ICCA国际仲裁第三方资助（TPF）报告：第2章 争议资助概述（1）

更新时间：2018-08-09 09:16:05   编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：4453次

Chapter 2* Overview of Dispute Funding（1）

第2章 争议资助概述（1）

I. Dispute Funding: An Introductory Overview  争议资助简介

As international arbitration continues to grow in prominence and complexity, so do the attendant costs and, consequently, demands from users of the process to find innovative ways to finance their matters.[1] “Whether in favour or against, third-party funding of litigation and, more recently, arbitration, is an undeniable and important reality.”[2] Anecdotal reports suggest that the global market for dispute funding – both litigation and arbitration – is currently estimated as exceeding US$ 10 billion and rapidly growing.[3]

随着国际仲裁的持续发展和日趋复杂，仲裁费用随之攀升，仲裁用户希望寻求创新方式来资助仲裁程序的需求也随之而来。“无论是否赞成，诉讼程序中的第三方资助以及最近的仲裁资助已经是不可否认的重要现实。”传闻报告显示，全球争议资助市场规模，包括诉讼资助和仲裁资助，目前预计超过100亿并仍在快速增长。

The business of law is changing and dispute funding is very much an integral part of the future of the global arbitration and litigation markets. It is amidst this backdrop that an exploration of the interplay between dispute funding and international arbitration is not only increasingly timely, but of the utmost importance. The arbitration community must find a way to balance the increasing business need for innovative approaches to the financing of legal matters while protecting the integrity of the arbitral process and the ultimate enforceability of awards. The aim of this Chapter is to provide a general overview of dispute funding as it relates to international commercial and investment arbitration.

法律业务正在发生变化，争议资助将成为未来全球仲裁和诉讼市场的重要组成部分。在这种背景下，对争议资助与国际仲裁之间关系的探索不仅日益及时，而且至关重要。仲裁机构在保护仲裁程序的完整性和裁决的最终可执行性的同时，必须适应不断增长的以创新方法资助法律事务的业务需求。本章将对国际商业和投资仲裁中的争议资助作整体概述。

A. What is Dispute Funding? 何为争议资助？

In less than a decade, dispute funding has moved from the fringes of a handful of common law jurisdictions to centre stage in the global commercial litigation and arbitration market. Dispute funding first started in Australia and then migrated to the United Kingdom in the beginning of the twenty-first century. While Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are now known to have established and thriving legal dispute funding markets, the practice continues to emerge and grow in new jurisdictions around the world (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Latin America, and Europe).[4]

在十年间，争议资助就从普通法系的边缘转移到全球商业诉讼和仲裁市场的中心。争议资助起源于澳大利亚并于21世纪初传到英国。当澳大利亚、英国和美国都已建立繁荣的法律争议资助市场时，该项实践也在世界各地的新司法辖区继续产生和发展，如新加坡、香港、中国、拉丁美洲和欧洲。

In its simplest form, third-party funding involves an entity, with no prior interest in the legal dispute, providing financing to one of the parties (usually the claimant). Typically, this financing is offered on a ‘non-recourse’ basis, meaning that the funder has no recourse against the funded party if the case is unsuccessful. Under this model, the funder’s recourse for repayment of the capital advanced and return on the capital invested is limited only to the claim proceeds recovered, if any.

形式最简单的第三方资助涉及一个对法律争议无优先利益的实体，为一方当事人（通常是申请人）提供资助。提供这种资助通常以“无追索权”为基础，意味着若案件不成功，资助者对受助者不享有追索权。根据这种模式，资助者要求偿还代付资金，或支付投资回报的追索权仅限于索赔收益（若有）。

1. Rising Demand for Funding 增长的资助需求

It has been suggested that the rapid expansion of this type of funding was fuelled by the economic downturn in 2008. Many corporations and investors experienced economic instability and were unable to proceed with meritorious claims due to reduced cash flow. At the same time, investors were seeking alternative capital outlets, where returns would not be correlated to traditional markets. It remains to be shown, however, whether there is any real as opposed to coincidental correlation between the 2008 crisis and the expansion of third-party funding in international arbitration. In recent years, with the rising costs of international arbitrations[5] and the additional number of constraints being placed upon corporate legal budgets, it is not surprising that the demand for dispute funding has continued to increase. According to Professors Lisa Bench Nieuwveld and Victoria Shannon Sahani:

有人提出该市场的壮大与2008年的经济危机有关：当时许多企业和投资者经历经济动荡，在有价值的索赔上面临现金流短缺。与此同时，投资者试图避开传统市场寻找替代的投资形式。然而，2008年危机与国际仲裁中第三方资助的扩张是否存在真实而非巧合关系仍待考证。近年来，随着国际仲裁费用的上涨以及公司的法律预算中存在的额外限制，争议资助的需求一直在持续增长。根据Sahani教授和Nieuwveld教授所言：

“[The] four main forces driving the sharp increase in the demand … [are: (1)] increasing access to justice … [; (2)] companies seeking a means to pursue a meritorious claim while also maintaining enough cash flow to continue conducting business as usual … [; (3)] worldwide market turmoil and uncertainty … which has inspired ... investors to seek investments that are not directly tied to or affected by the volatile and unpredictable financial markets … [; and (4)] third-party funding as corporate finance, whereby corporate entities … enter into bespoke arrangements … as a means of raising capital for general operating expenses or expansion to meet new business goals.”[6]

And:

“The global economic slowdown has also inspired companies facing bankruptcy or insolvency to seek funding to pursue claims that may generate cash flow for their businesses or mitigate the risk of losing a ’bet-the-company’ dispute.”[7]

Additionally, and not surprisingly, the aforementioned economic situation has increased client pressures upon law firms to deliver innovative solutions, some of which require the use of funding directly by the law firms in conjunction with the offering of alternative fee arrangements, in order to attract legal work.[8] Rising demand for third-party funding has led to a rather recent boom in supply. In the last few years, a multitude of new funders have entered the global dispute financing market. Additionally, the larger, established players are continually raising significant levels of new capital. The growth of the industry shows no signs of slowing.

“需求急剧增长的四大主要原因是：（1）司法普及；（2）公司试图寻找一种方法，使其在提起有价值索赔的同时，保持充足的现金流以继续照常营业；（3）全球市场的动荡和不确定性激发投资者寻找与该动荡不安的金融市场无直接联系或影响的投资；（4）第三方资助作为企业融资形式，由企业实体之间达成定制安排，为一般运营费用或业务扩张筹集资金以实现新的业务目标。”

“全球经济放缓促使面临破产的公司寻找资助，以提起可能为其业务带来现金流或可能降低‘赌注型’争议失败风险的索赔。”

此外，上述经济形势无疑会使客户向律师事务所施加更大的压力，迫使其提供创新的解决方案，其中一些需要直接由律师事务所资助并同时提供替代收费安排以吸引法律业务。对第三方资助需求的不断增长带动了近期供应的繁荣。近几年来，大量的新资助者涌入全球争议融资市场。此外，规模较大的成熟企业正在不断筹集新资本，该行业的增长没有放缓的迹象。

2. Why is Funding Sought and by Whom? 寻求资助的原因及主体

The key participants in the dispute funding process are the claim holders, funders, lawyers and, potentially, funding brokers. Funding may be sought to cover legal fees, out-of-pocket costs (e.g., expert fees, arbitrator fees, arbitral institution fees, discovery-related fees, etc...), or costs associated with subsequent enforcement actions or appeals and may be structured around a single claim or a portfolio of claims. Dispute finance is also increasingly being used by claim holders for other purposes, such as for raising working capital for the claimant entity, discharging other financial liabilities, or financing other litigation (unrelated to the claim against which the financing is secured).

争议资助过程的参与者主要包括：索赔持有人、资助者、律师及潜在的资助经纪人。寻求资助的项目主要包括：律师费、实际现金支出（如专家费用、仲裁员费用、仲裁机构费用、服务费用等），以及与后续申请执行或提出上诉有关的费用。此外，争议资助被争议当事人越来越多地运用于其他意图，如为申请人的企业募集运营资本，清偿其他金融债务或为其他诉讼提供资金支持。

Historically, third-party funding was considered as being primarily a mechanism by which financially distressed claimants could obtain access to justice. However, much of the focus of the litigation finance market today is on the growing corporate utilization of funding by large, well-resourced entities. These entities may be looking for ways to manage risk, to reduce legal budgets, take the cost of pursuing arbitration off-balance sheet, or to pursue other business priorities instead of allocating resources to financing an arbitration matter.[9] Put simply, funding is not only for those that are impecunious. “The use of funding offers the client the ability to minimize risk, does not have any negative effect on their cash flow, and ensures payment of lawyers.”[10]

有史以来，第三方资助主要被视为一种帮助陷入财务困境的申请人获得司法救济的途径。然而，如今诉讼金融市场的主要焦点在于，第三方资助越来越多地被实力雄厚的大型企业采用，这些企业可能正在寻找办法以管理风险，降低法律预算，将提起仲裁的费用从资产负债表中移除，或优先处理其他商业事项而不愿为仲裁事宜分配资源。简而言之，资助不仅仅提供给陷入财务困境的对象，“资助的使用使客户能够防范风险，在对现金流不产生任何负面影响的同时，确保律师费的支付”。

a. Claimants申请人

As noted above, the vast majority of recipients of third-party funding are claimants. At one end of the spectrum, there may be a party that has invested all of its resources into a failed project and funding provides this investor with the only mechanism by which the investor can seek redress from the parties that caused its losses.

如上所述，第三方资助的受助者绝大多数为申请人。在资助市场的一端，可能有一方当事人将所有资源投入到一个失败的项目中，而资助者为该投资者提供了唯一途径，使其能够向导致损失的另一方当事人寻求赔偿。

Somewhere in the middle, exists a claimant who may be adequately capitalized, but nonetheless is a smaller entity than the corporation it wishes to pursue an action against. In his book, Nick Rowles-Davies provides an example that captures this scenario well.[11] The example involves a mid-size company that has been wronged by a much larger competitor and is faced with the decision of whether to spend its capital on vindicating its rights (and unlocking a potential recovery) or allocating those resources to its core business operations.[12] Even if it does decide to self-fund the matter, it is likely that it will be outmatched in resources by its opponent. In the absence of external funding, the claimant would be in an untenable position. Funding allows the claimant to grow its business while pursuing the action in a manner that poses no cash flow burden or risk.[13]

在争议市场的中间，存在一个资本可能很充足的申请人，但相较于争议相对方仍然是一个较小的实体。Nick Rowles Davies在其书中提供的示例很好地描述了该场景：一个中型企业遭受了更大竞争对手的损害，并面临如下选择：一是花费资金维护自身权利并获取潜在赔偿；二是将这些资源投入到核心业务的运作中。即使该企业决定自筹资金，也很难与其对手所掌握的资源相匹敌。如果没有资助，申请人将处于难以维持的境地。资助的存在使申请人能够继续经营并以不对现金流产生负担或风险的方式提起索赔。

At the other end of the spectrum, large corporations with strong balance sheets are increasingly employing dispute funding as a corporate finance tool that allows them to effectively manage their disputes without negatively impacting their balance sheets.[14] Dispute funding for corporate clients can take on a variety of forms including traditional capital outlay by funders as well as insurance/hedge offerings, which enable clients with good liquidity to mitigate litigation risk without paying substantial returns to a third-party funder.[15] As an alternative to tying up their own capital in litigation or arbitration, corporations can use dispute funding to pursue arbitrations that can help transition their in-house legal departments from cost centres to profit centres.

在资助市场的另一端，资本雄厚的大型企业越来越多地将争议资助作为企业融资工具，使其能在不影响其资产负债表的前提下有效地管理争议。对企业客户提供的争议资助可采用多种形式，包括由资助者提供的传统资本支出，以及保险或对冲基金，使客户在保持资产流动性的同时将诉讼风险最小化，而无需向第三方资助者支付丰厚的回报。相较于将其资本捆绑在诉讼或仲裁程序中，作为替代方式，企业可以利用争议资助提起仲裁，若该仲裁能将其内部法律部门从成本中心转化为利润中心。

b. Law Firms 律师事务所

The role played by law firms in the third-party funding market is multi-faceted and evolving. In some instances, law firms, themselves, may be the users of dispute finance. For example, a law firm could seek the use of third-party funding as a way of supporting contingency fee opportunities, as discussed more fully below. In this context, the law firm would approach the funding market directly in order to seek financing options for its own fee risk exposure and enhance its ability to offer alternative billing offerings relative to its competitors.

律师事务所在第三方资助市场中发挥的作用是多面的，且在不断发展。在某些情况下，律师事务所本身可能是争议融资的使用者。例如，律师事务所可以利用第三方资助为风险代理机会提供支持，如下文详述述。这种情况下，律师事务所将直接进入资助市场，为其自身的费用风险敞口寻找融资选择并增强其提供替代性收费服务的竞争力。

In other instances, as discussed more fully below,[16] a law firm may effectively act as the provider of dispute finance, for example when offering to act on a contingency fee basis.

如下文所详述，在另一些情况下，律师事务所可以有效充当争议融资的提供者，例如，提供基于风险代理收费的服务。

Even where not directly a party to the funding agreement, the law firm’s role is often pivotal in a claimant’s decision as to whether it should explore the possibility of third-party funding and the approach taken if funding is sought. Although awareness of litigation finance is rising amongst corporate counsel,[17] most claimants rely heavily on their legal advisors for advice relating to third-party funding, the costs and practicalities involved, and which funder(s) or broker should be approached. Funders therefore cultivate relationships with law firms in order to encourage future referrals. In some instances, even where a law firm is not a direct party to the eventual funding agreement, the firm may still be highly invested in the outcome of the approach to funders. It is not uncommon for a law firm acting for a financially distressed client to invest significant time on a speculative basis in preparing a case for presentation to funders, understanding that it will only be able to recoup that time investment if funding is successfully obtained.[18]

虽然律师事务所不是资助协议的直接当事人，但就申请人决定是否寻求第三方资助以及寻求资助的途径，律师事务所往往能发挥关键作用。虽然企业法务的诉讼融资意识在不断增强，多数申请人仍然非常依赖法律顾问提供的关于第三方资助，涉及的费用和可行性，以及应当与哪个资助者或经纪人接洽的建议。因此，资助者会与律师事务所培养关系以便在将来能得到推荐。在某些情况下，即使律师事务所不是最终资助协议的直接当事人，资助者对事务所的投资将有利于申请人找到该资助者。律师事务所在投机的基础上为陷入财务困境的客户投入大量时间并向资助者准备案件陈述的案例并不少见，投入的这些时间成本只有在成功获得资助时才能被收回。

While the majority of opportunities presented to the funding market come via law firms, a growing awareness of third-party funding amongst clients has led to an increased percentage of claimants seeking funding directly, often prior to selecting a law firm (e.g., while still engaging in a law firm tender process).

尽管资助市场的大多数机会都是通过律师事务所提供，随着客户对第三方资助的日益了解，申请人直接寻求资助的比例也在上升，这种情况经常发生在选择律师事务所之前（例如，在进行律师事务所招标时找到资助者）。

c. Brokers and Other Intermediaries 经纪人及其他中介

As an alternative to approaching the funding market directly, some lawyers and claimants opt to use the services of a specialist third-party funding broker. The role of the broker is to advise on potential financing options, access a broader range of funders, and manage the process. With the ever-growing number of funds operating worldwide, as well as the range of alternative insurance structures available, brokers are regarded as playing an increasingly prominent role in the process of sourcing and structuring dispute finance arrangements. Support from funders can be either through traditional advice or new electronic platforms, which boast increased efficiency for parties.

作为直接进入资助市场的替代选择，一些律师和申请人选择聘用专业的第三方资助经纪人。经纪人的作用是为潜在融资选择提供建议，帮助寻找更多资助者并对整个过程进行管理。随着越来越多资金在世界范围内运作以及各种替代性保险结构可得性的不断增强，经纪人在争议融资安排的发起和构建过程中发挥着日益突出的作用。

A broker is usually paid either on an up-front basis, with the execution of the funding agreement, or on a contingent basis, which is correlated to the outcome of the funded case. Depending upon the arrangement, the broker’s fees may be paid by the funder or by the claimant.

经纪人的报酬通常或在资助协议签订后预先支付，或基于受助案件的结果收取风险代理费。根据资助安排，经纪人的费用可以由资助者或申请人支付。

There are also different types of broker services. Some brokers function as an “introducers” who can introduce the claimant to a sub-set of the funding market. Other brokers function as sell-side brokers who can introduce the claimant to the whole or a sub-set of the funding market, but who acts in the interest of the funders, while still other brokers function as buy-side brokers, who can introduce the claimant to the whole or a sub-set of the funding market, and who represent the interest of the claimant. In order to establish what type of broker they are dealing with, a party or its counsel should seek disclosure from the broker about how they are remunerated and whether they have access to the whole funding market or just a sub-set of it.

经纪人提供的服务也分不同类型。一些经纪人充当“引荐人”角色，可以将申请人引荐给一部分资助市场。一些经纪人作为卖方经纪人，代表资助者的利益，可以将申请人引荐给整个或一部分资助市场；还有一些经纪人作为买方经纪人，代表申请人的利益，也可以将申请人引荐给整个或一部分资助市场。为确认接洽的经纪人的类型，当事人或其律师应要求经纪人就其获取报酬的方式，以及可否进入整个资助市场或仅能进入一部分市场作出披露。

Although arguably on the rise and valuable in navigating the expanding funding markets, some questions were raised in the public comment period, particularly from third-party funders, regarding the use of brokers. Some questioned the extent to which brokers may potentially increase costs or slow down the process of obtaining funding. Other comments suggested that there may in the future be questions about confidentiality and privilege with respect to information shared with brokers.

尽管资助市场可以说在上升，其崛起也具有重要意义，公众评论期间仍提出了一些问题，尤其是第三方资助者提出的与经纪人聘用有关的问题。一些人质疑经纪人在多大程度上可能增加获取资助的成本或减缓获取资助的过程。其他评论人认为，对于与经纪人共享的信息，将来可能出现与其机密性和特权有关的问题。

d. Respondents 被申请人

While far from commonplace, financing for respondents is evolving and becoming more available. Apart from scenarios where a responding party may either via a counterclaim or a successful defence of the arbitration unlock a significant financial upside, funding for respondents is still relatively rare.[19] The funding of respondents poses challenges with respect to how to remunerate the funder for its provision of capital in the event of a successful defence, while avoiding any potential moral hazards created by the existence of the funding.

虽然还不普遍，但目前为被申请人提供资助的情况正在发生变化。除当事人可能通过反诉或成功的仲裁抗辩释放重要的融资优势外，为被申请人提供资助的情况仍相当罕见。资助被申请人面临的挑战是，在被申请人抗辩成功时，如何向资助者为其提供的资本支付酬金，并避免因存在资助而导致的潜在道德风险。

One possible option for respondents in situations where they can value their exposure may be to identify a realistic exit point, which, if met, will trigger a payment of some amount to their funders or law firms. Akin to a reverse or inverse contingency scenario, the respondent would pay the funder for some amalgamation of “the amount by which its liability has been reduced, comparing the amount originally claimed with the amount awarded”.[20] Although this structure is occasionally referenced, in practice, it does not seem to be commonplace, with only a few such arrangements having been successfully negotiated between funders and respondents. Of the few examples of respondent-side funding that exist, most involve situations where the funder has an independent financial or non-financial interest in the outcome. For example, in RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada, the respondent state was funded by a third party that apparently had a competing interest in the oil exploration rights that would have been awarded to the claimant if it prevailed.[21] In addition, cause-based funding of a defendant has occurred, for example in Philip Morris v. Uruguay,[22] where the Tobacco Free Kids Foundation provided funding to Uruguay. Notably, the Uruguay case may not be an isolated example as the Bloomberg Philanthropies and The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have launched an “Anti-Tobacco Trade Litigation Fund” to support low- and middle-income countries.[23] It has also been suggested that, similar to what occurs in WTO proceedings, states might fund other responding states, either for political reasons or because they have an interest in the legal issues being decided by the tribunal.[24]

在能够评估风险敞口的情况下，被申请人的一个可能选择是设置一个退出点，一旦满足，即向资助者或律师事务所支付一定款项。类似于反向风险代理情形，被申请人为其“少承担的责任（将初始索赔金额与最终裁决金额进行比较）”向资助者支付联合费用。虽然这种结构偶尔被提及，但在实践中并不常见，资助者和被申请人之间的这种资助安排很少能够协商成功。在仅存的几个资助被申请人的案例中，涉及的情况大多是资助者对案件结果具有独立的融资利益或不具有融资利益。例如，在RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada案中，被申请国受助于第三方，该第三方显然对授予给申请人的石油开采权（若申请人胜诉）有竞争利益。另外，还存在向被申请人提供公益资助的情况，例如在ICSID 审理的hilip Morris v. Uruguay案中，无烟儿童基金会（Tobacco Free Kids Foundation）向乌拉圭政府提供资助。值得注意的是，乌拉圭案件并非个例，彭博慈善基金会和比尔和梅林达•盖茨基金会已启动“反烟草贸易诉讼基金”为中低收入国家提供支持。也有人建议，与WTO诉讼程序中发生的情况类似，各国可以为其他抗辩国提供资助，或出于政治原因，或因其对法庭所裁决的法律问题享有利益。。

As noted in following sections, the defence of a claim could also potentially be included in a portfolio arrangement.

如以下各节所述，对索赔的抗辩也可能包含在投资组合安排中。

B. The Dispute Funding Process争议资助程序

1. Fundamentals 基本原理

The nature, structure, and features of third-party funding arrangements can vary significantly from case to case, as can the process involved in putting the arrangement in place. The vast majority of cases presented to any given funder are rejected by the funder for one reason or another. There are few published statistics available, however anecdotal reports, as well as statements made by some funders, suggest rejection rates of 90 per cent or higher. This rate may change with the growing number of funders entering the market, coupled with lawyers and their clients’ increasing familiarity with the basic requirements of most funders.

第三方资助的性质、结构和特点可能因案件情况而有所不同，将资助落实到位所涉及的程序也是如此。绝大多数提交的资助案件都被资助者以某种理由拒绝。虽然公布的统计数据很少，但根据传闻报道和一些资助者的陈述，拒绝率可能达到甚至超过90％，尽管该比率可能随着资助者不断加入这个市场，以及律师及其客户对大多数资助者基本要求的日益熟悉而改变。

The decision about whether to fund a claim will be taken following detailed due diligence by the funder (often using external counsel, and potentially damages or technical experts), and approval by the funder’s board or investment committee. Funders are primarily concerned with the case merits, the economics of the proposed investment (criteria listed below), and the enforceability of any award.

是否资助某索赔的决定须由资助者进行详细的尽职调查（经常聘请外部顾问，可能的损害评估专家或技术专家），并经过董事会或投资委员会的批准。资助者主要关注案件的是非曲直，拟投资的经济效益（标准列举如下）和仲裁裁决的可执行性。

In order for a funder to seriously consider a potential opportunity, there must be an adequate demonstration of a solid claim with a healthy, recoverable margin between the anticipated damages recovery and the anticipated budget for legal fees and costs. The facts, the merits, the parties, and their representatives will all play a crucial role in this calculus. “In addition, the analysis will consider other factors such as: 1) value of the law suits; 2) amount to be advanced; 3) jurisdictional obstacles; 4) defenses; 5) nature and length of the proceeding (including whether arbitration or litigation; venue and applicable rules); 6) possibilities of settlement; 7) creditworthiness of client and the opposing party (particularly with a view to collection prospects); 8) visibility and location of the opposing party’s assets; 9) counsel chosen and compensation structure (whether there is a contingency fee agreement in place) or 10) additional obligations of the party to be funded linked to the potential risk of recovery (such as previous funding agreements or any other alliance).”[25]

为使资助者认真考虑潜在机会，必须充分论证索赔的可靠性，即预期获得的损害获赔金额在扣除法律费用预算后还有健康可收回的利润空间。在这个评估中，案件事实、是非曲直、各方当事人及其代表都是重要的参考因素。“此外，其他考虑因素还包括：（1）诉讼价值；（2）预付款金额；（3）管辖权障碍；（4）抗辩；（5）程序的性质和历时（包括是否为仲裁或诉讼；地点及适用规则）；（6）和解的可能性；（7）客户和对方当事人的信誉（尤其为了发展潜在客户）；（8）对方当事人财产的可见性和所处位置；（9）律师的选择和报酬结构（是否存在风险代理收费协议）；（10）与费用补偿的潜在风险（例如先前的资助协议或任何其他联盟）相关的由受助者承担的附加义务。”

a. Economics经济回报

By far the most common reason for a potential opportunity to be turned down by a funder is not concerns over the legal merits of the case. Instead, when funders turn down a case it is more typically due to concerns that the quantum of the claim (or at least the realistic recovery or likely settlement value) will not be sufficient to justify the level of investment required to finance the arbitration budget.

目前为止，资助者拒绝潜在机会的最常见原因并不在于案件的法律价值，更典型的原因是担心索赔金额（至少是现实的可获赔价值或可能的和解价值）不足以弥补资助仲裁所需的投资。

Funders wish to ensure that the most likely outcome will leave the claim holder with more than a minority share of the recovery. This means ensuring that the combined funding costs (reimbursement of funder’s capital and success fee, any contingent litigation insurance premium payable and any contingent fee payment to the legal team) is less than half of the total recovery.

资助者希望确认资助最可能的结果是使申请人获得较大份额的赔偿。这意味着要确保综合资助成本（包括偿还资助者的资本和成功费，任何应付的风险代理诉讼保险费和支付给法律团队的风险代理费）低于总获赔金额的一半。

While funders’ approaches to this issue vary, many will include a fairly crude economics test in their investment criteria, requiring a minimum ratio between the funding request and a realistic claim value of 1:10. Notably, the 1:10 ratio does not assume a ten-fold return on investment. Instead, return on investment is estimated to be closer to four times the amount invested (including repayment of capital, which is referred to in the industry as a three-fold return (i.e., a return of amount invested, plus three times that amount)). The 1:10 ratio instead means that if a funder invests US$ 1 and the claimant recovers US$ 10, the funder can recover its investment plus three-fold return, which will leave the claimant with 60 per cent of the proceeds.

虽然资助者处理该问题的方法各异，但许多资助者在投资标准中都会使用粗略的经济学检验标准，要求资助金额与现实索赔金额的最小比例为1:10。值得注意的是，1:10的比例并未假定10倍的投资回报。据估计，投资回报接近投资金额的4倍（包括资本的偿还，在业内被称为3倍的投资回报，即除返还投资金额外，还加上该金额的3倍）。1:10的比例意味着，若资助者投资1美元且申请人获赔10美元，则资助者可以收回投资外加3倍的回报，这可以使申请人保留60%的收益。

Notably, while three-fold or four-fold return on investment is commonly discussed in the funding industry, even those rates of return are somewhat misleading. Not all cases will win. Consequently, for an investor investing in dispute funding, the actual return on investment is unlikely to be a three-fold return, but instead more likely in actual terms to be a double digit percentage.

值得注意的是，尽管资助行业通常讨论的投资回报率是3倍或4倍，但这些回报率仍存在一些误导性。并非所有的案件都能获胜。因此，对于争议资助的投资者而言，实际投资回报不太可能是3倍，而更可能是两位数的百分比。

It may be assumed that these numbers will leave a sufficient margin to allow for the claim holder to retain more than half of the claim proceeds, after deducting the cost of the funding arrangement. In this vein, most funders tend to be highly conservative when valuing claims and will concentrate on the realistic or likely “floor” value of the claim, as opposed to the maximum potential (but inherently more speculative) claim value.

可以假定，这些比例将留下足够的余量，使申请人在扣除资助安排费用后能保留一半以上的索赔收益。大多数资助者在对索赔进行估值时往往十分保守，并专注于索赔的实际价值或可能获得的“最低”价值，而非索赔价值的最大潜力（但本质上更具有投机性）。

Funders will also carefully scrutinize the arbitration budget (assuming that the financing is being provided primarily or solely for this purpose). A light or overly optimistic budget may be a cause for concern. While the funding commitment will be limited to a fixed or staged sum, a case which exceeds the budget where there is no pre- agreed mechanism in place to deal with the overrun can be problematic for all parties, potentially necessitating renegotiation of the funding agreement mid-way through the case. Funders increasingly will address this issue upfront, potentially requesting a fee cap or an overrun agreement from the claimant’s legal team in order to secure budget certainty.

资助者还将仔细审查仲裁预算（假定资助主要或仅为该目的而提供）。一个乐观或过度乐观的预算可能导致之后的忧虑。虽然承付资金以某固定总额或阶段总额为限，但在超过预算时，若没有事先商定的机制来处理超限问题，将可能给所有当事人带来麻烦，并可能需要中途重新拟定资助协议。越来越多资助者会提前处理该问题，这可能要求申请人的法律团队设置费用上限或拟定超预算协议以确保预算的确定性。

Ultimately, the most desirable cases are those that have a very high (realistic) claim value as well as a high ratio between the arbitration budget and the quantum of the claim.

最终，最理想的案件是那些具有非常高的（现实）索赔价值且仲裁预算与索赔金额之间比率很高的案件。

b. Return Structures 回报结构

A dispute funder providing “non-recourse” litigation finance will generally expect to make a multiple return on the capital invested. This reflects both the high-risk nature of the investment as well as the Internal Rate of Return (“IRR”) expectations of those that invest in litigation funds. From the claimant’s perspective, the funder’s return (or success fee) may be structured in a number of different ways. It may be structured as a multiple of the capital invested or as a percentage of the “claim proceeds” (the amount recovered by way of damages or settlement). Some arrangements will involve a combination of these, for example the greater of 3x the capital invested or 35 per cent of the claimant’s recovery. By way of illustration, this was the structure and pricing of the funder’s return in the Norscott v. Essar case,[26] in which the arbitrator accepted evidence that the cost of the funding was reasonable in the circumstances of the specific case in question.

提供“无追索权”诉讼融资的争议资助者通常期望其投资能产生高额回报。这既反映投资的高风险性，也反映投资者对诉讼资助投资的内部收益率（“IRR”）的期待。从申请人角度来看，资助者回报（或成功费）的构成方式有多种：可以是投资资本的倍数，或是“索赔收益”的百分比（以损害赔偿或庭外和解方式收回的金额）。一些资助安排将包括这二者的结合，如“投资资本的3倍或申请人获赔金额的35％，以高者为准”。作为例证，这是Norscott v. Essar案中资助者回报的结构和价格，仲裁员接受了James Blick提交的证明该案资助费用合理的证据。

It is also common for the funding agreement to link the funder’s return to the duration of the case (or to the amount of capital that has been drawn down), meaning that the funder’s return is lower if the case settles early, but rises throughout the proceedings. Such a structure will facilitate early settlement for the claimant, while ensuring that the return to the funder is more proportionate to the actual capital risk taken if the case settles early.

资助协议通常会将资助者的回报与案件期限（或资本回收期限）联系起来，这意味着如果结案早，资助者的回报较低；反之，随着整个程序的进行，资助者的回报逐渐上升。这种结构有利于案件的尽早解决，且能确保若案件解决越早，资助者获得的回报与资本的实际风险越相称。

While many funders target broadly similar returns, the differences from a claimant’s perspective between different funding offers on a specific matter can be huge, especially where the claim value is high. Fully understanding the commercial terms of any funding arrangement requires, at a minimum, some basic financial modelling in order to calculate the amount that the funder will be entitled to in a range of theoretical settlement outcomes at different stages of the case with different levels of capital deployed. With the growing number of funders competing for business and the ever-increasing diversity and complexity of funding agreements, claimants are well advised to obtain and compare (either directly or with the advice of brokers or independent counsel) multiple funding offers before entering into a funding agreement.

虽然许多资助者设定的投资回报目标大致相同，但从申请人的角度看，不同的资助报价在具体事项上可能存在很大差异，尤其是在索赔金额很高的情况下。充分理解各种资助安排的商业条款，至少需要一些基本的财务模型，以计算资助者在案件不同阶段，不同资本配置下，在各种理论解决结果中有权获得的报酬金额。随着越来越多资助者参与业务竞争，以及资助协议的日益多样化和复杂化，申请人在达成资助协议之前，最好能获取多个资助报价并进行比较（亲自进行或通过经纪人或独立律师）。

c. Waterfall Agreement优先级协议

Closely related to the funder’s return structure is what is often referred to as the “waterfall agreement” or “priority agreement”. This agreement can either be included within the funding agreement or be a separate document, and will usually require execution by all “stakeholders” (i.e., those entitled to a share or contingent payment from any recovery, typically including the claim holder, the funder, the law firm and any insurer providing coverage for fees, costs or an adverse costs award). The waterfall agreement will set out how the claim proceeds are to be divided between the stakeholders. The terms of this agreement can be as important as the return structure when considering the cost of a potential financing arrangement.

与资助者的回报结构密切相关的是所谓的“瀑布协议”或“优先级协议”。该协议既可以包含在资助协议中也可以单独制定，通常要求所有“利益相关者”执行，即有权从索赔收益中享有份额或可能获得支付的人，典型的包括索赔持有人、资助者、律师事务所以及任何对费用、成本或不利费用裁决进行承保的保险公司。该协议将列明索赔收益如何在利益相关者之间进行分配。在考虑潜在融资安排的成本时，该条款与回报结构同样重要。

d. Risk Alignment 风险分摊

Risk alignment (or “skin in the game” as it is more colloquially referred to) is an important consideration to many funders when considering a potential opportunity. Some funders have a strict requirement that the law firm should assume some element of risk in relation to its fee budget, either by offering a partial contingency fee and/or fee cap or overrun agreement. Even for those funders that do not require this element as a matter of course, a law firm’s (and/or client’s) willingness to share in the risk and reward is usually regarded as a positive feature when assessing a potential funding opportunity.

对许多资助者而言，在考虑潜在机会时，风险分摊（更通俗的说法是“风险共担（skin in the game）”）是一项重要的考虑因素。一些资助者会严格要求律师事务所应承担与费用预算相关的一些风险要素，如提供部分风险代理收费，设置费用上限或制定超额协议。即使对于那些不必然提出这些要求的资助者，在评估潜在资助机会时，律师事务所（和/或客户）愿意分担风险和报酬通常被视为积极的特征。

e. Control 控制

The extent to which the funder will assert control over the arbitration and the claimant’s decision-making process (e.g., whether, when and at what level to settle the claim) is often a concern expressed by claimants, lawyers, and regulators. In some common law jurisdictions, it can also be an important issue in assessing the legality of the financing arrangement where doctrines of maintenance and champerty still exist.

资助者将在多大程度上控制仲裁和申请人的决策过程（例如索赔是否和解、何时和解以及和解条件）通常是申请人、律师和监管人关心的问题，在一些仍然存在唆诉和帮诉理论（maintenance and champerty）的普通法辖区，也是评估融资安排合法性的重要问题。

In reality, the vast majority of third-party funding arrangements are structured carefully to ensure that the funder does not have control over the case or the claimant. In many jurisdictions, this is essential in order to avoid or minimize the risk of a challenge to the lawfulness of the funding agreement. Even in civil law jurisdictions that permit the sale or assignment of claims, many funders still adopt this common law model, although there are also many examples of funds in such jurisdictions seeking to purchase and aggregate (and thus take over control of) claims. This approach is prevalent, for example, in cartel damages claims in jurisdictions such as Germany and the Netherlands, but less common in international arbitration.

实际上，绝大多数第三方资助安排都通过谨慎制定以确保资助者不对案件或申请人进行控制。在许多司法辖区，为避免或尽可能降低资助协议合法性遭受质疑的风险，这种谨慎必不可少。即使在允许出售或转让索赔的大陆法系司法辖区，许多资助者仍采用这种普通法模式，尽管在这些司法辖区中也有许多试图购买和合并（从而控制）索赔的资助案例。例如，这种做法在存在“卡特尔”损害赔偿诉讼的司法辖区（如德国和荷兰）较为常见，但在国际仲裁中则较少见。

However, even where the funding arrangement does not seek excessive control, there are nevertheless certain safeguards built in to protect the funder’s investment. A third-party funding arrangement is not an unconditional agreement to fund the case to conclusion. Provision of ongoing funding will be subject to the merits of the case and compliance with the terms of the funding arrangement. Breach of the agreement or a fundamental change in the likelihood of success may entitle the funder to terminate the agreement (and, in some instances of serious breach, may allow the funder to seek recourse for the amount invested). While this does not amount to direct control, if the claimant is financially reliant upon the funder in order to pursue the claim to conclusion, the possibility of the withdrawal of funding may still amount to powerful indirect control.

然而，即使资助安排未试图寻求过度控制，资助者仍然会采取某些保障措施来保护其投资。第三方资助安排并非无条件为案件提供资助的协议。资助的持续提供将受制于案情和对资助安排条款的遵守。对协议的违反或案件成功可能性的根本变化都可能使资助者有权终止协议（在某些严重违约的情形下，可能允许资助者追索其投资）。虽然这并不等于直接控制，但若申请人提起索赔需要在财务上依赖资助者，则撤资的可能性仍可构成有力的间接控制。

Related to the issue of control is the question of how actively the funder wishes to monitor its investment. This varies from funder to funder, but it should be assumed that at a minimum, the funder will require reports about the progress of the case, the right to monitor fees and/or approve expenditures, notification of any significant developments (e.g., settlement offers or new information that changes the case outlook) and direct access to the claimant’s legal team. In some instances, the funder may play a highly active role, attending client meetings and/or hearings, being copied on correspondence, and providing input on strategic issues. Some clients regard this active involvement by the funder as a ‘value added’ in terms of budget management and legal, strategic, or technical expertise, beyond the mere provision of capital.

与控制问题有关的是资助者希望如何积极监督其投资的问题。不同资助者对该问题的处理也不同，但应当假定，资助者至少要求获得与案件进展有关的报告，监控费用或批准支出的权利，案件出现任何重大发展的通知（例如，提出和解提议或改变案件走向的新信息），以及直接联系申请人法律团队的权利。在某些情况下，资助者可以扮演高度活跃的角色，参加客户会议或听证会，在通信往来中被抄送并参与战略问题的讨论。有些客户将资助者在法律、战略或专业技术方面的这种积极参与视为超出资本提供的额外“增值”。

f. Confidentiality/Privilege 保密/特权

Securing funding necessarily requires the sharing of confidential, privileged and, on occasion, highly sensitive information with prospective funders. Ensuring the protection of that confidential information and that any existing privilege is not lost are important issues that claim holders and their advisors must consider before seeking funding.

寻求资助必然需要与潜在资助者分享机密的、享有特权的和有时高度敏感的信息。确保这些机密信息能得到保护并确保现存特权不会丧失，是索赔持有人及其顾问在寻求资助之前必须考虑的重要问题。

Anyone navigating the process must balance the disclosure of information required for assessment/due diligence and minimizing the risk of waiving privilege. Certain basic steps, such as entering into non-disclosure agreements before sharing any information and limiting the information shared early on, are fairly standard practice. The concerns and protocols for protecting confidential and privileged information necessarily vary depending on the jurisdiction or jurisdictions involved. In some national jurisdictions, the law is fairly well-established, whereas in others it is still evolving (although generally in the direction of accepting that parties should be able to share information with funders without waiving privilege).[27]

任何参与资助过程的人员，必须在（案件评估或尽职调查所需的）信息披露与降低特权丧失的风险之间取得平衡。某些基本步骤，例如在分享任何信息之前签订不披露协议或对早期分享的信息进行限制，是相当标准的做法。保护机密和特权信息的焦点和条款必然因所涉管辖区的不同而有所变化。一些司法辖区的法律已相当完善，而另一些司法辖区的法律仍在不断发展（尽管总体而言，这些司法辖区都接受当事人能够与资助者分享信息而不放弃特权）。

Issues of privilege are particularly complex in international arbitration. Tribunals often use conflict-of-laws analysis to determine which national law applies to the determination of whether a privilege exists. Some international standards are also developing, for example to resolve when different potentially applicable national rules point to opposite outcomes or to determine when waiver has occurred. The Task Force’s Principles on confidentiality and privilege are set forth in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 also includes some guidance on best practices.

国际仲裁中的特权问题极为复杂。对于应适用哪国法律来判断特权是否存在，仲裁庭经常使用法律冲突分析来确定。例如，为解决潜在适用的不同国家规则指向相反结果的问题，或为了确认弃权发生的时间，一些国际标准也在不断发展。第5章规定了工作组关于保密和特权的“原则”，第6章也包含一些有关最佳实践的指导。

g. Conflicts of Interest 利益冲突

The third-party funding market necessarily has to grapple with the issue of conflicts of interest (whether actual, potential or perceived) that arise as a result of the funder’s participation in a particular case. The issue of arbitrator conflicts of interest is addressed in Chapter 4, and so will not be discussed at length here.

第三方资助市场必然要解决因资助者参与特定案件而产生的利益冲突（无论是实际的，潜在的还是感知的）。仲裁员的利益冲突问题将在第4章阐述，此处不作详细讨论。

A related issue is how the claimant’s legal team can mitigate or manage potential conflicts of interest arising between its duties to the claimant and its relationship with the funder. While the majority of funded cases proceed smoothly with an aligned interest between the funder and claimant (and legal team), there is always the potential for an issue to arise. For example, under some funding structures, the funder is entitled to a multiple of the capital invested as a priority over the claimant. Under such an arrangement, there is a theoretical possibility that the funder could receive a healthy return (for example, repayment of its investment plus a return of 3x the invested capital), but the claimant receives nothing. Such a structure (while not uncommon) can clearly give rise to tensions when it comes to considering an offer of settlement proposed by the respondent that would produce that kind of result under the funding agreement. Similarly, issues such as budget overrun, a change in legal representation during the proceedings, or a deterioration in the merits of the case can create situations where the interests of the claimant diverge from those of the funder.

一个相关问题是，申请人的法律团队应如何减少或管理因其对申请人的责任和与资助者的关系而产生的潜在利益冲突。虽然在资助者和申请人（及法律团队）利益一致的情况下，大多数受助案件能够顺利进行，但始终存在潜在问题。例如：在一些资助结构中，资助者有权优先于申请人取得几倍的投资资本。根据这种安排，资助者理论上能够获取健康的回报（例如，偿还投资再加上投资资本3倍的回报），但申请人却无任何收益。若申请人考虑在同等条件下接受被申请人提出的和解，这种结构（虽然并不罕见）无疑会使申请人与资助者之间的关系变得紧张。同样，诸如预算超限，法律代理人中途变动或案件进展情况恶化，都可能使申请人的利益与资助者的利益出现分歧。

Most of these issues are addressed fairly and effectively through a well-written funding agreement. The most common structure of a third-party funding arrangement is one that clearly demarcates the duties the law firm owes to the claimant and those (if any) owed to the funder. The claimant and the funder enter into an arrangement under which the funder provides the claimant with capital in order to finance the legal fees and costs associated with the arbitration. Under this structure, the claimant’s lawyer advises and owes duties only to the claimant (the funder typically having taken separate advice from its own external counsel).

大多数问题都能通过一份拟定得当的资助协议得到公平和有效的解决。最常见的第三方资助安排结构能够将律师事务所对申请人的责任与律师事务所对资助者的责任（如有）进行清楚的划分。申请人和资助者达成一项协议，由资助者为申请人提供资金以支付与仲裁相关的法律费用。根据这种结构，申请人的律师仅向申请人提供咨询并对其负有义务（资助者通常已向外部顾问获取独立意见）。

In reality, however, the relationships between funders and law firms are often more complex. It may be for example that the client entered into the funding arrangement as a result of the law firm’s introduction to or relationship with the funder. It may even be that the law firm relies upon the funder for financing across a portfolio of matters, which can make it more difficult to avoid or manage perceived conflicts of interest where a disagreement arises between the funder and one of the funded clients in the portfolio. Many of these issues can be managed through adherence to industry-based best practices (see Chapter 7, below) and careful drafting of the funding agreement. Many of these issues are also subject to national or local ethical rules. In addition, some clients use and law firms recommend the services of independent brokers (or independent law firms) in order to maintain distance from the funder selection process and mitigate any perceived conflict issues.

但在现实中，资助者和律师事务所之间的关系往往更加复杂。例如，客户订立资助协议是由于律师事务所的引荐或其与资助者的关系。律师事务所甚至可能依靠资助者为一个投资组合提供融资，在资助者与投资组合中的某个客户出现分歧时，要避免或管理感知到的利益冲突就变得更加困难。这些问题很多可通过遵守行业最佳实践（见第7章）和仔细起草资助协议进行管理。其中，许多问题也受到国家或地方道德规则的约束。此外，一些客户使用独立经纪人提供的服务，律师事务所也会作此种推荐，以便于与资助者的选择过程保持距离并减少感知到的冲突问题。

2. The Process for Obtaining Funding 获取资助的程序

a. The Approach 接洽

The dispute funding market is changing rapidly, with a continued influx of new capital providers, greater competition amongst funders, and an increasing availability of alternative insurance-based structures. Since most clients are not repeat users of dispute funding, it may be increasingly important to rely upon a specialist broker or lawyer with expertise in this area for advice and guidance and to manage the process throughout.

争议资助市场发展迅速，新的资本提供者不断涌入，资助者之间的竞争加剧，替代保险结构的可得性增强。由于大多数客户不会重复使用争议资助，依靠该领域拥有专业知识的经纪人或律师提供建议和指导并对整个过程进行管理，可能变得越来越重要。

Regardless of whether an independent lawyer or broker is used, any party considering third-party funding for a claim will be well-advised to simultaneously approach multiple prospective funders. This increases the chances of securing funding (as noted above, individual funds reject the vast majority of opportunities presented to them), while creating a competitive process to enable the terms of any funding offer received to be weighed up in the context of any competing offers available.

无论是否聘用独立的律师或经纪人，当事人在考虑寻求第三方资助时最好能同时联系多个潜在资助者。这能够增加获得资助的机会（如上所述，单个资助者通常会拒绝绝大多数提供给他们的机会），同时创造竞争性局面并对所有竞争报价中的资助条款进行权衡。

Once a decision has been made to approach prospective funds with a particular matter, success in securing funding will often depend on careful funder selection based upon the case profile and specifics, and taking into account each funder’s investment criteria, as well as the types of structure and commercial terms sought.

一旦决定就某特定案件与期望的资助进行接洽，资助的成功获得通常取决于对资助者的谨慎选择，这种选择以案情简介和详细说明为基础，并考虑到每个资助者的投资标准和受助者所寻求的结构类型和商业条款。

Case presentation is also important. As noted above, funders’ investment decisions will be based upon a range of factors. A well-prepared and comprehensive case presentation covering the items listed at section B(ii) above will enable prospective funders to form a preliminary view on the case and move quickly to a decision on whether or not to offer terms.

b. Case Assessment案件评估

Each funder’s approach and decision-making process is different, as is the speed with which each can move from initial case presentation to execution of a funding agreement. The most common approach is a two-stage process. The first stage involves an initial (usually internal) evaluation of the opportunity by the funder. This evaluation will include an assessment of the items discussed above, such as the case merits, amount of the funding request, claim value, legal landscape, enforcement, etc.[28] If satisfied that the case meets the funder’s investment criteria, the funder will make an offer (usually in the form of a term sheet or conditional funding agreement). The offer will usually be subject to the funder completing a second more detailed due diligence process, often using external counsel. Given the time and expense incurred during the second phase, many funders request a period of exclusivity in order to complete this process.

资助者的接洽和决策过程各不相同，从最初接触到案件到执行资助协议的速度也有所不同。最常见的接洽过程分两阶段：第一阶段，资助者对投资机会进行初步（通常为内部）评估，包括对前述项目的评估，如案件的是非曲直，申请资助的金额，索赔价值，法律环境及执行情况等。如果案件满足资助者的投资标准，资助者将提供报价（通常以条款清单或附条件资助协议的形式），该报价通常受制于资助者完成的第二个更详细的尽职调查程序（通常使用外部顾问）。鉴于第二阶段耗费的时间和费用，许多资助者会请求一个排他性期限以完成该阶段的评估。

The requirement for exclusivity is not universal, but it is a relatively common practice amongst funders. While it should generally be accepted as a legitimate requirement by a funder about to embark upon an intensive and potentially costly due diligence process, it should also be approached with caution by claimants. Agreeing to a lengthy exclusivity period in a time-sensitive case can be highly damaging if the funding agreement is not executed at the end of the process.

排他性请求虽然不普遍，但在资助者中是相对常见的做法。这通常应被视为合理要求，如果一个资助者准备开展一个严密的和可能花费巨大的尽职调查程序，申请人也应当对此谨慎对待。若对一个时效性很强的案件约定冗长的排他期，但在调查结束后却没有达成资助协议，这无疑会给该案造成破坏性影响。

Some funders also employ a third level of review, which requires submission of the claim and the proposed funding terms to an investment committee for a final decision.

一些资助者还采用第三阶段审查，需要将索赔和拟定的资助条款提交给投资委员会最终决定。

c. The Funding Agreement[29] 资助协议

The funding agreement sets forth the terms upon which the funding is provided to the claimant, including the extent of funding commitment, return structure, rights and obligations of the parties and termination rights.

资助协议规定了向申请人提供资助的条件，包括承付资金的范围、回报结构、当事人的权利义务以及终止协议的权利。

For purposes of providing an overview, the sample Therium funding agreement contained within Nick Rowles-Davies’ book is useful, as is his explanation and those of other authors.[30] However, each funder’s standard funding agreement is different and most funding agreements eventually executed by a claimant are individually negotiated and therefore depart from the funder’s standard form to some extent. As such, it is beyond the scope of this Chapter to attempt to comment in detail upon the commonalities and differences between various agreements.

就提供概述的目的而言，Nick Rowles-Davies书中所载的Therium资助协议样本，以及Nick Rowles-Davies与其他作者作出的解释，都可以发挥作用。然而，每个资助者的标准资助协议并不相同，最终由申请人执行的大多数资助协议须通过单独协商，因而在某种程度上已经偏离了资助者提供的标准格式。因此，对各种资助协议的共性及区别进行详细评述不属于本章的讨论范围。

However, there are some provisions that are worthy of particular consideration. For example, the circumstances in which the funder may suspend or terminate the funding or potentially seek recourse against the claimant for the amount invested are especially important. The Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales (“ALF”) Code of Conduct envisages the following grounds for the funder seeking termination of the funding agreement (the last of which potentially entitling the funder to recourse for the capital invested to that point):

但仍有一些条款值得特别考虑。例如，关于资助者可以暂停或终止资助，以及可能向申请人追索投资金额的情形都非常重要。《英格兰与威尔士诉讼资助者协会（“ALF”）行为准则》规定资助者在下列情形下可以终止资助协议（最后一个情形可能使资助者有权追索其投资资本）：

“11.2.1 reasonably ceases to be satisfied about the merits of the dispute;

11.2.2 reasonably believes that the dispute is no longer commercially viable; or

11.2.3 reasonably believes that there has been a material breach of the LFA by the Funded Party.”[31]

While on the face of it, these are reasonable grounds for the withdrawal of funding, the manner in which the merits and commercial viability of the claim are to be judged and by whom are significant.

“11.2.1合理地不再对争议的是非曲直感到满意；

11.2.2合理地认为争议不再具有商业可行性；或

11.2.3合理地认为受助者严重违反资助协议。”

虽然从表面上看这些都是撤回资助的合理理由，但重要的是索赔的是非曲直和商业可行性应如何判定以及由谁判定。

The ALF Code of Conduct requires that any dispute about settlement or termination should be resolved by independent counsel. A dispute resolution clause along these lines is a common feature in many funding agreements (including agreements with funders who are not members of the ALF) to enable a funder to exercise reasonable termination rights, while protecting the client from a unilateral and unreasonable decision by the funder to cease funding.

《ALF行为准则》要求与资助结算或终止有关的任何争议应由独立律师解决。争议解决条款是许多资助协议（包括与非ALF成员的资助者签订的协议）的共同特征，使资助者能够行使合理终止权，同时保护客户免受因资助者单方不合理地停止资助所造成的影响。

It should also be noted that in addition to the funding agreement, various ancillary agreements may also be entered into as a part of formalizing the overall funding arrangement, such as the so-called waterfall or priorities agreement,[32] a retention or engagement agreement with the law firm, and/or related insurance policies. As noted above, the waterfall agreement is a particularly important document (or section within the funding agreement). It can also be one of the more challenging items to negotiate, given that multiple parties, potentially with competing interests, need to agree to the framework.

还应指出的是，除资助协议外，各种附属协议也可作为规范总体资助安排协议的一部分，如所谓的瀑布协议或优先级协议，与律师事务所订立的续聘或雇佣协议，和/或相关保险合同。如上所述，瀑布协议是一份非常重要的文件（或是资助协议的一部分），有时也是谈判中更具挑战性的项目之一，因该协议框架需要通过有潜在竞争利益的多方当事人通过。