仲裁员偏见：我们是否应该以貌取人？

更新时间：2018-01-10 14:36:29  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1451次

按照1996年英国仲裁法第33(1)(a)条（以下简称“AA 1996”），仲裁庭负有公平公正行事的基本职责。如果一方认为仲裁员没有尽到职责，按照AA 1996第24(1)(a)条：

“仲裁程序一方有权…基于以下任何一种理由申请法院解除一位仲裁员…,只要在当时情形下该等理由足以引起对该仲裁员公正性的合理怀疑…”

英国法规定了清楚、始终不变、严格的方法以判定是否存在针对一位仲裁员公正性的合理怀疑，即，关于表面偏见的普通法测试（Locabailv Bayfield案）。此种测试调查是否一个公正且见多识广的观察员在了解了所有事实的基础上会认为存在偏见(Porterv Magill案)。

尽管如此，双方有权在对于一位仲裁员公正性存有顾虑时脱离仲裁程序，即使该等顾虑尚不足以促使法院解除仲裁员。该等问题引发了关于我们是否应改革单边委任系统作为一项解决方案的新争论。

Jan Paulsson 和 Sundaresh Menon SC，与其他人一起，就现状提出了问题。他们不建议废止一方委任的做法但认为需要改进，例如创立一个仲裁员惩戒机构或者改进委任前面试规则。

两个最新的英国法院案例表明产生偏见印象的行为可能不足以达到英国法测试的表面偏见的要求。

1. 英国法院裁定

在Hv L and others案中，H和R是美国诉讼程序中的共同被告。H与L就保单索赔达成和解并企图提出权利主张。L辩称和解不合理且其（当然合理地）并未同意过该等和解。鉴于合作仲裁员无法就第三位仲裁员达成一致，按照仲裁协议该等选任转交高等法院进行。在进行了争论听证会后，Flaux法官选任M作为首席仲裁员。

M披露了在其之前参与的涉及L的仲裁中其担任的角色。H并未在那个阶段对于M的公正性提出任何质疑。但是，在M被任命后，H获悉了一些事实，其随即基于该等事实申请法院将解除M仲裁员。H辩称M的行为足以引发偏见出现，原因是：

• M接受了关于针对R的索赔要求的仲裁程序的仲裁员委任，而上述索赔要求也是基于同一美国诉讼程序。

• M没有将该等委任披露给H知晓。

• M对于针对其公正性的质疑的反应。

M承认“本应谨慎告知H…”，因为双方“相互确信纠纷会在没有偏见并基于证据和法律的基础上公平确定”是非常重要的。

Popplewell J驳回了H的主张，认为公正且见多识广的观察员不会发现任何足以解除M的理由。但是，M的承认暗示其行为给予H合理怀疑其公正性的理由即使该等理由尚不足以达到英国法测试对于表明偏见的要求。

在 SymbionPower LLC v Venco Imtiaz Construction Co案中，法院对于根据AA1996第68条的质疑给予了考虑。但是法官（明显主动地）就Symbion一方委任的仲裁员的行为提出了严重顾虑。

Symbion一方委任的仲裁员向其顾问发了一封标题为“高度机密：不可被用于仲裁”的邮件。该等邮件并未抄送仲裁程序另一方或其他仲裁员。该等邮件表达了对于仲裁庭首席仲裁员的负面态度。

Jefford 法官认为此等单方接触是完全不合适的，因为：

 “任何一方委任一位仲裁员的权利是旨在…给与双方对于仲裁庭平衡性和公平性的信心。一方委任的仲裁员明显不代表委任其的一方，他们有责任作为独立仲裁员且作为一个仲裁庭公平且公正地行事。”

尽管此等单方沟通“可能会引起对于该仲裁员没有公平公正行事的顾虑”，但这并未能（也许令人惊讶地）导致对于该等仲裁员公正性的合理怀疑，因为，与英国法测试相吻合，这会作为一个整体成为案件事实进行考虑。

2. 对未知的恐惧

尽管英国法测试被正确适用，你可以看到双方在上述案件中对于仲裁员的公正性产生合理的顾虑。此等顾虑可能会导致双方对于仲裁程序的公正性产生怀疑。一方是否就其怀疑持有证据不是那么重要；仅凭仲裁庭部分仲裁员对一方产生不利影响的印象足以导致其产生该等怀疑。

该等怀疑通常部分来自于对于一方委任的仲裁员应代表该方的错觉。尽管这种错觉明显不正确，它强调了仲裁是否需要采取措施解决表面偏见问题可能引发对于仲裁程序完整性的怀疑的风险这个问题。

3. 建议

Paulsson 和 Menon的一些提议值得深思。全球普遍接受了英国伦敦国际仲裁院（以下简称“LCIA”）默认委任规则，限制委任前面试时长且确保另一方可以获得面试记录的做法可能会增强双方对于仲裁员公正性和公平性的信心。

一个仲裁员惩戒机构将国家增强对仲裁的信心。特许仲裁员协会（以下简称“CIArb”）应该就建议的惩戒体系进行机构调查。CIArb随后可以对任何有责任的仲裁员进行惩罚，向其他机构发布和通知其调查结果。

但是，严格的审查是必要的。任何建议应巩固仲裁，且被注意适度实施，不得被双方用于作为拖延程序或影响仲裁员决策的战术工具。

【英文】

Arbitratorbias: should we judge a book by its cover?

Tribunals have a fundamental duty to act fairly and impartially under section 33(1)(a) of the English Arbitration Act(“AA 1996“). Where a party feels an arbitrator is failing in their duty, pursuant to section 24(1)(a) of the AA 1996:

“A party to arbitral proceedings may… apply to the court to remove an arbitrator on any of the following grounds –that circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality…”

English law stipulates a clear, consistent and rigorous approach to determining whether there are justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality, namely the common law test of apparent bias (Locabail v Bayfield). This test examines whether the fair-minded and informed observer, looking at all the facts, would consider there to be bias (Porter v Magill).

Despite this, parties may still come away from arbitral proceedings with concerns that an arbitrator is not impartial, even if such concerns are not sufficient for the court to remove the arbitrator. This problem has led to a renewed debate regarding whether we should consider alterations to the system of unilateral appointments as a solution.

Jan Paulsson and Sundaresh Menon SC, among others, have questioned the status quo.They do not suggest the abolition of party nomination but that improvements are needed, such as creating a disciplinary body for arbitrators or improving the rules on pre-appointment interviews.

Two recent English court cases have illustrated that actions creating an impression of bias may not be sufficient to meet the English law test for apparent bias.

What the English courts say

In H v L and others, H and R had been co-defendants in American proceedings. H settled the claim and sought to claim on its insurance policy with L. L argued the settlement was unreasonable and it (reasonably) had not consented to it. As the co-arbitrators could not agree on a third arbitrator, the selection was referred to the High Court under the arbitration agreement. Following a contested hearing, Flaux J selected M.

M disclosed his role in previous arbitrations involving L. H raised no objection to M’s impartiality at that stage. However, following M’s appointment, H learnt of several facts which led to it making an application to court to have M removed as an arbitrator. H argued M’s conduct gave rise to the appearance of bias due to:

• M’s acceptance of appointments in arbitrations relating to claims brought against R arising from the same underlying American proceedings.

• M’s failure to disclose those appointments to H.

• M’s response to the challenge to his impartiality.

M acknowledged that “it would have been prudent for [him] to have informed [H]…”as it was important both parties “should share confidence that the dispute would be fairly determined on the evidence and the law without bias”.

Popplewell J dismissed H’s claims, finding that the fair-minded and informed observer would not have found any grounds to remove M. However, M’s acknowledgments uggests his actions gave H reasonable concerns as to his impartiality even if they were not sufficient to meet the English law test for apparent bias.

In Symbion Power LLC v Venco Imtiaz Construction Co, the court considered a challenge under section 68 ofthe AA 1996. However, serious concerns were also raised by the judge(apparently on her own initiative) regarding the conduct of Symbion’s party-nominated arbitrator.

Symbion’s arbitrator had sent an email to Symbion’s counsel headed “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL:NOT TO BE USED IN THE ARBITRATION”. It was not copied to the other party or arbitrators. The email expressed negative views about the tribunal chairman.

Jefford J stated that such unilateral contact had been wholly inappropriate because:

“the ability of each party to appoint an arbitratoris intended to… give the parties confidence in the balance and fairness of the tribunal. The party-appointed arbitrators patently do not represent the party that appointed them and they are under a duty, as individual arbitrators and as a tribunal, to act fairly and impartially.”

Although such a unilateral communication “may give rise to concerns that the arbitratoris not acting fairly or impartially”, it did not lead (perhaps surprisingly) to there being justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality, as,consistent with the English law test, this would turn on the facts of the case as a whole.

Fear of the unknown

Although the English law test was correctly applied, one can see how the parties in the above cases could nonetheless have come away with reasonable concerns as to the arbitrators’ impartiality. Such concerns may create doubt for parties as to the fairness of arbitration proceedings. It does not necessarily matter whether a party has evidence to support its doubt; the impression that some of the tribunal may be influenced against them is enough to give rise to such doubts.

These doubts often arise in part from the misconception that a party-nominated arbitrator is there to represent the relevant party. While this is clearly incorrect, it highlights the question of whether arbitration needs to take steps to address the risk that issues of apparent bias may give rise to doubts about the integrity of the arbitral process.

What can be done?

Some of Paulsson and Menon’s proposals merit serious consideration. Universal adoption of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA“) default appointment rule, limiting the length of pre-nomination interviews and ensuring transcripts of such interviews are made available to the other sidemay increase parties’ confidence in the impartiality and fairness of arbitrators.

A disciplinary body for arbitrators would inspire greater confidence in arbitration. The proposed disciplinary system would start with an institutional investigation followed by a Charter Institute of Arbitrators (“CIArb“) investigation. CIArb could then punish any guilty arbitrator, publishing, and notifying other institutions of its findings.

However,rigorous scrutiny is required. Any proposals must strengthen arbitration and so care must be taken that they are properly implemented and cannot be used by parties as a tactical tool to delay proceedings or influence arbitrators’ decision-making.

By Michael Taylor - Hogan Lovells