The Tribunal appointed in each arbitration was identical and the parties appeared to have agreed to consolidate the arbitrations. The Claimants sought declarations from the arbitral tribunal(s) that the Pledge Terminations are valid and an anti-suit injunction, similar to the one sought before the English court.
English court proceedings
The Claimants made an application before the English court for a final anti-suit injunction to restrain the pursuit of the court proceedings in Russia and Cyprus which they alleged had been brought in breach of the arbitration clauses in the Share Pledges and Pledge Terminations.
The court’s decision
Court’s general power to issue anti-suit injunction
The court confirmed its general power to grant an anti-suit injunction in support of an arbitration under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, noting that the power does not depend on whether an arbitration has been or is about to be commenced.
The application need not be made to the arbitrators
The court disagreed with the Bank’s position that an anti-suit application should be made to the arbitral tribunal that had already been constituted and not to the court. The court noted that, in the absence of a section 9 application by a defendant for a stay of the application, “there is no reason why the court should not exercise the jurisdiction to grant anti-suit relief which it undoubtedly has“. The effect of The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 and AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP v Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC [2013] UKSC 35 was that the availability of anti-suit relief from the arbitrators was no reason for the court to refuse an injunction or to issue only a temporary, as opposed to a final, injunction. As an aside, the court noted that, in practice, a defendant would rarely make the necessary section 9 application to stay the anti-suit action brought in court in favour of arbitration. The mere fact of parallel court proceedings would indicate that the putative section 9 applicant disputes the validity of the arbitration clause. It would therefore be highly unlikely to seek a stay from the court to allow the tribunal (whose jurisdiction it disputes) to order an anti-suit injunction.
Russian proceedings are in breach of arbitration agreements
The court found that the “abuse of rights” claim in Russia was an ordinary civil claim and had nothing to do with insolvency law, and hence was clearly within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
As to the insolvency claim, the Bank argued that it was either outside the scope of the arbitration agreements or not arbitrable at all. The court rejected both arguments for the following reasons, and consequently granted the injunction sought:
Russian insolvency proceedings within the scope of the arbitration agreements
It rejected the suggestion of a presumption (as exists in Singapore[1]) that would exclude insolvency proceedings from the ambit of arbitration agreements in the absence of express language. The court also noted the “modern view” that commercial parties agreeing to arbitrate do not deprive themselves of fundamental rights to access the courts, and found inapplicable the necessity test[2] to imply a limitation of the scope of the arbitration clause.
Russian proceedings are arbitrable
Emphasising substance over form, the judge had no difficulty finding that, however one wished to characterise the dispute, it was “plainly” capable of being determined in arbitration.
No injunction to restrain Cyprus proceedings – West Tankers principle stands
Following review of West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA (Case C-185/07) [2009] AC 1138, Proceedings concerning Gazprom OAO (Case C-536/13) and AG Wathelet’s Opinion in Gazprom, the court concluded that the effect of the Recast Brussels Regulation (Council Regulation 1215/2012) is “clear“.
Effectiveness of Regulation not to be undermined via anti-suit injunction
The judge found that there was nothing to undermine or even address the “fundamental principles concerning the effectiveness of the Regulation which were affirmed in the West Tankers case and reiterated in Gazprom“. The relevant principle was that an anti-suit injunction directed at EU Member States’ court proceedings, while not itself within the scope of the Regulation, undermines the effectiveness of the Regulation and is, therefore, prohibited. He further noted the absence of an express provision in the Recast Regulation itself or its recitals that these principles no longer apply or that an anti-suit injunction should take precedence.
The judge analysed AG Wathelet’s opinion in Gazprom (that was not adopted by the CJEU) and strongly disagreed with it in several respects, concluding that “there is nothing in the Recast Regulation to cast doubt on the continuing validity of the decision in West Tankers“.
No injunction regarding the Cyprus proceedings
Because Cyprus was an EU Member State, the court could not order an anti-suit injunction against the Cypriot proceedings. The court pointed out several possibilities that could bring an end to those proceedings: (i) the Cypriot court itself may order a stay or (ii) the Tribunal could issue an order restraining the Cypriot proceedings which, following Gazprom, would be entitled to recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention even in EU Member States. The second possibility, however, presupposes that such an order would be treated as an “award” for the purposes of the New York Convention.
Effect of Recast Regulation: Tribunal’s award upholding jurisdiction takes precedence over court’s finding no valid arbitration agreement
The court further noted that the Regulation’s framework provides for the possibility of a court judgment negating the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement and a conflicting arbitral award upholding jurisdiction. In this case, the judge held that “recognition and enforcement of the award under the New York Convention is to take precedence“, noting that this scenario may well arise in the present circumstances.
The court found there were no other extenuating circumstances or reasons not to grant the anti-suit injunction against the Russian court proceedings. The court also deferred the Claimants’ claim for indemnification for the costs of the Cypriot proceedings.
Comment
This important judgment makes certain welcome clarifications to the law:
In this carefully reasoned and balanced interpretation of the arbitration-related provisions of the Recast Brussels Regulation, the following are of particular note:
1. the court’s duty to consider an application for a stay;
2. the precedence of an arbitral award upholding jurisdiction over a court’s decision refusing to refer parties to arbitration; and
3. the continuing validity of the West Tankers principle requiring the Regulation’s effectiveness, unaffected by the Recast Brussels Regulation. This means that an anti-suit injunction continues to be unavailable vis-à-vis EU court proceedings.
2. English courts remain reluctant to exclude categories of disputes from widely drafted arbitration clauses, notwithstanding alleged mandatory foreign jurisdictional rules.
3. As between commercial parties that have agreed to arbitrate, there is no fundamental right to court access that would generate a presumption to uphold that right to court access in the face of a clear and unequivocal agreement to arbitrate.
It remains to be seen whether the judge’s West Tankers interpretation and rejection of AG Wathelet’s analysis in Gazprom will be followed more widely in England and Wales, and mirrored by other EU jurisdictions. While historically anti-suit injunctions tend to be a common law creature, there is scope for its increased use across the EU (both to restrain subsequent court proceedings under lis pendens and non-EU court proceedings in support of arbitration).
It is also interesting that the court suggested that the Cypriot proceedings could be brought to an end by an “order” of the tribunal. It may be that the choice of language here was not intentional, but if it were, it presupposes that such an order would be treated as an “award” for the purposes of the New York Convention. This is an unsettled area and judicial pronouncements are rare. For example, the Singaporean Court of Appeal found an interim award enforceable as it was finally dispositive of a preliminary issue (and it distinguished the decision from a “provisional” award that was open to revision) – see here for a further discussion. Arguably a Tribunal’s final anti-suit injunction has the necessary aspect of finality and this court’s decision appears to support this view, as does the Gazprom judgment – see here for more detail. A party seeking to enforce such a decision via the New York Convention should request the Tribunal to make it in the form of a partial award, as opposed to (as may be commonly the case) a Procedural Order.