《英国仲裁法（1996）》第69条对裁决上诉的限制适用

更新时间：2018-02-01 16:05:08  张振安 临时仲裁ADA 编辑：lianluobu  点击次数：1767次

在英国为仲裁地的仲裁中，尽管是在特定有限的情况下，《英国仲裁法（1996）》第69条允许当事人可以就仲裁裁决中的英国法律问题向法院提起上诉。英国高院最近关于“CV Stealth” [2017] EWHC 2808一案的判决表明了寻求该救济时需要谨慎考虑。

1. 《1996英国仲裁法》第69条规定

英国仲裁法第69条规定了当事人对仲裁法律问题可上诉制度，第69条第（1）款规定：

“除非当事人另有约定，仲裁程序的一方当事人（经通知其他当事人和仲裁庭）可就仲裁程序中所作的裁决的法律问题向法院上诉。

当事人约定仲裁庭作出不附具理由裁决的，应视为约定排除法院根据本条所具有的管辖权。”

第69条第（3）款进一步规定，法院仅在其认为符合下列条件时准许上诉：（a）问题的决定将实质性地影响一方或多方当事人的权利，（b）问题是仲裁庭被请求作出决定的，（c）根据裁决书中认定的事实：（i）仲裁庭对问题的决定明显错误，或（ii）问题具有普遍的公共重要性，仲裁庭对此作出的决定至少存在重大疑问，以及（d）尽管当事人约定通过仲裁解决争议，但在任何情况下由法院对该问题进行判决是公正和适当的。此外，第70条第（2）款规定上诉人应首先用尽任何可资利用的仲裁内上诉或复审程序以及裁决更正或补充裁决等追诉手段。

 

2. 当事人可以约定排除对裁决的上诉

由于第69条属于非强制性条款，当事人可以约定不受该条约束。因此，为了保证仲裁裁决的终局性，可以通过以下方式达到排除该条适用的目的：

（1）仲裁条款可以明确约定排除；

（2）通过仲裁机构的仲裁规则，规则中含有合理排除对裁决进行上诉的规定，例如：

• 伦敦国际仲裁院（LCIA）规则26.8条规定：

26.8  Every award (including reasons for suchaward) shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake tocarry out any award immediately and without any delay (subject only to Article27); and the parties also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal,review or recourse to any state court or other legal authority, insofar as such waiver shall not beprohibited under any applicable law.

• 国际商会（ICC）规则第35.6条规定：

Every award shall be binding on theparties. By submitting the dispute to arbitration under the Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award without delay andshall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar assuch waiver can validly be made.

 

3. 第69条适用的限制：仅限于英国法问题

即使当事人未选择排除适用仲裁法第69条规定，该条的适用仍受限制，也就是上诉必须针对裁决中的英国法律问题。

 

4.“CV Stealth”一案的认定

Popplewell法官在“CV Stealth”一案裁定，对裁决的上诉不能扩展到诸如仲裁员对事实问题涉及的法律（正确）适用或程序性的正当决定——无论申请人如何掩饰这些问题（the arbitrator’s application of facts to the (correct) law, orlegitimate procedural decisions – howsoever dressed up by an applicant）。

 

5.  “CV Stealth”案件事实和Popplewell法官的裁定

 “CV Stealth”轮是一艘滞留在委内瑞拉的船只。承租人指令该船到委内瑞拉港为第三方运载原油。但是租船人并不知悉该批原油属于非法从委内瑞拉出口的原油的一部分。等船舶进入港口并被当局命令留滞在港口时该问题才曝光（尽管船东及承租人为释放该船已尝试了多次努力，但是该命令仍未被解除）。

船东（与承租人一样均未涉入违法计划）向承租人主张船只扣留而遭受的损害赔偿。2015年9月的部分裁决中，仲裁庭认为应由承租人承担一定的赔偿责任以及承租人承担相关租约中关于船只遭遇风险的违约责任。仲裁庭还认为承租人的指示是船只被扣留的实际原因（Popplewell法官在本案的早期诉讼程序中维持了该裁决[2016] EWHC 880）。

在该裁决作出后，船只仍被扣留在委内瑞拉。船东和承租人都尝试说服当地法院解除对该船舶的扣押。仲裁庭于2017年5月又作出了一份不利于承租人的裁决，包括需赔偿船东自第一份裁决作出之日起的留置费用。但是承租人认为第一份裁决作出之后是法院拒绝释放船舶，认为是船只被扣留的唯一有效原因。但是，仲裁庭并未认可其说法，并认为该等行为仅与2015年裁决作出前其已采取的其他行动如出一辙。

承租人根据仲裁法第69条对该裁决提起上诉，特别主张仲裁庭存在法律错误，因为其有义务审议当地法院行为对损害的持续影响。但是，Popplewell法官并不认可该主张。考虑到海运背景的适用标准以及相关判例，提出了该仲裁庭是否误解或错误适用了上述标准和判例的问题，仲裁庭作出的裁决很显然适用了正确的标准，也并没有误解或错误适用该标准和判例，并且其显然已认识到了相关标准。既然这样，上诉并没有涉及任何法律问题；与法院行为相关的仲裁庭认定仅是该标准下被适用的事实性结论（the arbitrators’ findings as the relevance of the local court’sconduct simply being a factual conclusion being applied in the context of thattest.）。

船东根据第69条对裁决提起上诉的请求也没有得到支持，原因类似。船东试图以裁决应当扣除节省的干船坞费用来挑战裁决。船东认为这涉及到严格法律原则的适用问题，并认为仲裁庭并未适用这些原则。Popplewell法官并未认可该意见，认为该裁决属于一种合法的“待决”方式，并且符合为评估未来意外费用造成损失的原则。既然如此，该上诉事项为试图对合法的案件裁决提出异议而并非涉及法律问题。

 

6. 结论

法院判决表明，法院将根据仲裁法第69条规定审查对裁决的上诉是否真正地涉及英国法律问题。如以往一样，即使可能适用该条款的情况下，对裁决提起异议的申请人也需要仔细考虑这样做是否有适当的依据。

[英文原文]

 

No appeals on a point of law by stealth

the limits of s.69 Arbitration Act 1996

In an English seated arbitration,s.69 Arbitration Act 1996 permits, albeit under certain limited circumstances,an appeal to the court on a question of English law arising from an arbitralaward. The High Court’s recent decision in “The CV Stealth” [2017] EWHC 2808 illustrates the needto think carefully about such a course of action.

An introduction tos.69 Arbitration Act 1996 (the “Act”)

In an English seatedarbitration, s.69 of the Act provides one potential basis upon which anaggrieved party may seek to challenge an eventual award – specifically on thebasis of an appeal to the court on a question of English law arising from theaward.  The availability of s.69 is, however, subject to severalrestrictions. Importantly it is a non-mandatory section of the Act, so partiescan contract out of it. This, in the interests of finality of the award, theyoften do (whether explicitly in their arbitration clause or through the use ofinstitutional rules insofar as they contain an appropriately worded exclusion,e.g. LCIA Rules Article 26.8, ICC Rules 35.6 (which have, in England, been heldto be effective for such purposes)).

But even if theparties have not opted out of its application, s.69 is subject to several otherlimitations and restrictions. One of these is that the appeal must involve aquestion of English law arising out of the award. As Popplewell J’s decision in“The CV Stealth” illustrates, this will not extend, for example, to thearbitrator’s application of facts to the (correct) law, or legitimateprocedural decisions – howsoever dressed up by an applicant. 

The facts of the “CVStealth” and the ruling of Popplewell J

The “CV Stealth” wasa ship detained in Venezuela. Its charterers had ordered it into a Venezuelanport to pick up crude oil for a third party. Unbeknown to the charterers, thiscargo was part of an attempt to unlawfully export oil from Venezuela. This plancame to light whilst the ship was in port and led to the local authoritiesordering it to remain there (an order which remained despite numerous attemptson the part of the owners, and the charterers, to get it released).  

The owners (who, like thecharterers, were not involved in the unlawful plan) claimed compensation fromthe charterers for losses arising out of the detention of the ship. In apartial award of September 2015 the arbitrator held that the charterers wereliable for these on the basis of certain indemnities, and breach of a termconcerning exposure of the ship to such risks, in the relevant charter-party. Thearbitrator also found that the charterer’s instruction was an effective causeof the detention of the ship (a decision upheld by Popplewell J in earlierproceedings in the case:[2016] EWHC 880).

Following that award,the ship remained detained in Venezuela. The attempts on the part of theowners, and the charterers, to persuade the local court to release the shipcontinued. The arbitrator then made a further award, in May 2017, against thecharterers including the owner’s expenses of detention since the first award.In those proceedings, the charterers sought to rely on what it saw as anincreasingly retractable refusal of the Venezuelan courts, since the firstaward, to release the vessel. This, in its view, had accordingly become thesole effective cause of the ship’s detention. The arbitrator disagreed, seeingsuch conduct simply “of a piece” with what had been experienced prior to the2015 award.

The charterers soughtto challenge this conclusion under s.69 of the Act. In particular, theyasserted that the arbitrator had made an error of law because he was obliged toconsider the cumulative effect of the local court’s acts as a matter of the lawof causation. Popplewell J, however, rejected this. He considered theappropriate test and the relevant authorities in the shipping context and thenasked the question whether the arbitrator had misunderstood or misapplied thesame; it was clear from his award, which referred to the correct test, that hehad not done and that he was plainly aware of the relevant test. That being thecase, there was no question of law raised by the appeal; the arbitrators’findings as the relevance of the local court’s conduct simply being a factualconclusion being applied in the context of that test.

An attempt by theowners to invoke s.69 also failed for similar reasons. They attempted tochallenge a decision of the arbitrator to deduct sums from its award for saveddrydocking expenses. The owners claimed this involved the application of strictlegal principles which, in their view, had not been applied. Popplewell Jdisagreed holding that this decision had been taken as part of a legitimate“wait and see” approach in line with principles established for the assessmentof loss dependent upon future contingencies. That being the case, the complaintwas correctly categorised as an attempt to challenge a legitimate casemanagement decision – and did not involve a question of law.

Conclusions

The court’s decision showsthat it will forensically examine appeals brought under the auspices of s.69 asto whether they are truly an appeal concerning a point of English law. As ever,even where the section is potentially available, applicants looking tochallenge an award will need to think carefully about whether this is really anappropriate basis for doing so.

By Stephen Lacey